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Theory and Social Education : The Theme and the Issue
It may be fitting that this, our last issue as editors of the Journal,
should be devoted to the theme of theory in social education . While the
title of this journal is Theory and Research in Social Education, there
has been little systematic attention given in these pages to the concept
"theory." "Why," one might ask, "does this occur?" Perhaps it is assumed
that the meaning of "theory" is known and the task at hand is practical
and not reflective. Or one might feel some hesitancy in tackling the prob-
lem because of the juxtaposition of "theory" to "research" in the
journal's title . One might consider that theory is somehow different from
research rather than the two standing in unity . Or perhaps at the heart of
the matter are structural issues which limit discussion. A quick glance at
graduate programs, for example, might reveal an emphasis upon the pro-
cedures of research (statistical procedures, field methods, problems in
research designs and so on) creating an illusion that methodological
problems stand as distinct and separate from the conceptual lenses and
theories that guide scientific discourse .
Traditions of professional education and categorical dichotomies
often limit our self-reflection, and thus our practices may work against
our ability to do science . At the center of that self-reflection should be
the nature and meaning of theory . All empirical work contains theoreti-
cal assumptions about the nature of the phenomena investigated . There is
no data outside of theory . Scientific invention, imagination and creativity
are tied to theory. A substantive element of our scientific discourse,
therefore, must give attention to the nature and character of theory .
The issue of theory is intensified in a scientific community that values
pluralism . Much of the sociology and history of science in the West has
emphasized the importance of different theoretical positions . It is argued
that the conflict produced by different intellectual approaches is central
to the vitality of inquiry . The cross-fertilization of ideas is thought to
prevent the crystalization and stagnation of inquiry . The competition
among different intellectual perspectives strengthens the validity of social
inquiry, compensating for unavoidable biases resulting from the fact that
scientists are human beings, unable to isolate their socio-political selves
from their scientific selves . The confrontation of different ideas is also
thought essential to the creativity and imagination of scientific work .
The conflict in the social and educational sciences is, in part, the
result of the various conceptual perspectives brought to bear upon the
problems of schooling. We think about classrooms as "linguistic commu-
nities," places of "decision-making" or "socialization," as containing "per-
spectives on teaching" or as representing "moral stages of development ."
In each instance, a conceptual perspective provides a series of words that
guides us in a particular way to see and talk about classrooms or schools .
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Each conceptual perspective provides a form to theory by orienting us
to the phenomena of study. As relationships are identified and illustrated
from the observations of school, the theories further take on an empiri-
cal character, being extended, modified or refuted by the data drawn
from the ongoing world .
Much of the debate in the social and educational sciences had given
focus to the conceptual and empirical problems of theory . Should one
view classroom activities as "socialization" or "decision-making"? What is
not considered when a conceptual perspective is used? How can our con-
ceptual lenses be made more rigorous and theoretically potent?
Theoretical conflict in social science can be thought of as the result of
different underlying assumptions, commitments and values that guide
research . Thomas Kuhn's work on the history of science calls attention to
different paradigms or disciplinary matrices that compete within schol-
arly disciplines. The different conceptual perspectives that were previous-
ly seen in conflict can now be viewed as not so much in conflict about
assumptions but as in competition within a paradigm . While providing
different ways of selecting and organizing data, much of the research
conducted in "political socialization," "decision-making" or "moral
reasoning," for example, contains coherence in certain paradigmatic
assumptions . These assumptions evolve around what is called behavioral
sciences, social sciences which posit a vision of human affairs in which
there are lawlike regularities and which maintain methodological commit-
ments to theory based upon observable phenomena and the development
of formal languages of argument .
The idea of paradigm, therefore, directs attention, first, to the inter-
relation of assumptions, commitments and theories that give direction to
a science and, second, to the interplay of the different paradigms in giv-
ing coherence to scientific work . It would be inadequate for example, to
view the commitments and theoretical positions within the behavioral
sciences in isolation. Behavioral sciences exist within a dynamic context
of other paradigms that also articulate views of science and of theory . In
a different context it has been argued that there are at least three para-
digms that give direction to scientific interests in education .' These are :
(1) empirical-analytic, an approach that encompass the behavioral
sciences' focus upon a search for law-like regularities in human conduct ;
(2) symbolic or interpretive sciences which focus upon how human inter-
actions produce rule-making and rule-governed actions, and (3) critical
sciences which adopt the sociological motif of debunking, seeking to illu-
minate the ways in which social relations have developed and the mech-
anism of social life that obscure social interests .
'Thomas S . Popkewitz, Paradigms and Field-Based Methodologies in Educational Research
and Evaluation, in The Study of Schooling, T . S . Popkewitz and B. R . Tabachnick
(eds .), New York, Praeger, 1981 .
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Of central importance in these different paradigms is the different
meaning of and use for educational theory . Rather than one view of
theory, there are multiple views, each containing the root assumptions,
commitments and values that are drawn from its paradigmatic tradition .
The empirical analytic sciences, for example, direct attention to a mean-
ing of theory concerned with increasing the administrative efficiency of
social institutions . The experimental quality of much of this research pro-
motes theory that is concerned with the appropriate application of tech-
nique to realize defined goals under given conditions . Symbolic or inter-
pretive sciences seek to generate theory that clarifies the conditions
under which improved communication leads to more "productive" social
interactions. The theoretical concern of the critical sciences is with
uncovering the pretensions, deceptions, self-deceptions and propa-
ganda through which people cloak their actions with each other .
Where the first two paradigms involve the development of theories
that are to lead directly to the improvement of our social conditions, the
latter is a negative science . For the critical science, the purpose of theory
is to uncover the past that is embedded in the present, and that limits the
potential and possibilities of our existence . The theoretical purpose and
the nature of descriptive and explanatory qualities represented in each of
the paradigms represent different but complementary paths to scientific
knowledge about our human condition .
It is our view that different meanings to theory are a normal and inte-
gral element of the human enterprise that we call science. It is "normal"
because the social scientist lives in the world s/he studies and draws the
language of inquiry from the commonsense experiences and events of
that world . These experiences involve continual conflicts with people
arguing for different paths to salvation . The different paths (liberal, con-
servative, radical socialist and the vast range between) contain visions
about community, social order and individuality . As with that larger
world in which we live, the various paradigms in educational research
represent the deeper conflict and debate of our human conditions . Our
sciences can never be aloof from these larger debates but partisan. Yet,
to illuminate the different meanings of theory is to enlarge our under-
standing of human and educational science and thereby increase its
possibilities .
It is to the different meanings, purposes and values that underlie
theory that the issue devotes its attention. James Shaver challenges the
belief that an adequate, positivistic theory can be developed in an educa-
tional science . He suggests that the question of theory should be reori-
ented to include broader considerations about what data should be col-
lected and for what purposes . Social theory, he suggests, is distinctly dif-
ferent from natural science theory and, in the context of education, may
be directed toward a "more adequate knowledge informing decisions ."
Cleo Cherryholmes and Henry Giroux draw upon European traditions of
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critical theory to consider the purpose and nature of theory . Cherry-
holmes argues that social studies education contains epistemological and
ideological structures that have been uncritically accepting of the repro-
ductive aspects of society . Drawing upon continental social theory and,
in particular the Frankfurt School of social theory, Cherryholmes pro-
poses an alternative set of assumptions and characteristics of theoretical
and practical discourse for schooling . Giroux' article provides a compre-
hensive review, analysis and interpretation of the Frankfurt School of
social theory . His purpose is to identify theoretical assumptions that can
unify understanding, critique and transformations in social education .
Max Stephens also poses a skepticism towards conventional notions of
theory by considering the problem of generalization . He suggests that
educators have been overly concerned with procedural questions of
generalization, leaving unscrutinized the theoretical basis of a science of
education . On one hand Stephens agrees with Shaver's basic agreement
about the limitations of conceptual notions of theory in education . His
argument, however, seeks to redefine the meaning of generalization and
therefore the view of theory that is appropriate . In this discussion, the
nature of appropriate procedures and data of research is broadened to
include nonstatistically based methodologies . Stephens, as do Giroux and
Cherryholmes, accepts the idea that theory and practical discourse are
interrelated . A different, linguistic, perspective is developed by Angene
Wilson. She focuses upon the meaning of theory through theories of lan-
guages and arrives at different but complementary forms by which
theoretical knowledge can be developed .
Taken as a whole, the essays suggest that the nature and character of
theory must be viewed problematically and as reflecting sets of assump-
tions and values that respond to our pluralistic traditions . These tradi-
tions, as the essays suggest, do not lie solely in scholarly life but emerge
from and are to social and cultural life .
The examination of the meaning, assumptions and values found in
theories of social education leads us to consider one further dimension of
the discussion of theory . As the authors clearly illustrate, the creation of
theory has not only "ideational" purposes but practical functions as well .
Whether we label the theory as having importance to decision-makers or
to ideological structures in society, there seems to be agreement that the
nature of theory is to influence the practical elements of our daily life .
Theory does not only describe and interpret . It selects, organizes and
channels our thought towards what is appropriate and reasonable as
possibilities of our existence . As such our underlying assumptions of
theory influence the conceptions of content, our adaptation of teaching
strategies and our rationales for the organization of curriculum . Ques-
tions of theory and fact become interrelated with views about what we
want society to be as well as what we think society is . This latter point
raises questions about our traditional position of empirical theory as
distinct from normative theory .
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As our three year tenure as editors comes to an end, it is important
that we acknowledge the many people who have helped us in the publica-
tion of the journal . The College and University Faculty Assembly Execu-
tive Committee has given us support and advice that has been invaluable .
In particular we would like to thank Gerald Marker and Murry Nelson
who, through the years, have helped us through crises of finance . In
addition, we would like to thank many people who have served on the
editorial board and as reviewers . Their sound advice about journal policy
and articles has strengthened the contributions found on the pages of this
journal. The review process has served to maintain peer involvement in
article selection as well as insightful comments for both authors and
editors to consider .
We must acknowledge the administrative assistance provided by the
University of Wisconsin-Madison and our Department of Curriculum
and Instruction. The Department has provided expert editorial assistance
over three years . These include Emmanual Ekpunobi, Chwee Lye Chung
and, for the past two years, Paula Bozoian . In particular Ms. Bozoian's
editorial knowledge and printing savvy have helped to produce a more
polished and artful journal. It is to Donna Schleicher that we owe what-
ever organizational efficiency there is . She has ensured that checks were
deposited in the correct accounts, that university procedures were fol-
lowed without having them burden the publishing effort, and just
watched over the editors as a guardian angel . Carol Newland has always
come through in a pinch to type ; Diane Falkner has overseen the interna-
tional mailing . Finally, we need to thank the UW-Madison Publications
Office, in particular Gabrielle Cooke . Their expertise with typesetting
and paste-up, and their work as liaison with our printers enabled us to
minimize the cost of the journal while increasing its esthetic appeal .
During the three years there have been some policy changes in the
journal that, we think, have helped to improve its quality . For the past
two years, the editorial board met at the NCSS convention to discuss
policy and advise the editors . We think this is a positive policy which
helps increase involvement of our colleagues in the journal and also pro-
vides the editors with ideas that can only help to improve the journal . In
addition, there have been two theme issues ; one on the history of social
studies, which appeared last winter, and the current issue on theory in
social education . The themes provided a way in which the editors were
able to focus upon issues central to the vitality of the field but that have
not received adequate attention in the journal . The introduction of
themes, however, did not reduce peer review policy or access to the jour-
nal that is so important.
Editors: Thomas S . Popkewitz
B. Robert Tabachnick
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Reappraising the Theoretical Goals of
Research in Social Education
James P . Shaver
Utah State University
The 1960s and early 1970s were a time for optimism about the future
of educational research generally and social studies research in particular .
Federal funding for educational research on a moderately large scale had
become a reality during the late 1950s . It was assumed by many, in-
cluding me, that with more research would come an accretion of findings
that would lead to validated generalizations and, finally, to confirmed
theory. The basic epistemological assumption was, in Pillemer and
Light's (1980) later words, that "as more and more data accumulate un-
der improved experimental conditions, knowledge [will] converge upon
an underlying truth" (p. 193) .
By the mid-1970s, however, it was becoming clear to many observers
that the theoretical promise was not coming to pass . Research results
were collecting, but sound generalizations and, especially, validated edu-
cational theory were not . Certainly, knowledge was not accumulating in
the sense of the theory of the "hard" sciences that has allowed for precise
prediction and control (see, e.g ., Cronbach, 1975, p . 125; Larkins &
McKinney, 1980, p . 14) and provided the basis for engineering feats in
space, communications, weaponry, and medicine that have often seemed
on the verge of moving us into science fiction futures .
Expressions of dismay about the lack of accumulated knowledge from
educational research-and social studies research in particular-are com-
mon. As Gage (1978) noted : "Most reviewers of research on teaching
have concluded their reports by saying that past work has been essen-
' My appreciation to A . Guy Larkins for his usual incisive, helpful comments on an earlier
draft of this article. Despite several revisions, I am sure that he will continue to disagree
with much of what is said herein, in large part because we are operating from different
tenets of faith - a circumstance not openly or widely enough recognized in disputes over
approaches to educational research .
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tially fruitless" (p . 229) . My own skeptical view (Shaver, 1979b) was that
"there would have been little discernible effect on educational practice if
most of the studies reported in educational journals and dissertations had
never been conducted" (p. 3). Clifford (1973, p . 23) summarized similar
views . In the social studies area specifically, Wiley (1977) indicated that
"Many reviewers have expressed concern over the lack of a cumulative
research base in social studies/social science education" (p . 165), and
findings in the area of effectiveness and efficiency of instructionial
methods and techniques appear to be "fairly chaotic" with "few con-
clusions that one can endorse with much confidence and few guidelines
for practitioners" (p . 171) .
It is not that educational research has had no impact on school prac-
tices. As Clifford (1973) noted, occasionally studies-not necessarily the
least deficient or most sophisticated in design and execution-have in-
fluenced schooling . But, overall, educational research, including that in
social studies, has not fulfilled the theoretical expectations to which the
successes of the physical sciences led us to aspire .
The reasons offered for the shortfall have been many . To some
analysts (e .g ., Kerlinger, 1977), the difficulty was strategic : a failure to
focus sufficiently on basic as opposed to applied research . Others sug-
gested that methodological shortcomings niight be the obstacle : for ex-
ample, an over-reliance on inferential statistics and infrequent replication
of findings (e.g ., Shaver, 1979a, b) ; the lack of adequate attention to
population-sampling considerations (Brickell, 1974 ; Shaver & Norton,
1980a, b); the overemphasis on quantitative, group experimental designs
and too few efforts by researchers to set their studies in theoretical con-
texts (e.g ., Shaver & Larkins, 1973); and the use of insufficient means
for synthesizing research findings (Glass, 1977 ; Jackson, 1978) .
Some assessors of educational and psychological research even began
to raise a more ominous possibility : developing more sophisticated
methods, trying to be more "scientific," even paying greater attention to
research-theory relationships, would not produce the desired payoffs in
scientific theory. These commentators (e.g., Gergen, 1973 ; Cronbach,
1975; Shaver, 1979b) argued that a change in goals might be necessary .
The prognosis for scientific theory in education is still unclear . What
follows is a discussion of some of the issues related to the prospects for
educational research which leads to nomothetic, scientific
theories-theories that "ideally tell us the necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for a particular result," allow the forecasting of outcomes "with a
reasonable margin of error," once parameters are specified, and include
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statements of the "boundary conditions that limit [their] application"
(Cronbach, 1975, p . 125 ; also see Larkins & McKinney, 1980, p . 14) 2
Educational Research as Immature Science
How can the paucity of theoretical outcomes from educational re-
search be accounted for? One explanation could be that educational re-
search is a relatively young field and pessimism about its theoretical fu-
ture is premature (Suppes, 1974) . Some five decades ago, John Dewey
(1929) commented on the immaturity of the "sciences which must be
drawn upon to supply content to the work of the practitioner in educa-
tion" (p. 40), and noted that "education is still in a condition of transi-
tion from an empirical to a scientific status" (p . 14) .
Dewey has not been alone in his appraisal of scientific immaturity in
educational research, an assessment which is implicitly optimistic in
regard to potential . Science historian Thomas Kuhn (1970a, c), one of
the major challengers of the "accretion" or "development-by-accumula-
tion" view of science, 3 cites the social sciences as examples of "immature"
sciences (1970c, pp . 15, 160-1) . Not only is educational research a subset
of the social sciences, with special commonalities with social psychology,
but Kuhn's characterization of immature sciences sounds very much like
contemoporary educational research - "there is a multiplicity of com-
z This article might have been introduced by an extensive definition of "scientific theory,"
but such a discussion did not seem pertinent . A few comments to elaborate on the
references to scientific theory in the preceding paragraphs should suffice .
To be scientifically acceptable, a theory must lead to accurate explanations and pre-
dictions within the set of phenomena defined as within its scope . Such theory is universal,
in the sense that it must apply to all of the referent phenomena . For example, chemical
reactions are assumed not to be governed by different principles today than they were in
the eighteenth century, although our understanding of the reactions does differ . At the
same time, accepted theory may be incomplete . For example, Newtonian dynamics theory
did not provide adequate solutions to problems in which the velocity of bodies was large
compared to the velocity of light . In fact, if Kuhn (1970c) is correct, it is in large part the
dissonance created by such exceptions that leads to the development of new theories .
Moreover, contrary to logical positivist tenets, accepted theories can conflict with one
another . For example, acceptance of Einstein's relativistic dynamics does not entail the
conclusion that the Newtonian theory of dynamics was wrong . Despite the greater com-
prehensiveness of Einsteinian theory, Newtonian dynamics is still used successfully by
engineers and physicists for selected applications . (See Kuhn, 1970c ; pp. 98-110 .)
3 See Suppe (1977) . Kuhn's view of scientific revolutions has not gone unchallenged (see
Lakatos & Musgrave, 1970; Wade, 1973 ; Suppe, 1977). In fact, Suppe contended that, by
1977, while the Weltenschauungen analysts, such as Kuhn and Feyerbrand, were still
developing their ideas and the ideas were still being discussed in the philosophical
literature, "contemporary philosophy of science, although strongly influenced by [them],
has gone beyond . . . and the Weltenschauugen views, in a word, today are passe" (pp .
633-4) . That is a rather strong judgment at a time when Kuhn's writings are just beginning
to infiltrate the social studies research literature . Suppe's judgment is not shared by Gale
(1979) who believes that Kuhn's idea of paradigms is accepted as significant by "most
students of the sciences" (p . 75) .
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peting schools [and] evidence of progress, except within schools, is hard
to find" (1970c, p. 163) .
To apply Kuhn's idea of mature and immature science it is necessary
to define "paradigm" - the key concept in his The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions (first published in 1962) . According to Kuhn, a paradigm is
what the members of a scientific community ("the practitioners of a
scientific specialty" [Kuhn, 1977, p. 461]) share "that enable[s] them to
solve puzzles and that account[s] for their relative unanimity in problem-
choice and in the evaluation of problem solutions" (Kuhn, 1970b, p .
271) .
Kuhn (1970b, 1977) has, however, agreed with Masterman (1970 ; also
see Suppe, 1977, pp . 136-137) that his use of "paradigm" was, at best,
ambiguous. Because the multiple meanings of the word were the basis for
so many misunderstandings among his critics, Kuhn (1970b) suggested
that a better term would have been "disciplinary matrix ." His definition
of that term suggests more clearly what it is that a mature scientific com-
munity shares in a paradigm . Included are "symbolic generalizations,"
"models . . . metaphysical . . . or heuristic," "values, like . . . accuracy
of prediction," and other elements such as "concrete problem solutions,
the . . . standard examples of solved problems . . . encounter[ed] first in
student laboratories, in the problems at the ends of chapters in science
texts, and on examinations" (pp. 271-272; also see 1977, p. 462ff) .
Initially, Kuhn considered immature sciences to be in a pre-paradigm
state (1970c, e.g ., pp. 11, 13, 18-20, 163) . Indeed, he was led to recog-
nize the central role of paradigms in scientific research during a year at
the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Science when he "was
struck by the number and extent of the overt disagreements between
social scientists about the nature of legitimate scientific problems and
methods . . . [and by] the controversies over fundamentals that today
often seem endemic among, say, psychologists or sociologists" - as con-
trasted with those who practice "astronomy, physics, chemistry, or
biology" (1970c, p . viii) . He commented, "It remains an open question
what parts of social science have yet acquired such paradigms at all"
(1970c, p . 15) .
In pre-paradigm, immature research fields, all potentially relevant
facts seem to be equally pertinent, and fact-gathering tends to be
somewhat random and confined to readily available data (Kuhn, 1970c,
p. 15). There can, however, be "a sort of scientific research" (p . 11),
although the result of the research activity is "something less than
science" (p . 13 ; also see pp . 16, 163). In the pre-paradigm state, writing
books is an important task because each researcher starts again from the
beginning . Laymen can grasp the field by reading original research
reports because there is not a shared esoteric professional paradigm (pp .
13, 20) .
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Masterman (1970, pp . 73-4) took strong exception to this view of pre-
paradigm, immature science, and suggested that it was more valid to
think in terms of "non-paradigm" science - which is largely philosophic
- and "multiple-paradigm" science where, rather than no paradigm,
there are too many . The latter, she argued, is the status of the social
sciences. Many have quite advanced technologies, but often within fields
that intuition indicates are overly narrow and trivial . There are specific
but discordant operational definitions . And "discussion on fundamentals
remains, and long-run progress (as opposed to local progress) fails to oc-
cur" (p. 74) .
Kuhn (1970b, p . 272; 1977, p. 460) concurred with Masterman's
analysis, but noted that his description of immaturity still stood . That is,
in immature sciences there are a number of competing schools, each
coming at the same subject matter in a different way-and, it should be
emphasized, with considerable controversy and little clear overall prog-
ress .
Educational research clearly fits Kuhn's view of immature science . 4
Much of it, as with other social sciences, appears to be multi-paradigm ;
but research in social studies education appears to be pre-paradigm -
or, in Masterman's terms, non-paradigm . As Metcalf (1963) noted, after
looking at three major summaries of social studies research:
The three summaries suggest that research on teaching the social
studies has not been guided by a framework or theory that would
make possible a distinction between basic and trivial investigations .
(p . 933)
There are competing conceptions of social studies education but not
competing schools of social studies education research . There is
philosophical debate, not paradigm competition . And, there is a basic
absence of research thrust, a lack which appears to be notable even for
educational research. Is the dearth of theory-research relationships (i .e .,
research guided by theory, and theory articulated, specified, reformu-
lated, and applied by research [Kuhn, 1970c, Ch . 3], as well as chal-
lenged by anomalous findings [Ch . 6]) a function only of the immaturity
of the field?
Can Social Studies Research Yield Theory?
The consideration of scientific immaturity as a possible explanation
for the lack of theoretical fruitfulness of a social science > educational >
social studies researchs has, as I have noted, a certain optimistic ring .
Immaturity implies the possibility, if not an explicit likelihood, of
maturity . Less hopeful is the view implicit in the common distinction be-
° For a recent demonstration of this point, see ornstein and Levin (1981) .
5 Read: "Social science research which encompasses educational research which encompasses
social studies education research ."
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tween the "hard" and "soft" sciences, based on the ability of the research
field to establish validated truth with its particular subject matter . Clear-
ly, social science > educational > social studies research falls at the soft
science pole as far as sound theory is concerned .
Boulding (1980) has, however, disputed the hard-soft science image as
illusionary . He proposed that it is more valid to think in terms of
"secure" and "insecure" fields of knowledge, with secure fields those in
which knowledge is not likely to change rapidly . And, he argued, some
fields of knowledge about humans typically thought of as "soft," such as
human history, are undoubtedly more secure than some fields of knowl-
edge thought of as "hard" science, such as paleontology . Moreover,
Boulding introduced a note of hopefulness by directly denying that there
is a "single `scientific method,' a touchstone that can distinguish what is
scientific from what is not" (p. 833), and by calling for the development
of research methods appropriate to different epistemological fields .
Boulding's call is not only congruent with Kuhn's emphasis on
research methodology as a distinct part of the paradigms that guide
research in scientific fields,, but with admonitions to educational re-
searchers (including social studies educators) to analyze the ap-
propriateness of their methodologies for coming to know about human
behavior and about processes of human learning in particular (see, e.g .,
Shaver, 1979a, b, 1980) . Is it realistic to expect that appropriate research
methods and strategies can be found so that educational research will not
only becomed a more secure field of knowledge but will mature as a
science?
One answer is suggested by the attributes of Boulding's insecure fields
of knowledge . They are ones in which "the available data only cover a
small part of the total field . . ., the actual structures and relationships
. . . are extremely complex . . . [as, e .g.,] our knowledge of human
behavior," the events studied are not "common and repeatable-at-will,"
and extreme, but important events which have low probabilities are dif-
ficult to study (pp. 834-5). These are attributes of social science > educa-
tional > social studies research, and it is dubious that attention to
methodology can overcome the obstacles to scientific theory-building
which they present . I continue to be impressed by the thoughts of Gergen
(1973), Cronbach (1975), and Snow (1977) in this regard .
Gergen (1973) addressed theory-building in social psychology, which
has much in common with education. He argued that
unlike the natural sciences [social psychology] deals with facts that
are largely nonrepeatable [see Dewey, 1929, p . 65] and which fluc-
tuate markedly over time . Principles of human interaction cannot
readily be developed over time because the facts on which they are
based do not generally remain stable . . . [and] such knowledge
does not generally transcend its historical boundaries . (p. 310)
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Others, such as Cameron (1963), have discussed the difficulties in ap-
plying experimental methods from the physical and biological sciences to
research with humans . Included are greater uncertainty that a sample will
represent the population ; greater likelihood that the research will change
that which is the subject of investigation ; the effects of the researcher on
the outcomes of the research (i .e., experimenter effects) ; greater difficul-
ty in controlling relevant variables . Boulding (1980) suggested correctly
that experimental methods are only one among many ways to gain
knowledge about human behavior . But Gergen has gone further than
Cameron, both in discussing the shortcomings of research with humans
and by not limiting his discussion to experimentation .
According to Gergen (1973), cultural changes over time invalidate
social science research findings and make the building of theory in regard
to human behavior a tenuous process . Moreover, he argued, research
plays a significant role in such changes . Those who study human interac-
tions have values in regard to social relations that not only influence the
selection of research topics and methods, but also lead to prescriptive
reports . 6 In addition, social science research results are widely dissemi-
nated, thereby changing behavior dispositions in two ways : people are
enlightened - they become more sensitive to the effects of the variables
and react accordingly ; and people may strive to invalidate findings that
seem to suggest a conception of humanness to which they object . The
dissemination of research results might be restricted in the interest of
validity, but that hardly seems desirable, especially in education . Or, a
theory might be constructed to account for the reactive effects of re-
search dissemination; but that theory, too, Gergen argued, would create
reactions which would need to be taken into account, and so on ad in-
finitum .
Gergen's contentions have not received widespread attention . The arti-
cle did generate some negative reactions (e .g ., Schlenker, 1974)' and at
least one positive reference to it as a "telling event" (Buss, 1975) . Cron-
bach (1975) concurred with Gergen's analysis, but added another dimen-
sion to skepticism about building scientific theory through educational
research - the complex interactions between such factors as treatment
characteristics, person traits, and situational dimensions that are not only
6 The human-social factor may well play a more central role in the scientific nonproductivi-
ty of social science research than I have accorded it, as Thomas S . Popkewitz has remind-
ed me in correspondence . Social science researchers function in a very different
psychological-social context vis-a-vis their subject matter than do those in the physical and
biological sciences . The difficulty of extricating oneself from his or her own social milieu
in order to study it and the varying unconscious as well as conscious perspectives which
each researcher brings from his or her past militate against objective intellectualization .
Although physical and biological scientists do get caught in personal jealousies and
overzealous commitment to hypotheses, at least their subject matter is further removed
from themselves as humans .
Also see Volume 2, 1976, of the Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin .
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difficult to ferret out but potentially almost unlimited . As Cronbach
(1975) noted :
Once we attend to interactions, we enter a hall of mirrors that ex-
tends to infinity. However far we carry our analysis - to third
order of fifth order or any other - untested interactions of still
higher order can be envisioned . (p. 119)
The matter of interactions also led Snow (1977) to conclude that general
instructional theory is impossible .
Will educational research, and social studies education research in
particular, mature as a science? I must concur with Gergen and Cron-
bach (as I have done in this journal before [1979, p . 391]), as well-
summarized by Cronbach (1975) . It is unrealistic to model our work on
the physical sciences,
aspiring to amass empirical generalizations, to restructure them into
more general laws, and to weld scattered laws into theory . (p . 125)
The aspiration to scientific theory will not be realized because :
rarely is a social or behavioral [or educational] phenomenon
isolated enough to have [a] steady-process property. Hence the ex-
planations we live by will perhaps always remain partial and distant
from real events . . . and rather short lived . . . Our troubles do
not arise because human events are in principle unlawful ; man and
his creations are part of the natural world . The trouble is . . . that
we cannot store up generalizations and constructs for ultimate as-
sembly into a network. (p . 123)
Boulding's (1980) plea for the development of research methods ap-
propriate to the epistemological constraints of different fields of knowl-
edge is valid; but while the result in education - and social studies
education in particular - may be more adequate knowledge for inform-
ing decisions, I hold little hope that it will be scientific, nomothetic
theory .
Alternatives
Of course, for many the above line of argument will not be per-
suasive. They will continue in their logical empiricist hope (Wade, 1977)
to accumulate knowledge into theory or, alternatively, to reach a
paradigmatic state, in Kuhn's terms, that will provide the basis for focus-
ed, productive research and clear clashes between old and new
paradigms . Hopefully, they will consider Perrow's (1981) admonition that
attempts to impose order in human behavior through rational designs, in-
cluding theories which rarely predict well, may well run contrary to the
natural disorder and unpredictability in human affairs which was
recognized in Greek tragedy . Such a position does not mean that one
ought to give up trying to make sense out of education, but rather that
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we should acknowledge our limitations in constructing systems of propo-
sitions to explain human behavior .
Would social studies education research have no function if we were
to abandon the goal of constructing scientific theory? That question to a
large extent poses a strawman . As has been lamented frequently in the
literature - and as one wouild expect in a non-paradigm field - little
research in social studies education has been guided by theory (see Shaver
& Norton, 1980a, for some data on this matter) . The question should
probably be rephrased: Should efforts to encourage social studies
researchers to be theory-oriented in their work be abandoned? What
other goals might provide more productive guides for social studies
education research?
Gergen (1973) has proposed that research in social psychology not
aim at prediction and control, but at sensitization, at enlightenment -
making people more sensitive "to the range of factors" that may influ-
ence behavior in different situations and the relative importance of those
factors in particular settings at particular times (p . 317). Specifically,
findings on the stability of behavioral dispositions across time and
cultures could be helpful (p . 318) . These are appropriate goals for social
studies education research, as are the similar ones proposed by Cronbach
(1975) :
To assess local events accurately, to improve short run conditions
. . ., to develop explanatory concepts, concepts which will help peo-
ple use their heads .$ (p. 126)
Those views can be expanded on in the context of social studies edu-
cation research. The discussion above has been centered on scientific
theory. But, as Larkins and McKinney (1980) have pointed out, there are
other conceptions of theory . One type particularly pertinent to social
studies educators is a combination of "theory as classics" and "theory as
critique" (p. 12). Larkins and McKinney cite as examples two statements
on the social studies curriculum: the "closed areas" position of Hunt and
Metcalf and the "jurisprudential" approach of Oliver and Shaver . My
preference is not to define "theory" to cover such efforts, but to label
them "curricular rationales" or even "educational philosophies" . But
Larkins and McKinney (1980) observe correctly that such rationales,
which "combine criticism of prior recommendations and criticism of cur-
rent practice with recommendations for innovation," usually lack re-
search evidence. In the context of Gergen and Cronbach's view of the
s The severe cuts in federal funds for social science research proposed by the Reagan admin-
istration have brought forth defenses of the field . Interestingly, the arguments for the
usefulness of social science research put forth by persons such as the immediate past-
president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (Mosteller, 1981)
and the president of the Social Science Research Council (Prewitt, 1981) are phrased in
terms similar to the goals proposed by Gergen and Cronbach - the availability of con-
cepts and techniques which help us to comprehend society .
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proper role of research into human behavior, it might more appropriately
be said that such positions are usually lacking in research evidence to
sensitize and help people who would apply them in the schools . Research
evidence is typically unavailable, for example, as to the conditions that
might affect their implementation - factors such as community at-
titudes, teacher characteristics, student attributes, school organization -
as is validation evidence for the materials and teaching strategies implied
or explicitly proposed .
Research based on such rationales in the past has not, in my opinion,
been particularly productive because it has been focused on trying to
establish general principles (e .g ., Is socratic teaching more effective than
recitation teaching?) rather than seeking to help thoughtful potential
users to decide if and how to adapt the rationales to their particular set-
tings . It is in this sense, too, rather than in the hopes of "scientific
knowledge-building," that the recent advocacy (e .g ., Glass, 1977 ;
Jackson, 1978, 1980 ; Pillemer & Light, 1980) of methods of synthesizing
research could be helpful - to give social studies practitioners compen-
dia of factors to which to be alert in making curricular-instructional deci-
sions . The need to use research methods appropriate to this
epistemological frame seems evident . Techniques that provide valid in-
sights - e.g ., case studies - will often be more appropriate than the
positivist experimental designs which have dominated our research .
It seems reasonable to entertain the possibility that some such ra-
tionale, although not offering the empirically coherent and predictive
theories of the physical sciences, might be sufficiently explanatory at a
general level to provide conceptual unity to social studies education .
Along with Metcalf (1963), I have long thought that some of the philo-
sophical work of John Dewey might provide such a foundation. 9
Dewey's straightforward notions that thinking is a precursor to learning
and that we think about those things that pose problems real to us as in-
dividuals (Shaver, 1977) could provide the basis for an agenda of re-
search to inform curriculum reconstruction in social studies education .
Graduate Education
Social studies education is not a field of science . The public schools
provide a service to the society . Within that context, social studies edu-
cators are mainly interested in defining and meeting educational needs .
Advancing empirical knowledge is not, per se, a major interest . Social
service is .
9To the contrary, Egan (1980) contends that a major reason for the conceptual inade-
quacies of social studies as well as for its failure to work in practice is the acceptance of
ideas promulgated by Dewey . Our contrasting views are due, I believe, to differential
focusing on Dewey's ideas, to differing interpretations of Dewey, and to differing beliefs
about the extent to which social studies curricula really do reflect Dewey's thought .
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If Kuhn (1970c, pp . 19, 164) is correct, science is not in any event
likely to flourish in social service areas because research problems are not
selected according to a paradigm and they are pursued regardles of the
availability of adequate research tools due to the social urgency of their
solution. Yet, mistakenly, graduate faculties in social studies education
try to maintain a facade of scientism . The result is much confusion about
the place of research in our profession and, consequently, in graduate
training .
We attempt - although our hearts are not really in it - to educate
graduate students for a field that does not exist, and which I have argued
above is not likely to exist . Kuhn pointed out that the graduate education
of scientists is imbued from beginning to end with the current paradigm
of the field - including its methodology - through textbook assign-
ments, examinations, and laboratory research . That situation contrasts
sharply with most graduate work in social studies education - a smatter-
ing of courses in methodology (including inferential statistics), taken in
isolation from philosophical-curricular studies, and rarely including any
"laboratory" research experience . The dissertation with its research re-
quirement is, in my experience, typically viewed as a hurdle on the way
to a doctoral degree . It too is frequently disconnected from the student's
philosophical-curricular studies, as well not being apart of any ongoing
stream of research and bearing little relationship to the student's long
term professional interests. The dissertation is, indeed, for most social
studies educators the last piece of research they do, and it makes little
functional contribution to their careers - or to knowledge about social
studies .
The recognition that our goals in regard to research and theory have
not been realistic should be liberating for those responsible for graduate
programs in social studies education . Some may wish to continue to pur-
sue the hope of scientific theory, a goal supported by Larkins and
McKinney (1980, pp . 15-16). But many graduate programs which wish to
continue to emphasize research may feel freer to refocus their efforts to-
ward goals such as those espoused by Gergen and Cronbach: to develop
researchers who can do science-like research (in Kuhn's terms) with
methods appropriate to the questions that need to be addressed (in
Boulding's terms) to help social studies practitioners make informed deci-
sions .
Those responsible for graduate programs that are not really intended
to develop researchers should, if they accept the arguments presented in
this paper, feel more at ease in re-examining the role of research in their
graduate programs . What, for example, should be the essential nature of
the doctoral dissertation in the graduate education of a district supervisor
or social studies consultant, a product developer, or a professor of social
studies curriculum and methods? Should not the heart of a dissertation
be an intellectual experience that leads to growth in professional com-
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petence? Is it important that the dissertation be an empirical study, with
data subjected to inferential statistical analysis? Should not dissertations
involving the construction of curricular rationales, the development of
validated educational products (see Schutz, 1979) or reviews of literature
using new integrative techniques be as acceptable as those that report
tests of statistical significance?
Affirmative answers to such questions do not imply that intellectual
rigor in coursework and in faculty supervision of dissertations will be any
less important .' ° In fact, alternative types of dissertations tend to be
more difficult than the traditional empirical ones because they do not run
a predictable course once a proposal is approved by the student's super-
visory committee .
Although a group design, quantitative dissertation will not be relevant
to the career of every social studies educator, research-statistics concepts
still have some place in social studies education graduate programs (see,
e.g ., Shaver, 1980) . For example, they are important to the validation
methodology of those doing product development studies, to the orienta-
tion of those exploring the context of social studies with nonstatistical
methods such as ethnography, to the analytic frames of reference of
those doing reviews of the research literature . They also need to be
taught as part of the "general education" of our graduate students, for
research design and statistical concepts have so permeated the educa-
tional literature that awareness of their meanings and implications is a
significant part of being an educated educator . Given the differing foci,
however, research and statistics courses would no longer be taught as
abstract bodies of knowledge with esoteric, if not self-evident, intrinsic
importance .
Conclusion
It might be argued that scientific theory has not emerged from re-
search in social studies education because of a lack of systematic, sus-
tained - i .e., programmatic - efforts aimed at the accretion of knowl-
edge. Nonprogrammatic research efforts may be inevitable in social
studies education, as a field of social service rather than of science . But
the thesis of this paper is that even programmatic research efforts are un-
likely to build theory of the sort that has emerged in the physical sci-
ences. The very nature of the subject matter - thinking, complex
humans who live in changing cultural contexts of which research is itself
a part - militates against the positivist Comtean faith that the objective
realities of human social life can be observed and formulated into scien-
tific principles and laws such as scientists verify for the physical or the
biological world . Research still is important for informing educational
decision-makers, but in a manner significantly different from the way in
° For an excellent warning about the trap of assuming that non-statistical research requires
less rigor, see Rist (1980) .
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which research in the physical sciences informs engineering decision-
makers or biological research informs medical decision-makers .
In the "age of science," it is not surprising that pseudo-scientism has
permeated education, including graduate programs in social studies edu-
cation. Trying to be "scientific," often without substantial efforts to
understand science or its relevance to the study of human behavior, has
resulted in strictures that often unreasonably bind and blind us in our
work. A realistic view of the potential of social studies education
research for scientific theory can, I believe, help us to develop more
fruitful perspectives on the role of research in educational decision-
making. Our past research endeavors in social studies education have not
been particularly productive of either scientific theory or knowledge to
inform and sensitize decision-makers . The first does not seem likely .
How to produce the latter is an important long-term agenda item for
social studies education researchers, especially for those of us responsible
for graduate programs in social studies education .
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Introduction
Until recently, mainstream interpretations of the history, philosophy,
and sociology of American education have been relatively immune from
the effects of social and political criticism . That such interpretations were
the object of heated criticism by educational reformers has been well
documented (Feinberg, 1975 and Bowles and Gintis, 1976). But the exist-
ence of such criticism appears less important than the marginal role it
has played historically in shaping the image and function of American
education . It is against the muting of opposing perspectives on the nature
of American schooling that the role of school as a legitimating agency
becomes clear . That is, the function of schooling historically appears to
have been viewed less in terms of what schools actually do and more in
terms of ideologies about what they should or could be doing . It is with-
in this contradiction between the reality and the promise of American
schooling that educational criticism has been both sustained and severely
muted .
The historical circumstances surrounding the muting of educational
criticisms are relatively straightforward . In the transition period from
entrepreneurial to advanced capitalism, public schooling developed as the
11 wish to thank Stanley Aronowitz, Paul Breines, Roger Simon, Cleo Cherryholmes,
Len Barton, Walter Feinberg and Philip Wexler for their helpful contributions and
advice . Without their comments this manuscript would have been finished much earlier
than it was. Needless to say, I bear full responsibility for the contents of the paper .
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concrete counterpart to and successor of the mythic legacy of the 19th
century Western frontier . That is, as the Western frontier lost its in-
nocence to the logic of capitalist industrialization and expansionism, the
public school became the new birthplace for unfettered social and
economic opportunities . As Bowles and Gintis (1976) point out, state
supported education provided the new vision, and "a new ideology
became the order of the day . The folklore of capitalism was revitalized,
education became the new frontier" (p . 3) . The assumptions that fueled
this mythic vision of schooling have exercised a powerful influence on
traditional and liberal views of education . The central assumption was
that schools were neutral institutions that provided equal opportunities
for all students to pursue social and economic mobility . As a result of
this assumption, individual initiative and intellectual labor became the
starting points and most important categories by which to analyze the
success or failure of different groups of students who made the sojourn
through American schools . Similarly, social stability and moral order,
rather than issues such as domination and emancipation, became the cen-
tral concerns for analyzing the relationship between schools and the
wider society; and finally, the mythic vision of schooling was reinforced
by the assumption that public education was the most important vehicle
to promote economic growth and to ensure economic equality (Feinberg,
1975) .
Within the last decade, the view of American education as the "new
frontier" has come under increasing attack by a chorus of educational
critics . Changing material and ideological conditions have provided an
impetus for such criticism while simultaneously helping to sustain it. For
example, dissatisfaction with the role and meaning of American educa-
tion erupted strongly amidst the political events of the 1960s and early
1970s. In addition, the emerging objective contradictions of the last
decade contributed to a crisis ideologically . That is, beliefs and values
used to legitimate the dominant society began to lose their sustaining
power, particularly in those social science disciplines that played a signifi-
cant role buttressing what might be called American hegemonic ideology .
Thus, a number of scholars turned away from functionalist and empiri-
cist models of social inquiry and attempted to reconstruct alternative
views of education by drawing theoretical sustenance from diverse conti-
nental philosophies such as phenomenology, existentialism, and various
forms of neo-Marxist thought (Pinar, 1974, 1975 ; Macdonald and Zaret,
1975 ; and Apple et al ., 1974) .
Against the landscape of developing crises in American education,
which include severe financial cutbacks, shrinking job markets, and
massive teacher layoffs, educational critics found new opportunities to
call into question the political and economic nature of schooling . The
result has been quite significant . For example, a revisionist educational
history emerged that provided an indictment suggesting that schools
functioned to sustain rather than prevent class inequality (Katz, 1968 ;
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Feinberg, 1975 ; Gree, 1972; Karier, 1975 ; and Bowles and Gintis, 1976) .
In addition, various theories of social education emerged that exposed
the ideological interests underlying the selection, organization and distri-
bution of school knowledge (Apple, 1979 and Popkewitz, 1978) . Further-
more, the foundation for a more critical theory of social education was
established through reflexive studies of classroom relationships and other
aspects of the hidden curriculum of schooling (Apple and King, 1977 and
Giroux and Penna, 1979) . 2
More recently, educational criticism has moved away from its initial
focus on understanding the political and normative nature of American
schooling, and has attempted to develop a more specific theoretical re-
construction . Consequently, the early diversity that often clouded ideo-
logical differences among various educational critics in social education
has now given way to some rather clear-cut theoretical positions regard-
ing what constitutes a critical science of social education (Pinar, 1981
and Giroux, 1981a, 1981b) . While the transition from critique to theoret-
ical reconstruction is both welcome and imperative, it has not been a
very successful one to date . Unable to discard the theoretical baggage of
either a limiting structuralism or an equally limiting idealism, theories of
social education appear to be caught between deterministic structural
studies of American education or interactionist studies that are bogged
down in a celebration of psychologism . Needless to say there have been
some sophisticated attempts to move out of these polarities, but such
work occupies an unjustifiably marginal place in current educational
scholarship . 3
This essay attempts to contribute to the search for a theoretical foun-
dation upon which to develop a critical theory of social education . With-
in the parameters of this task, the notion of critical theory has a two-fold
2 The view of social education expressed and used in this paper is quite different from
the way it appears in traditional literature on the subject . That is, traditionally social
education takes as its primary concerns issues of citizenship education, moral educa-
tion, global education, etc. with the express purpose of simplifying the social sciences
for instructional use. The classic example of this view can be found in Wesley and
Wronski (1973) : "The social studies are designed primarily for instructional purposes .
They include those substantive portions of human behavior as well as those procedural
modes of inquiry that have been selected and adopted for use in schools and other in-
structional situations" (p . 5) .
In my view, this perspective fails because of its atheoretical and apolitical stance
toward the role that schools play as political but relatively autonomous institutions
that serve in a somewhat contradictory fashion as agencies of social and cultural
reproduction . Social education, as it is used in this paper, points to the macro- and
micro-issues that tie schools to the larger social order and affect their role as ideolog-
ical institutions involved in the reproduction of class and gender (and racial) based
relations . See Giroux (1981).
aSome of the exceptional work being done in the United States in educational theory
would include : Apple (1979) ; Cherryholmes (1980) ; Anyon (1980); Feinberg (1980);
Green (1978); Pinar (1981) ; Popkewitz (1980) ; Simon and Dippo (1980) .
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meaning. On the one hand, critical theory refers to the legacy of theoreti-
cal work developed by certain members of what can be loosely described
as "the Frankfurt School ." 4 Specifically, I argue in this essay that the
works of Horkheimer, Marcuse, and Adorno provide a number of im-
portant theoretical insights for developing a critical foundation for a
theory of social education . 5 On the other hand, the concept of critical
theory refers to the nature of self-conscious critique and to the need to
develop a discourse of social transformation and emancipation that does
not cling dogmatically to its own doctrinal assumptions . In other words,
critical theory refers to both a "school of thought" and process of cri-
tique. It points to a body of thought that is, in my view, invaluable for
educational theorists ; it also exemplifies a body of work that both dem-
onstrates and simultaneously calls for the necessity of ongoing critique,
one in which the claims of any theory must be confronted with the dis-
tinction between the world it examines and portrays, and the world as it
actually exists . 6
The Frankfurt School took as one of its central values a commitment
to penetrate the work of reified appearances and to expose the underly-
ing social relationships they often conceal . In other words, penetrating
reified appearances meant exposing through critical analysis social rela-
tionships that took on the status of things or objects . For instance, by
examining notions such as money, consumption, distribution, and pro-
duction it becomes clear that the latter do not represent objective "facts"
or things but historically contingent contexts mediated by relationships of
domination and subordination . As such, the Frankfurt School not only
broke with forms of rationality that wedded science and technology into
new forms of domination, it also rejected all forms of rationality that
subordinated human consciousness and action to the imperatives of uni-
versal laws . Whether it be the legacy of the positivist intellectual thought
° The term "Frankfurt School" should not suggest that the numerous individuals that
either belonged to or were affiliated with the Institute for Social Research shared "a
body of learnable statements and doctrines with which one could live comfortably or
uneasily" (Lowenthal, 1979, p . 391) . Rather, the term provides a point of focus but as
Lowenthal indicates should not be read so as to hide the differences of opinion as well
as the different research concerns that characterized the Institute's members . This issue
is explored in detail in Jay (1973) and Held (1981) .
5 An extensive bibliography of both primary and secondary materials on the Frankfurt
School can be found in Arato and Gebhardt (1978). It is also worth noting that Held
(1981) provides a worthwhile introduction to the developing and changing ideas of the
Frankfurt School. Moreover, Arato and Gebhardt (1978) provide both primary sources
previously unpublished in English as well as a number of scholarly and informative
commentaries on the Frankfurt School . Held's (1981) bibliography provides original
dates of publication .
6% One purpose of this paper is to stress the importance of original critical theory,
particularly the early work of Adorno and Horkheimer (1972) as well as the wide
range of work written by Marcuse . This seems to me an important task especially since
so much of the work on the Frankfurt School in social education focuses almost exclu-
sively on the writings of Jurgen Habermas .
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of Victorian Europe or the theoretical edifice developed by Engels, Kaut-
sky, Stalin and other heirs of Marxism, the Frankfurt School argued
against the Tatter's suppression of "subjectivity, consciousness, and
culture in history" (Breines, 1979-80, p. 113), and in doing so articulated
a notion of negativity in opposition to all theories that celebrated social
harmony and left unproblematic the basic assumptions of the wider
society . In more specific terms, the Frankfurt School stressed the impor-
tance of critical thinking by arguing that the latter is a constitutive
feature of the struggle for both self-emancipation and social change .
Moreover, its members argued that it was in the contradictions of society
that one could begin to develop forms of social inquiry that analyzed the
distinction between what is from what should be ; and finally, they
strongly supported the assumption that the basis for thought and action
should be grounded, as Marcuse argued just before his death, "in com-
passion, [and] in our sense of the sufferings of others" (Habermas, 1980,
p. 12) .
In general terms, the Frankfurt School provides a number of valuable
insights for studying the relationship between theory and society . In do-
ing so, they developed a dialectical framework by which to understand
the mediations that link the institutions and activities of everyday life
with the logic and commanding forces that shape the larger social total-
ity. The characteristic nature of the form of social inquiry that emerged
from such a framework was articulated by Horkheimer (1972) when he
suggested that other members of the Institute for Social Research explore
the question of:
the interconnection between the economic life of society, the psy-
chic development of the individual and transformations in the realm
of culture . . . including not only the so called spiritual contents of
science, art and religion, but also law, ethics, fashion, public opin-
ion, sport, amusement, life style, etc . (p. 43)
The issues raised by Horkheimer (1972) have not lost their importance
with time, and they still represent both a critique of and challenge to
many of the theoretical currents that presently characterize theories of
social education . The necessity for theoretical renewal in the educational
field, coupled with the massive number of primary and secondary sources
that have been translated or published recently in English, provide the
opportunity for American and English speaking pedagogues to begin to
appropriate the discourse and ideas of the Frankfurt School . Needless to
say, such a task will . not be easily accomplished since both the complexity
of the language used by members of the School and the diversity of the
positions and themes they pursued demand a selective and critical reading
of their works . Yet the critique of culture, instrumental rationality,
authoritarianism, and ideology that they pursued in an interdisciplinary
context generated categories, relationships and forms of social inquiry
that constitute a vital source of knowledge for developing a critical theo-
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ry of social education . Since it will be impossible within the scope of this
essay to analyze the diversity of themes examined by the Frankfurt
School, I will limit my analysis to their treatment of rationality, theory,
culture and depth psychology .
History and Background . The Institute for Social Research (The Institut
Fur Sozialforschung) was officially created in Frankfurt, Germany, in
February 1923 and was the original home of the Frankfurt School . Estab-
lished by a wealthy grain merchant named Felix Weil, the Institute even-
tually came under the directorship of Max Horkheimer in 1930 . Under
Horkheimer's directorship most of the members who later became
famous joined the Institute. These included Erich Fromm, Herbert Mar-
cuse, and Theodor Adorno. As Martin Jay (1973) points out in his now
famous history of the Frankfurt School,
If it can be said that in the early years of its history the Institut
concerned itself primarily with an analysis of bourgeois society's
socio-economic substructure, in the years after 1930 its prime inter-
ests lay in its cultural superstructure . (p . 21)
The changing of the Institute's theoretical focus was soon followed by
a geographical shift in its location . Threatened by the Nazis because of
the avowedly Marxist orientation of the Institute's work and because
most of its members were Jews, the Institute was forced to relocate for a
short time in Geneva in 1933 . It was moved to New York City in 1934,
where it was housed in one of Columbia University's buildings . Emigra-
tion to New York was followed by a stay in Los Angeles, California, in
1941 ; and, by 1953, the Institute was reestablished in Frankfurt, Ger-
many.'
The strengths and weaknesses of the Frankfurt School project become
intelligible only if seen as part of the social and historical context in
which it developed . In essence, the questions it pursued, along with the
forms of social inquiry it supported, represent both a particular moment
in the development of Western Marxism as well as a critique of it . React-
ing to the rise of Fascism and Naziism on the one hand, and the failure
of orthodox Marxism on the other, the Frankfurt School had to
refashion and rethink the meaning of domination and emancipation . The
rise of Stalinism, the failure of the European or Western working class to
contest capitalist hegemony in a revolutionary manner, and the power of
capitalism to reconstitute and reinforce its economic and ideological con-
trol forced the Frankfurt School to reject the orthodox reading of Marx
and Engels, particularly as it had developed through the conventional
wisdom of the Second and Third Internationals . It is particularly in the
6 It is important to note that Erich Fromm and Herbert Marcuse remained in the United
States . In fact, this geographic separation, in part, may have contributed to the diverg-
ing perspectives that separated Marcuse from Adorno and Horkheimer from 1955 on-
wards .
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rejection of certain doctrinal Marxist assumptions, developed under the
historical shadow of totalitarianism and the rise of the consumer society
in the West that Horkheimer; Adorno, and Marcuse attempted to con-
struct a more sufficient basis for social theory and political action. Cer-
tainly such a basis was not to be found in standard Marxist assumptions
such as : a) the notion of historical inevitability, b) the primacy of the
mode of production in the shaping of history, and c) the notion that
class struggle as well as the mechanisms of domination take place
primarily within the confines of the labor process . For the. Frankfurt
School, orthodox Marxism assumed too much while simultaneously ig-
noring the benefits of self-criticism. It had failed to develop a theory of
consciousness and by doing so expelled the human subject from its own
theoretical calculus . Thus, it is not surprising that the focus of the
Frankfurt School's research downplayed the area of political economy
and focused instead of the issue how subjectivity was constituted, as well
as on the issue of how the spheres of culture and everyday life
represented a new terrain of domination . It is against this historical and
theoretical landscape that we can begin to abstract categories and modes
of analysis that speak to the nature of schooling as it presently exists,
and the possibilities it contains for developing into a force for social
change .
Rationality, Theory, and the Critique of Instrumental Reason . Funda-
mental to an understanding of the Frankfurt School's view of theory and
their critique of instrumental reason is their analysis of the heritage of
Enlightenment rationality. Echoing Nietzsche's (1957) warning about
humanity's unbounded faith in reason, Adorno and Horkheimer (1972)
voiced a trenchant critique of modernity's unswerving faith in the prom-
ise of Enlightenment rationality to rescue the world from the chains of
superstition, ignorance, and suffering . The problematic nature of suchh a
promise marks the opening lines of Dialectic of Enlightenment (1972) :
In the most general sense of progressive thought the Enlightenment
has always aimed at liberating men from fear and establishing their
sovereignty . Yet the fully enlightened earth radiates disaster trium-
phant. (p . 3)
The faith in scientific rationality and the principles of practical judg-
ment did not constitute a legacy that developed exclusively in the 17th
and 18th centuries when people of reason united on a vast intellectual
front in order to master the world through an appeal to the claims of
reasoned thought. According to the Frankfurt School, the legacy of sci-
entific rationality represented one of the central themes of Western
thought and extended as far back as Plato (Horkheimer, 1974 pp . 6-7) .
Habermas (1973), a later member of the Frankfurt School, argues that
the progressive notion of reason reaches its highest point and most com-
plex expression in the work of Karl Marx, after which it is reduced from
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an all encompassing concept of rationality to a particularized instrument
in the service of industrialized society . According to Habermas (1973),
On the level of the historical self reflection of a science with critical
intent, Marx for the last time identifies reason with a commitment
to rationality in its thrust against dogmatism. In the second half of
the 19th century, during the course of the reduction of science to a
productive force in industrial society, positivism, historicism, and
pragmatism, each in turn, isolate one part of this all encompassing
concept of rationality. The hitherto undisputed attempts of the
great theories, to reflect on the complex of life as a whole is hence-
forth itself discredited as dogma . . . the spontaneity of hope, the
art of taking a position, the experience of relevance or indifference,
and above all, the response to suffering and oppression, the desire
for adult autonomy, the will to emancipation, and the happiness of
discovering one's identify-all these are dismissed for all time from
the obligating interest of reason . (pp. 262-263)
Marx may have employed reason in the name of critique and emanci-
pation, but it was still a notion of reason that was limited to an over-
emphasis on the labor process and the exchange rationality that was both
its driving force and ultimate mystification . In contrast to Marx, Adorno,
Horkheimer, and Marcuse believed that "the fateful process of rationali-
zation" (Wellmer, 1974, p . 133) had penetrated all aspects of everyday
life, whether it be the mass media, the school or the workplace . The cru-
cial point here is that no social sphere was free from the encroachments
of a form of reason in which "all theoretical means of transcending reali-
ty became metaphysical nonsense" (Horkheimer, 1974, p . 82) .
In the Frankfurt School's view, reason has not been stripped perma-
nently of its positive dimensions . Marcuse, for instance, believed that
reason contained a critical element and was still capable of reconstituting
history or, as he put it, "reason represents the highest potentiality of man
and existence ; the two belong together ;" (Marcuse, 1968, p . 136). But if
reason was to preserve its promise of creating a more just society, it
would have to demonstrate its power of critique and negativity . Accord-
ing to Adorno (1973), the crisis of reason takes place as society becomes
more rationalized because under such historical circumstances it loses its
critical faculty in the quest for social harmony, and as such, becomes an
instrument of the existing society . As a result, reason as insight and cri-
tique turns into its opposite, i.e ., irrationality .
For the Frankfurt School the crisis in reason is linked to the crisis in
science and the more general crisis of society . Horkheimer (1972) argued
that the starting point for understanding "the crisis of science depends on
a correct theory of the present social situation" (p . 9). In essence, this
speaks to two crucial aspects of Frankfurt School thought . First, it
argues that the only solution to the present crisis lies in developing a
more fully self-conscious notion of reason, one that embraces both the
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notion of critique and the element of human will and transformative ac-
tion. Second, it means entrusting to theory the task of rescuing reason
from the logic of technocratic rationality or positivism . It was the Frank-
furt School's view that positivism had emerged as the final ideological
expression of the Enlightenment . The victory of positivism represented
not the high point but the low point of Enlightenment thought . Rather
than being the agent of reason, it became its enemy and emerged in the
20th century as a new form of social administration and domination .
Friedman (1981) sums up the essence of this position :
To the Frankfurt School, philosophical and practical positivism
constituted the end point of the Enlightenment . The social function
of the ideology of Positivism was to deny the critical faculty of rea-
son by allowing it only the ground of utter facility to operate upon .
By so doing, they denied reason a critical moment, reason, under
the rule of Positivism, stands in awe of the fact . Its function is
simply to characterize the fact. Its task ends when it has affirmed
and explicated the fact . . . . Under the rule of positivism, reason
inevitably stops short of critique . (p . 118)
It is in its critique of positivistic thought that the Frankfurt School
makes clear the specific mechanisms of ideological control that permeate
the consciousness and practices of advanced capitalistic societies . It is
also in its critique of positivism that it develops a notion of theory that
has major implications for educational critics . But the route to under-
standing the latter necessitates that one first analyze the Frankfurt
School's critique of positivism, particularly since the logic of positivist
thought (though in varied forms) represents the major theoretical impetus
that currently shapes educational theory and practice .
The Frankfurt School defined positivism in the broad sense as an
amalgam of diverse traditions that included the work of Saint-Simon and
Comte, the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle, the early Wittgen-
stein, and the more recent forms of logical empiricism and pragmatism
that dominate the social sciences in the West . While the history of each
of these traditions is complex and cluttered with detours and qualifica-
tions, each of them has supported the goal of developing forms of social
inquiry patterned after the natural sciences and based on the methodo-
logical tenets of sense observation and quantification. Marcuse (1964)
provides both a general definition of the notion of positivism as well as a
starting point for some of the reservations the Frankfurt School ex-
pressed regarding its most basic assumptions :
Since its first usage, probably in the school of Saint-Simon, the
term "positivism" has encompassed (1) the validation of cognitive
thought by experience of facts ; (2) the orientation of cognitive
thought to the physical science as a model of certainty and exact-
ness; (3) the belief that progress in knowledge depends on this ori-
entation . Consequently, positivism is a struggle against all meta-
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physics, transcendentalisms, and idealisms as obscurantist and re-
gressive modes of thought . To the degree to which the given reality
is scientifically comprehended and transformed, to the degree to
which society becomes industrial and technological, positivism finds
in the society the medium for the realization (and validation) of its
concepts - harmony between theory and practice, truth and facts .
Philosophic thought turns into affirmative thought ; the philosophic
critique criticizes within the societal framework and stigmatizes
non-positive notions as mere speculation, dreams or fantasies .
(p. 172)
Positivism, according to Horkheimer (1972), presented a view of
knowledge and science that stripped both of their critical possibilities .
Knowledge was reduced to the exclusive province of science, and science
itself was subsumed within a methodology that limited "scientific activity
to the description, classification, and generalization of phenomena, with
no care to distinguish the unimportant from the essential" (p . 5). Accom-
panying this view is the notion that knowledge derives from sense experi-
ence and that the ideal it pursues takes place "in the form of a mathe-
matically formulated universe deducible from the smallest possible num-
ber of axioms, a system which assures the calculation of the probable
occurrence of all events" (Horkheimer, 1972, p . 138) .
For the Frankfurt School, positivism did not represent an indictment
of science, instead it echoed Nietzche's (1966) insight that "it is not the
victory of science that is the distinguishing mark of our nineteenth cen-
tury, but the victory of the scientific method over science" (p . 814) .
Science, in this perspective, was separated from the question of ends and
ethics, the latter being rendered insignificant because they defied "expli-
cation in terms of mathematical structures" (Marcuse, 1964, p . 147) . Ac-
cording to the Frankfurt School, the suppression of ethics in positivist
rationality precludes the possibility for self critique, or more specifically,
the questioning of its own normative structure. Facts become separated
from values, objectivity undermines critique, and the notion that essence
and appearance may not coincide is lost in the positivist view of the
world. The latter point becomes particularly clear in the Vienna Circle
pronouncement: "The view that thought is a means of knowing more
about the world than may be directly observed . . . seems to use entirely
mysterious" (Hahn, 1933, p . 9). For Adorno, the idea of value freedom
was perfectly suited to a perspective that was to insist on a universal
form of knowledge while it simultaneously refused to inquire into its own
socio-ideological development and function in society .
According to Frankfurt School, the outcome of positivist rationality
and its technocratic view of science represented a threat to the notion of
subjectivity and critical thinking . By functioning within an operational
context free from ethical commitments, positivism wedded itself to the
immediate and "celebrated" the world of "facts ." The question of essence,
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or the difference between the world as it, is and that which it could be, is
reduced to the merely methodological task of collecting and classifying
that which is, the world of facts . In this schema, "knowledge relates
solely to what is and to its recurrence" (Horkheimer, 1972, p . 208). Ques-
tions concerning the genesis, development and normative nature of the
conceptual systems that select, organize, and define the facts appear to be
outside of the concern of positivist rationality .
Since it recognizes no factors behind the "fact," positivism freezes
both human beings and history. In the case of the latter, the issue of his-
torical development is left aside since the historical dimension contains
truths that cannot be assigned "to a special fact-gathering branch of sci-
ence" (Adorn, quoted in Gross, 1979, p . 340). Of course, positivism is
not impervious to history because it ignores it, i.e., the relationship be-
tween history and understanding. On the contrary, its key notions regard-
ing objectivity, theory, and values as well as its modes of inquiry are
both a consequence and a force in the shaping of history . In other
words, positivism may ignore history but it cannot escape it. What is im-
portant to stress is that fundamental categories of socio-historical devel-
opment are at odds with the positivist emphasis on the immediate, or,
more specifically, that which can be expressed, measured, and calculated
in precise mathematical formulas . Russell Jacoby (1980) points concisely
to this issue in his claim that "the natural reality and natural sciences do
not know the fundamental historical categories : consciousness and self
consciousness, subjectivity and objectivity, appearance and essence" (p .
30) .
By not reflecting on its paradigmatic premises positivist thought ig-
nores the value of historical consciousness and consequently endangers
the nature of critical thinking itself . That is, inherent in the very struc-
ture of positivist thought, with its emphasis on objectivity and its lack of
theoretical grounding regarding the setting of tasks (Horkheimer 1972),
are a number of assumptions that appear to preclude its ability to judge
the complicated interactions of power, knowledge and values and to re-
flect critically on the genesis and nature of its own ideological presuppo-
sitions . Moreover, situated within a number of false dualisms (facts vs .
values, scientific knowledge vs . norms, and description vs . prescription)
positivism dissolves the tension between potentiality and actuality in all
spheres of social existence. Thus, under the guise of neutrality, scientific
knowledge and all theory become rational on the grounds of whether
they are efficient, economic or correct. In this case a notion of methodo-
logical correctness subsumes and devalues the complex philosophical con-
cept of truth. As Marcuse points out, "the fact that a judgment can be
correct and nevertheless without truth has been the crux of formal logic
from time immemorial" (quoted in Arato and Gebhardt, 1978, p . 394) .
For instance, an empirical study that concludes that native workers in a
colonized country work at a slower rate than imported workers who per-
form the same job may provide an answer that is correct, but such an
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answer tells us little about the notion of domination or the resistance of
workers under its sway . That the native workers may slow down their
rate as an act of resistance is not considered here . Thus, the notions of
intentionality and historical context get dissolved within the confines of a
limiting quantifying methodology. For Adorno, Marcuse, and Hork-
heimer, the fetishism of facts and the belief in value neutrality repre-
sented more than an epistemological error ; more importantly, such a
stance served as a form of ideological hegemony that infused positivist
rationality with a political conservatism that make it an ideological prop
of the status quo . The latter should not suggest an intentional support
for the status quo on the part of the individuals who work within a posi-
tivist rationality . Instead, it suggests a particular relationship to the
status quo which in some situations is a consciously political one, while
in others it is not . In other words, in the latter stance the relationship to
the status quo is a conservative one, but it is not self-consciously recog-
nized by those who help to reproduce it .
The Frankfurt School's Notion of Theory . According to the Frankfurt
School any understanding about the nature of theory had to begin with a
grasp of the relationships that exist in society between the particular and
the whole, the specific and the universal . This position appears in direct
contradiction to the empiricist claim that theory is primarily a matter of
classifying and arranging facts . In rejecting the absolutizing of facts, the
Frankfurt School argued that in the relation between theory and the
wider society mediations exist that function to give meaning not only to
the constitutive nature of a fact but also to the very nature and substance
of theoretical discourse. As Horkheimer (1972) writes :
The facts of science and science itself are but segments of the life
process of society, and in order to understand the significance of
facts or of science, generally one must possess the key to the histor-
ical situation, the right social theory . (p. 159)
This speaks to another constitutive element of critical theory . If
theory is to move beyond the positivist legacy of neutrality, it must
develop the capacity of a meta-theory . That is, it must acknowledge the
normative interests it represents and be able to reflect critically on both
the historical development or genesis of such interests and the limitations
they may present within certain historical and social contexts . In other
words, "methodological correctness" does not provide a guarantee of
truth nor does it raise the fundamental question of why a theory func-
tions in a given way under specific historical conditions to serve some
interests and not others . Thus, a notion of self critique is essential to a
critical theory.
A third constitutive element for a critical theory takes its cue from
Nietzche's dictum that "a great truth wants to be criticized not idolized"
(Quoted in Arato and Gebhardt, 1978, p . 383). The Frankfurt School
believed that the critical spirit of theory should be represented in its un-
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masking function. The driving force of such a function was to be found
in the Frankfurt School's notions of immanent criticism and dialectical
thought. Immanent critique is the assertion of difference, the refusal to
collapse appearance and essence, i.e., the willingness to analyze the real-
ity of the social object against its possibilities . As Adorno et al . (1976)
wrote :
Theory . . . must transform the concepts which it brings, as it were,
from outside into those which the object has of itself, into what the
object, left to itself, seeks to be, and confront it with what it is . It
must dissolve the rigidity of the temporally and spatially fired ob-
ject into a field of tension of the possible and the real : each one in
order to exist, is dependent upon the other. In other words, theory
is indisputably critical . (p . 69)
Dialectical thought, on the other hand, speaks to both critique and theo-
retical reconstruction (Giroux, 1980) . As a mode of critique it uncovers
values that are often negated by the social object under analysis . The no-
tion of dialectics is critical because it reveals "the insufficiencies and im-
perfections of `finished' systems of thought . . . it reveals incompleteness
where completeness is claimed . It embraces that which is in terms of that
which is not, and that which is real in terms of potentialities not yet real-
ized" (Held, 1980, p . 177). As a mode of theoretical reconstruction, dia-
lectical thought points to historical analysis in the critique of conformist
logic, and traces out the "inner history" of the latter's categories and the
way in which they are mediated within a specific historical context . By
looking at the social and political constellations stored in the categories
in any theory, Adorno (1973) believed that their history could be traced
and thus their existing limitations revealed . As such, dialectical thought
reveals the power of human activity and human knowledge as both a
product and force in the shaping of social reality, but does so not simply
to proclaim that humans give meaning to the world, a position that has
always plagued the sociology of knowledge (Adorno, 1967) . Instead, as a
form of critique, dialectical thought argues that there is a link between
knowledge, power, and domination . Thus it is acknowledged that some
knowledge is false, and that the ultimate purpose of critique should be
critical thinking in the interest of social change . For instance, as I men-
tioned earlier, one can exercise critical thought and not fall into the ideo-
logical trap of relativism in which the notion of critique is negated by the
assumption that all ideas should be given equal weight . Marcuse (1960)
points to the connection between thought and action in dialectical
thought :
Dialectical thought starts with the experience that the world is un-
free; that is to say, man and nature exist in conditions of aliena-
tion, exist as `other than they are .' Any mode of thought which ex-
cludes this contradiction from its logic is faulty logic . Thought `cor-
responds' to reality only as it transforms reality by comprehending
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its contradictory structure. Here the principle of dialectic drives
thought beyond the limits of philosophy . For to comprehend reality
means to comprehend what things really are, and this in turn means
rejecting their mere factuality . Rejection is the process of thought
as well as of action . . . . Dialectical thought thus becomes negative
in itself. Its function is to break down the self-assurance and self-
contentment of common sense, to undermine the sinister confidence
in the power and language of facts, to demonstrate that unfreedom
is so much at the core of things that the development of their inter-
nal contradictions leads necessarily to qualitative change : the explo-
sion and catastrophe of the established state of affairs . (p . ix)
According to the Frankfurt School all thought and theory are tied to
a specific interest in the development of a society without injustice. The-
ory, in this case, becomes a transformative activity that views itself as ex-
plicitly political and commits itself to the projection of a future that is as
yet unfilfulled . Thus, critical theory contains a transcendent element in
which critical thought becomes the precondition for human freedom .
Rather than proclaiming a positivist notion of neutrality, critical theory
openly takes sides in the interest of struggling for a better world . In one
of his most famous early essays comparing traditional and critical theory,
Horkheimer (1972) spelled out the essential value of theory as a political
endeavor :
It is not just a research hypothesis which shows its value in the
ongoing business of men ; it is an essential element in the historical
effort to create a world which satisfies the needs and powers of
men. However extensive the interaction between the critical theory
and the special sciences whose progress the theory must respect and
on which it has for decades exercised a liberating and stimulating
influence, the theory never aims simply at an increase of knowledge
as such . Its goal is man's emancipation from slavery . (p. 245)
Finally, there is the question of the relationship between critical the-
ory and empirical studies . In the ongoing debate over theory and empiri-
cal work, the same old dualisms appear, though in recycled forms, in
which one presupposes the exclusion of the other .$ One manifestation of
this debate is the criticism that the Frankfurt School rejected against
many educational critics who have drawn upon the work of the Frank-
furt School .9 Both sets of criticisms appear to have missed the point .
Certainly, it is true that for the Frankfurt School the issue of empirical
work was a problematic one, but what was called into question was its
universalization at the expense of a more comprehensive notion of ration-
8 See Arato and Gebhardt (1979), "A Critique of Methodology" for an excellent analysis
of this issue, especially pages 371-406 .
9 See, for instance, the debate between Tanner and Tanner (1979) and Pinar (1980) over
this issue .
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ality. In writing about his experience as an American scholar, Adorno
(1969) spelled out a view of empirical studies that was representative of
the Frankfurt School in general :
My own position in the controversy between empirical and theoreti-
cal sociology . . . I may sum up by saying that empirical investiga-
tions are not only legitimate but essential, even in the realm of cul-
tural phenomena . But one must not confer autonomy upon them or
regard them as a universal key . Above all they must terminate in
theoretical knowledge . Theory is no mere vehicle that becomes
superfluous as soon as data are in hand . (p . 353)
By introducing the primacy of theoretical knowledge in the realm of
empirical investigations, the Frankfurt School also wanted to highlight
the limits of the positivist notion of experience, where research had to
confine itself to controlled physical experiences that would be conducted
by any researcher . Under such conditions, the research experience is lim-
ited to simple observation . As such, generalizable and abstract methodol-
ogy follows rules that preclude any understanding of the forces that
shape both the object of analysis as well as the subject conducting the
research . In contrast, a dialectical notion of society and theory would
argue that observation cannot take the place of critical reflection and
understanding . That is, one begins not with an observation but with a
theoretical framework that situates the observation in rules and conven-
tions that give it meaning while simultaneously acknowledge the limita-
tions of such a perspective or framework . A further qualification must
be made here . The Frankfurt School's position on the relation between
theory and empirical studies helps to illuminate its view of theory and
practice. Once again, critical theory insists that theory and practice are
interrelated, but it cautions about calling for a specious unity. As Adorno
(1973) points out, "the call for the unity of theory and practice has irre-
sistibly degraded theory to the servants's role, removing the very traits it
should have brought to that unity. The visa stamp of practice which we
demand of all theory became a censor's place . Yet whereas theory suc-
cumbed in the vaunted mixture practice became nonconceptual, a piece
of the politics it was supposed to lead out of ; it became the prey of
power" (p . 143). Theory, in this case, should have as its goal emancipa-
tory practice, but at the same time it requires a certain distance from
such practice . Theory and practice represent a particular alliance, not a
unity in which one dissolves into the other . The nature of such an alli-
ance might be better understood by illuminating the drawbacks inherent
in the traditional anti-theoretical stance in American education in which
it is argued that concrete experience is the great
	
1 0
Experience, whether on the part of the researcher or others, contains
in itself no guarantees that it will generate the insights necessary to make
10 For an example of the issues involved in this debate, see my response to Linda
McNeil (1981) in Giroux (1981d) .
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it transparent to itself. In other words, while it is indisputable that expe-
rience may provide us with knowledge, it is also indisputable that knowl-
edge may distort rather than illuminate the nature of social reality . The
point here is that the value of any experience "will depend not on the ex-
perience of the subject but on the struggles around the way that experi-
ence is interpreted and defined" (Bennet, 1980, p . 126). Moreover, theory
cannot be reduced to the mistress of experience, empowered to provide
recipes for pedagogical practice . Its real value lies in its ability to estab-
lish the possibilities for reflexive thought and practice on the part of
those who use it, and in the case of teachers, it becomes invaluable as an
instrument of critique and understanding. As a mode of critique and
analysis, theory functions as a set of tools inextricably affected by the
context in which it is brought to bear, but it is never reducible to that
context. It has its own distance and purpose, its own element of practice .
The crucial element in both its production and use is not the structure at
which it is aimed, but the human agents who use it to give meaning to
their lives .
Conclusion . In conclusion, Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse provided
forms of historical and sociological analyses that pointed to the premise
as well as the limitations of the existing dominant rationality as it devel-
oped in the 20th century . Such an analysis took as a starting point the
conviction that for self conscious human beings to act collectively against
the modes of technocratic rationality that permeated the work place and
other socio-cultural spheres, their behavior would have to be preceded
and mediated by a mode of critical analysis. In other words, the precon-
dition for such action was a form of critical theory . But it is important
to stress that in linking critical theory to the goals of social and political
emancipation, the Frankfurt School redefined the very notion of ration-
ality. Rationality was no longer merely the exercise of critical thought, as
had been its earlier Enlightenment counterpart. Instead, rationality now
became the nexus of thought and action in the interest of the liberation
of the community or society as a whole . As a higher rationality, it con-
tained a transcendent project in which individual freedom merged with
social freedom . Marcuse (1964) articulated the nature of such a rational-
ity in his claim that :
(a) it offers the prospect of preserving and improving the produc-
tive achievements of civilization ;
(b) it defines the established totality in its very structure, basic ten-
dencies, and relations ;
(c) its realization offers a greater chance for the pacification of
existence, within the framework of institutions which offer a
greater chance for the free development of human needs and
faculties. (p . 220)
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The Frankfurt School's Analysis of Culture . Central to the Frankfurt
School's critique of positivist rationality was its analysis of culture . Re-
jecting the definition and role of culture found in both traditional socio-
logical accounts and orthodox Marxist theory, Adorno and Horkheimer
(1972), in particular, developed a view of culture that assigned it a key
place in the development of historical experience and everyday life . On
the other hand, the Frankfurt School rejected the mainstream sociologi-
cal notion that culture existed in an autonomous fashion unrelated to the
political and economic life processes of society . In their view, such a per-
spective neutralized culture and, in doing so, abstracted it from the his-
torical and societal context that gave it meaning . For Adorno (1967) the
truth value of such a view was shot through with a contradiction that
reduced culture to nothing more that a piece of ideological shorthand
since :
It overlooks what is decisive: the role of ideology, in social conflicts .
To suppose, if only methodologically, anything like an independent
logic of culture is to collaborate in the hypostasis of culture, the
ideological proton pseudos . The substance of culture . . . resides
not in culture alone but in relation to something external, to the
material life-process . Culture as Marx observed of juridicial and
political systems, cannot be fully `understood either in terms of
itself . . . or in terms of the so-called universal development of the
mind.' To ignore this . . . is to make ideology the basic matter and
to establish it firmly . (p . 29)
On the other hand, while orthodox Marxist theory established a rela-
tionship between culture and the material forces of society, it did so by
reducing culture to a mere reflex of the economic realm . In this view, the
primacy of economic forces and the logic scientific laws took precedence
over any concern with issues concerning the terrain of everyday life, con-
sciousness, or sexuality (Aronowitz, 1981) . For the Frankfurt School,
changing socio-economic conditions had made traditional Marxist cate-
gories of the 1930s and 1940s untenable . They were no longer adequate
for understanding the integration of the working class in the West or the
political effects of technocratic rationality in the cultural realm .
Within the Frankfurt School perspective the role of culture in Western
society had been modified with the transformation of critical Enlighten-
ment rationality into repressive forms of positivist rationality . As a result
of the development of new technical capabilities, greater concentrations
of economic power, and more sophisticated modes of administration, the
rationality of domination increasingly expanded its influence to spheres
outside of the locus of economic production . Under the sign of Taylor-
ism and scientific management instrumental rationality extended its influ-
ence from the domination of nature to the domination of human beings .
As such, mass cultural institutions such as schools took on a new role in
the first half of the 20th century as "both a determinant and fundamental
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component of social consciousness" (Aronowitz, 1976, p . 20) . According
to the Frankfurt School, this meant that the cultural realm now consti-
tuted a central place in the production and transformation of historical
experience. Like Gramsci (1971), Adorno and Horkheimer (1972) argued
that domination had assumed a new form. Instead of being exercised pri-
marily through the use of physical force (the army and police), the power
of the ruling classes was now reproduced through a form of ideological
hegemony; that is, it was established primarily through the rule of con-
sent, and mediated via cultural institutions such as the schools, the fam-
ily, the mass media, the churches, etc . Briefly put, the colonization of
the workplace was not supplemented by the colonization of all other cul-
tural spheres (Aronowitz, 1973 ; Enzensberger, 1974 ; and Ewen, 1976) .
According to the Frankfurt School, culture-like everything else in
capitalist society-had been turned into an object. That is, under the
dual rationalities of administration and exchange the elements of critique
and opposition, which the Frankfurt School believed inherent in tradi-
tional culture, had been lost . Moreover, the objectification of culture did
not simply result in the repression of the critical elements in its form and
content, such objectification also represented the negation of critical
thought itself. In Adorno's (1975) words :
. . . culture, in the true sense, did not simply accommodate itself to
human beings ; . . . it always simultaneously raised a protest against
the petrified relations under which they lived, thereby honoring
them. Insofar as culture becomes wholly assimilated to and inte-
grated into those petrified relations, human beings are once more
debased. (p . 13)
As far as the Frankfurt School was concerned the cultural realm has
become a new locus of control for that aspect of Enlightenment rational-
ity in which the domination of nature and society proceeded under the
guise of technical progress and economic growth. For Adorno and Hork-
heimer (1972) culture had become another industry, one which not only
produced goods but also legitimated the logic of capital and its institu-
tions. The term, "culture industry," was coined by Adorno as a response
to the reification of culture and it had two immediate purposes . First, it
was coined in order to expose the notion that "culture arises spontane-
ously from the masses themselves" (Lowenthal, 1979, pp . 388-389) . Sec-
ond, it pointed to the concentration of economic and political determi-
nants that control the cultural sphere in the interest of social and politi-
cal domination . The term "industry" in the metaphor provided a point o f
critical analysis. That is, it pointed not only to a concentration of
political and economic groups who reproduced and legitimated the domi-
nant belief and value system, it also referred to the mechanisms of
rationalization and standardization as they permeated everyday life . Or,
as Adorno (1975) put it, "the expression `industry' is not to be taken liter-
ally . It refers to the standardization of the thing itself- such as the West-
34
em, familiar to every moviegoer-and to the rationalization of distribu-
tion techniques . . . [and] not strictly to the production process" (p . 14) .
At the core of the theory of culture advanced by Horkheimer, Ador-
no, and Marcuse was an attempt to expose, through both a call for and
demonstration of critique, how positivist rationality manifested itself in
the cultural realm. For instance, they criticized certain cultural products
such as art for excluding the principles of resistance and opposition that
once informed their relationship to the world while simultaneously help-
ing to expose it (Horkheimer, 1972) . Likewise, for Marcuse (1978), "the
truth of art lies in its power to break the monopoly of established reality
(i .e ., of those who established it) to define what is real . In this rupture
. . . the fictitious world of art appears as true reality" (p . 9). The Frank-
furt School argued that in the one dimensional society art collapses,
rather than highlights, the distinction between reality and the possibility
of a higher truth or better world . In other words, in the true spirit of
positivist harmony, art becomes simply a mirror of the existing reality
and in doing so affirms it . Thus, either the memory of a historical truth
or the image of a better way of life is rendered impotent in the ultra real-
ism of the Warhol Campbell soup painting or the Stakhanovite paintings
of socialist realism .
The dictates of positivist rationality and the attendant mutilation of
the power of imagination are also embodied in 'the techniques and forms
that shape the messages and discourse of the culture industry . Whether it
be in the glut of interchangeable plots, gags, or stories, or in the rapid
pace of a film's development, the logic of standardization reigns supreme .
The message is conformity, and the medium for its attainment is amuse-
ment, which proudly packages itself as an escape from the necessity of
critical thought . Under the sway of the culture industry, style subsumes
substance and thought becomes an after-thought banished from the tem-
ple of official culture. Marcuse (1972) states this argument as well as
anyone in his comment:
By becoming components of the aesthetic form, words, sounds,
shapes, and colors are insulated against their familiar, ordinary use
and function ; . . . This is the achievement of style, which is the
poem, the novel, the painting, the composition . The style, embodi-
ment of the aesthetic form, in subjecting reality to another order,
subjects it to the laws of beauty . True and false, right and wrong,
pain and pleasure, calm and violence become aesthetic categories
within the framework of the oeuvre . Thus deprived of their (imme-
diate) reality, they enter a different context in which even the ugly,
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cruel, sick become parts of the aesthetic harmony governing the
whole. (pp. 98-99) "
Inherent in the reduction of culture of amusement is a significant
message, one which points to the root of the ethos of positivist rational-
ity, i .e ., the structural division between work and play . Within the latter
division, work is confined to the imperatives of drudgery, boredom and
powerlessness for the vast majority while culture becomes the vehicle by
which to escape from such toil . The power of the Frankfurt School's
analysis lies in its exposure of the ideological fraud that constitutes this
division of labor. Rather than being an escape from the mechanized work
process, the cultural realm becomes an extension of it . Adorno and
Horkheimer (1972) write :
Amusement under late capitalism is the prolongation of work . It is
sought after as an escape from the mechanized work process, and
to recruit strength in order to be able to cope with it again . But at
the same time mechanization has such power over a man's leisure
and happiness and so profoundly determines the manufacture of
amusement goods, that his experiences are after images of the work
process itself. The ostensible content is merely a faded background ;
what sinks in is an automatic succession of standardized operations .
(p. 137)
The most radical critique of the division of labor among the three
theorists under study finds its expression in the work of Herbert Marcuse
(1955, 1969) . Marcuse (1969) claims that Marxism has not been radical
enough in its attempt to develop a new sensibility that would develop as
"an instinctual barrier against cruelty, brutality, ugliness" (p . 3). Mar-
cuse's (1955) point is that a new rationality which takes as its goal the
erotization of labor "and the development and fulfillment of human
needs" (p . 205) would necessitate new relations of production and organi-
zational structures under which work could take place . This should not
suggest that Marcuse abandons all forms of authority or that he equates
hierarchical relationships with the realm of domination . On the contrary,
he argues that work and play can interpenetrate each other without either
losing their primary character . As Agger (1979) points out :
''The implication that Marcuse's insight has for educational criticism, particularly anal-
yses of the ideologies implicit in textbook design is an important one . Francis Fitzger-
ald (1979) illustrates its use in analyzing some recent social studies textbooks :
The use of all this art and high-quality design contains some irony . The nineteenth-
century photographs of child laborers or urban slum apartments are so beautiful that
they transcend their subjects . To look at them, or at the Victor Gatto painting of the
Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire, is not to see misery or ugliness but an art object . In
the modern chapters, the contrast between junkyards or polluted rivers look as entic-
ing as Gourmet's photographs of food. The book that is perhaps most stark in its
description of modern problems illustrates the horrors of nuclear testing with a pretty
Ben Shahn picture of the Bikini explosion, and the potential for global ecological
disaster with a color photograph of the planet swirling its mantel of white clouds (pp .
15-16) .
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Marcuse is . . . saying that . . . work and play converge without
abandoning the `work' character of work itself. He retains the ra-
tional organization of work without abandoning the Marxian goal
of creative praxis. As he (Marcuse) notes . . . `hierarchical relation-
ships are not unfree per se .' That is, it depends upon the kind of
hierarchy which informs relationships . . . Marcuse . . , suggests
two things : in the first place, he hints at a theory of work which
rests upon the merger of work and play components . His views in
this regard are captured in his vision of the `erotization of labor .' In
the second place, Marcuse, hints at a form of organizational ration-
ality which is nondominating . (p. 194)
According to Marcuse (1964) science and technology have been inte-
grated under the imprint of a dominating rationality that has penetrated
the world of communicative interaction (the public sphere) as well as the
world of work . It is worth mentioning that Habermas (1970), in contrast,
argues that science and technology within the sphere of work are neces-
sarily limited to technical considerations, and that the latter organization
of work represents the price an advanced industrial order must pay for
its material comfort . This position has been challenged by a number of
theorists including Aronowitz (1980) who astutely argues that Habermas
separates "communications and normative judgments from the labor pro-
cess" (p . 80), and in doing so "had ceded to technological consciousness
the entire sphere of rational purposive action [work]" (pp . 81-82). In op-
position to Habermas, Marcuse (1964) argues that radical change means
more than simply the creation of conditions that foster critical thinking
and communicative competence . Such change also entails the transforma-
tion of the labor process itself and the fusion of science and technology
under the guise of a rationality that stresses cooperation and self-
management in the interest of a democratic community and social free-
dom .
While there are significant differences among Adorno, Horkheimer,
and Marcuse regarding their indictment of positivist rationality and their
respective notions about what constitutes an aesthetic or radical sensibil-
ity, their views converge on the existing repressiveness underlying positiv-
ist rationality and the need for the development of a collective critical
consciousness and sensibility that would embrace a discourse of opposi-
tion and non-identity as a precondition of human freedom . Thus, for
them, criticism represented an indispensible element in the struggle for
emancipation, and it is precisely in their call for criticism and a new sen-
sibility that one finds an analysis of the nature of domination that con-
tains invaluable insights for a theory of social education . The analysis, in
this case, includes the Frankfurt School's theory of depth psychology to
which I will now briefly turn .
The Frankfurt School's Analysis of Depth Psychology. As I have pointed
out previously, the Frankfurt School faced a major contradiction in at-
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tempting to develop a critical tradition within Marxist theory . On the one
hand, the historical legacy since Marx had witnessed increased material
production and the continued conquest of nature in both the advanced
industrial countries of the West and the countries of the socialist bloc as
well. In both camps, it appeared that the objective conditions that pro-
moted alienation, despite economic growth, had deepened . For example,
in the West the production of goods and the ensuing commodity fetish-
ism made a mockery of the concept of the good life, reducing it to the
issue of purchasing power . In the socialist bloc, the centralization of
political power led to political repression instead of political and eco-
nomic freedom as had been promised. Yet in both cases the conscious-
ness of the masses failed to keep pace with such conditions .
For the Frankfurt School it became clear that a theory of conscious-
ness and depth psychology was needed to explain the subjective dimen-
sion of liberation and domination. Marx had provided the political and
economic grammar of domination, but he relegated the psychic dimen-
sion to a secondary status and believed that the latter would follow any
significant changes in the economic realm . Thus, it was left to the Frank-
furt School, especially Marcuse (1955, 1964, 1969, 1970), to analyze the
formal structure of consciousness in order to discover how a dehuman-
ized society could continue to maintain its control over its inhabitants,
and similarly, how it was possible that human beings could participate
willingly at the level of everyday life in the reproduction of their own
dehumanization and exploitation . For answers, the Frankfurt School
turned to a critical study of Freud .
If a general theory of culture had been fashioned from the tools of
sociological and historical analyses, it remained to merge Marx with
Freud in order to complete the task . But the notion of depth psychology
as a social and political category did not make its first appearance in the
work of the Frankfurt School ; its historical, political and theoretical
roots were first established in the early works of Wilhelm Reich (1949,
1970, 1969, 1970, 1971). Reich's work is important because it exercised a
strong influence on figures such as Erich Fromm, who was one of the
first members of the Frankfurt School to display a serious interest in
Freud's work . Moreover, the work of Reich and Fromm influenced in
both a positive and negative manner the way in which Adorno, Hork-
heimer, and Marcuse developed their own perspectives on Freudian
psychology .
Historical Background to Depth Psychology . Wilhelm Reich (1949, 1970)
began with the assumption that the rise of authoritarianism in Europe in
the 1920s and the willingness of sections of the working class to partici-
pate in such movements could not be explained by the breakdown of
social relations into merely economic and political categories . While the
latter were clearly important in any discussion of domination, such cate-
gories did not address the question of how domination was internalized
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by the oppressed. Put another way, such categories could not provide an
answer to the question of how it was possible that the oppressed could
participate actively in their own oppression .
In attempting to answer the above questions, Reich's early work pro-
vided both a critique of orthodox Marxism and an elaboration of the
role that Freudian thought might play in deepening and extending a criti-
cal Marxist perspective . For Reich, as well as for the Frankfurt School,
"crude" Marxism had eliminated the notion of subjectivity and as such
had blundered both theoretically and politically . That is, theoretically
European Marxism in the early 1920s had failed to develop a much need-
ed political psychology because of its indifference to the issues of subjec-
tivity and the politics of everyday life . On the other hand, it blundered
politically because by abandoning a concern for issues such as human
motivation, the nature of human desire, and the importance of human
needs as fundamental components of a theory of political change it had
"surrendered" to Hitler and Fascism the opportunity to mobilize both
working class and middle class groups by engaging their emotions and
appealing through propagandistic techniques to important psychic needs,
i.e ., solidarity, community, nationalism, self-identity, etc. Reich (1971) is
worth quoting on this issue :
One element in the fundamental cause of the failure of socialism-
only an element, but an important one, no longer to be ignored, no
longer to be regarded as secondary-is the absence of an effective
doctrine of political psychology . . . . This shortcoming of ours has
become the greatest advantage of the class enemy, the mightiest
weapon of fascism . While we presented the masses with superb his-
torical analyses and economic treatises on the contradictions of im-
perialism, Hitler stirred the deepest roots of their emotional being .
As Marx would have put it, we left the praxis of the subjective fac-
tor to the idealists ; we acted like mechanistic, economistic material-
ists . (p . 19)
For Reich, the obstacles to political change could, in part, be over-
come by delineating "the exact place of psychoanalysis within Marxism"
(Jacoby, 1975, p . 90). In Reich's (1972) terms, this meant uncovering the
way in which concrete mediations, whether they be in the form of dis-
course, social relations, or the productions of the mass media, functioned
so as to produce the internalization of values and ideologies that inhib-
ited the development of individual and collective social consciousness .
Central to Reich's (1970, 1971) early focus on explaining the role of
psychoanalysis within a Marxist perspective was his emphasis on charac-
ter structure, the role of the family as an oppressive agency of socializa-
tion, and the importance of sexual repression as a basis for authoritar-
ianism .
In brief, Reich (1949) argued that the patriarchal family under capi-
talist social relations "creates those character forms which it needs for its
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preservation" (p . xxii). In this case, Reich believed that the family was a
microcosm of the dominant society and that through its perpetuation of
sexual repression it created personality structures receptive to authoritar-
ian ideologies and movements . As Reich (1970) puts it :
Authoritarian society's fight against the sexuality of children and
adolescents, and the consequent struggle in one's own ego, takes
place within the framework of the authoritarian family, which has
thus far proven to be the best institution to carry out this fight suc-
cessfully . . . it is the authoritarian family that represents the fore-
most and most essential source of reproduction of every kind of
reactionary thinking; it is a factory where reactionary ideology and
reactionary structures are produced . Hence, the `safeguarding of the
family,' i .e ., of the authoritarian and large family, is the first cul-
tural precept of every reactionary policy . (p . 56, 60)
While members of the Frankfurt School saw both the role of the fam-
ily and the importance of sexual repression in generating fascism in more
expansive and dialectical terms, they were strongly influenced by Reich's
formulations on the role and nature of depth psychology in providing the
basis for a more critical Marxism .
Erich Fromm. As one of the first members of the Frankfurt School to
display a sustained interest in Freud's work, Erich Fromm occupies an
important place in the attempt to locate psychoanalysis within a Marxist
framework. Like Reich, Fromm was interested in Freud's attempt to
reveal those linkages between the individual and society that illuminated
the dynamics of psychological repression and social domination . As such,
Fromm's (1970) early work on the patriarchical family as well as his
modifications of Freud's ahistorical view of the unconscious exercised a
significant influence on Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse . Equally im-
portant is the negative influence that Fromm had on latter theorists . As
Fromm (1941, 1947) later rejected many of his early formulations regard-
ing Freud's work, particularly as he shifted his focus from a psychology
of the unconscious to one of the conscious, from sexuality to morality,
and from repression to personality development (Jacoby, 1975), the
Frankfurt School began to fashion their own diverse versions of Freudian
theory in reaction to Fromm's revisionist reading of psychoanalysis .
Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse on Depth Psychology . For the Frank-
furt School, Freud's metapsychology provided an important theoretical
foundation for revealing the interplay between the individual and society .
More specifically, the value of Freudian psychology in this case rested
with its illumination of the antagonistic character of social reality . As a
theoretician of contradictions, Freud provided a radical insight into the
way in which society reproduced its powers both in and over the individ-
ual. As Jacoby (1975) puts it :
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Psychoanalysis shows its strength ; it demystifies the claims to liber-
ated values, sensitivities, emotions, by tracing them to a repressed
psychic social, and biological dimension . . . it keeps to the pulse of
the psychic underground. As such it is more capable of grasping the
intensifying social unreason that the conformist psychologies repress
and forget : the barbarism of civilization itself, the barely sup-
pressed misery of the living, the madness that haunts society . (p . 18)
The Frankfurt School theorists believed that it was only in an under-
standing of the dialectic between the individual and society that the depth
and extent of domination as it existed both within and outside of the in-
dividual could be open to modification and transformation . Thus, for
Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse, Freud's emphasis on the constant
struggles between the individual's desire for instinctual gratification and
the dynamics of social repression provided an indispensible clue to under-
standing the nature of society and the dynamics of psychic domination
and liberation. Adorno (1967) points to this in the following comments :
The only totality the student of society can presume to know is the
antagonistic whole, and if he is to attain to totality at all, then only
in contradiction . . . . The jarring elements that make up the indi-
vidual, his `properties,' are invariably moments of the social totali-
ty. He is, in the strict sense a monad, representing the whole and its
contradictions, without however, being at any time conscious of the
whole. (pp. 74-77)
In order to explore the depth of the conflict between the individual
and society, the Frankfurt School accepted with some major modifica-
tions most of Freud's most radical assumptions . More specifically,
Freud's theoretical schema contained three important elements for devel-
oping a depth psychology. First, Freud provided a formal psychological
structure for the Frankfurt School theorists to work with . That is, the
Freudian outline of the structure of the psyche with its underlying strug-
gle between eros (the life instinct), the death instinct, and the outside
world represented a key conception in the depth psychology developed by
the Frankfurt School .
Secondly, Freud's studies on psychopathology, particularly his sensi-
tivity to humanity's capacity for self-destructiveness and his focus on the
loss of ego-stability and the decline of the influence of the family in con-
temporary society, added significantly to the Frankfurt School analyses
of mass society and the rise of the authoritarian personality . For the
Frankfurt School, the growing concentration of power in capitalist soci-
ety along with the pervasive intervention of the state in the affairs of
everyday life had altered the dialectical role of the traditional family as
both a positive and negative site for identify formation. That is, the
family traditionally had provided, on the one hand, a sphere of warmth
and protection for its members, while, on the other hand, it also func-
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tinned as a repository for social and sexual repression . But under the
development of advanced industrial capitalism, the latter dual function
of the family was gradually giving way to functioning exclusively as a site
for social and cultural reproduction .
Finally, by focusing on Freud's theory of instincts and metapsychol-
ogy, the Frankfurt School devised a theoretical framework for unraveling
and exposing the objective and psychological obstacles to social change .
This issue is important because it provides significant insights into how
depth psychology might be useful for developing a more comprehensive
theory of social education . Since there were some major differences be-
tween Adorno and Horkheimer, on the one side, and Marcuse on the
other regarding Freud's theory of instincts as well as his view of the rela-
tionship between the individual and society, I will treat their respective
contributions separately .
Adorno and Horkheimer on Depth Psychology . Adorno (1968) was quick
to point out that while Freud's denunciation of "man's unfreedom" over-
identified with a particular historical period and thus "petrified into an
anthropological constant" (p . 81), it did not seriously distract from his
greatness as a theoretician of contradictions . That is, in spite of the limi-
tations in Freudian theory, Adorno and Horkheimer firmly believed that
psychoanalysis provided a strong theoretical bulwark against those psy-
chological and social theories that exalted the idea of the "integrated per-
sonality" and the "wonders" of social harmony . True to Adorno's (1968)
view that "every image of man is ideology except the negative one" (p .
84), Freud's work appeared to transcend its own shortcomings because at
one level it personified the spirit of negation. Adorno (1967, 1968) clearly
exalted the negative and critical features of psychoanalysis and saw them
as major theoretical weapons to be used against every form of identity
theory . The goals of identity theory and revisionist psychology were both
political and ideological in nature, and it was precisely through the use of
Freud's metapsychology that they could be exposed as such . As Adorno
(1968) put it :
The goal of the `well integrated personality' is objectionable because
it expects the individual to establish an equilibrium between conflic-
ting forces which does not obtain in existing society . Nor should it,
because these forces are not of equal moral merit . People are
taught to forget the objective conflicts which necessarily repeat
themselves in every individual instead of being helped to grapple
with them . (p . 83)
While it was clear to the Frankfurt School that psychoanalysis could
not solve the problems of repression and authoritarianism, they believed
that it did provide important insights into how "people become accom-
plices to their own subjugation" (Benjamin, 1977, p . 22). Yet, beneath
the analyses put forth on psychoanalysis by Adorno (1967, 1968, 1972,
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1973) and Horkheimer (1972) there lurked a disturbing paradox . While
both theorists went to great lengths to explain the dynamics of authori-
tarianism and psychological domination, they said very little about those
formal aspects of consciousness that might provide a basis for resistance
and rebellion . That is, while Freudian psychology in their view registered
a powerful criticism of existing society in exposing its antagonistic char-
acter, Horkheimer and Adorno failed to locate in either individuals or
social classes the psychological or political grounds for recognizing such
contradictions and acting to transform them . Consequently, Adorno and
Horkheimer provided a view of Freudian psychology that consigned
Freud to the ambiguous status of being a radical as well as a prophet of
gloom.
Marcuse's Search For Freud . If Adorno and Horkheimer viewed Freud as
a revolutionary pessimist, Marcuse (1955) read him as a revolutionary
utopian. That is, though Marcuse (1955) accepts most of Freud's most
controversial assumptions, his interpretation of the latter are both unique
and provocative . In one sense, Marcuse's (1955, 1968, 1970) analysis con-
tained an original dialectical twist in that it pointed to a utopian integra-
tion of Marx and Freud . While Marcuse (1955) accepted Freud's view of
the antagonistic relations between the individual and society as a funda-
mental insight, he nevertheless altered some of Freud's basic categories
and in doing so situated Freud's pessimism within a historical context
that revealed its strengths as well as limitations . In doing so, Marcuse
was able to illuminate the importance of Freud's metapsychology as a
basis for social change . This becomes particularly clear if we examine
how Marcuse (1955, 1968, 1970) reworked Freud's basic claims regarding
the life and death instincts, the struggle between the individual and soci-
ety, the relationship between scarcity and social repression, and, finally,
the issues of freedom and human emancipation .
Marcuse (1955, 1964) begins with the basic assumption that inherent
in Freud's theory of the unconscious and theory of the instincts the theo-
retical elements for a more comprehensive view of the nature of individ-
ual and social domination could be found. Marcuse (1955) point to this
possibility when he writes :
The struggle against freedom reproduces itself in the psyche of
man, as the self repression of the repressed individual, and his self
represssion in turn sustains his masters and their institutions . It is in
the mental dynamic which Freud unfolds as the dynamic of civiliza-
tion . . . . Freud's metapsychology is an ever renewed attempt to un-
cover, to question, the terrible necessity of the inner connection be-
tween civilization and barbarism, progress and suffering, freedom
and unhappiness -a connection which reveals itself ultimately as
that between Eros and Thanatos . (pp. 16-17)
For Marcuse (1955, 1970) Freudian psychology posited, as a result of its
analysis of the relationship between civilization and instinctual repres-
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sion, the theoretical basis for understanding the distinction between so-
cially necessary authority and authoritarianism . That is, in the interplay
between the need for social labor and the equally important need for
sublimation of sexual energy, the dynamic connection between domina-
tion and freedom, on the one hand, and authority and authoritarianism,
on the other, starts to become discernible . Freud presented the conflict
between the individual's instinctual need for pleasure and the society's de-
mand for repression as an insoluble problem rooted in a transhistorical
struggle; as such, he pointed to the continuing repressive transformation
of eros in society along with the growing propensity for self destruction .
Marcuse (1970) believed that the "Freudian conception of the relationship
between civilization and the dynamics of the instincts [was] in need of a
decisive correction" (p . 20). That is, whereas Freud (1949) saw the in-
creased necessity for social and instinctual repression, Marcuse (1955,
1970) argued that any understanding of social repression had to be situ-
ated within a specific historical context and judged as to whether such
systems of domination exceeded their bounds . To ignore such a distinc-
tion was to forfeit the possibility of analyzing the difference between the
exercise of legitimate authority and illegitimate forms of domination . For
Marcuse (1955), Freud had failed to capture in his analysis the historical
dynamic of organized domination and thus he gave it the status and dig-
nity of a biological development that was universal rather than historical-
ly contingent .
While Marcuse (1955) accepts the Freudian notion that the central
conflict in society is between the reality principle and the pleasure prin-
ciple, he rejects the position that the latter had to adjust to the former .
In other words, Freud (1949) believed that "the price of civilization is
paid for in forfeiting happiness through heightening of the sense of guilt"
(p . 114) . This is important because at the core of Freud's notion that
humanity was forever condemned to diverting pleasure and sexual energy
into alienating labor was an appeal to a transhistorical "truth" : that scar-
city was inevitable in society and that labor was inherently alienating . In
opposition to Freud, Marcuse (1955) argued that the reality principle re-
ferred to a particular form of historical existence when scarcity legiti-
mately dictated instinctual repression . But in the contemporary period,
such conditions had been superceded and as such abundance, and not
scarcity, characterized or informed the reality principle governing the ad-
vanced industrial countries of the West .
In order to add a more fully historical dimension to Freud's analysis,
Marcuse (1955) introduced the notions of performance principle and sur-
plus repression. By arguing that scarcity was not a universal aspect of the
human condition, Marcuse (1955, 1970) claimed that the moment had ar-
rived within the industrial West when it was no longer necessary to sub-
mit men and women to the demands of alienating labor . The existing
reality principle, which Marcuse (1955) labeled as the performance prin-
ciple, had outstripped its historical function, i .e., the sublimation of eros
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in the interest of socially necessary labor . The performance principle,
with its emphasis on technocratic reason and exchange rationality, was,
in Marcuse's (1955) terms, both historically contingent and socially re-
pressive. As a relatively new mode of domination it tied people to values,
ideas and social practices that blocked their possibilities for gratification
and happiness as ends in themselves .
In short, Marcuse (1955) believed that inherent in Marx's view of
societal abundance and Freud's theory of instincts was the basis for a
new performance principle, one that was governed by the principles of
socially necessary labor as well as by those aspects of the pleasure prin-
ciple that integrated work, play, and sexuality . This leads us to Marcuse's
second important notion, i.e ., the concept of surplus repression. The ex-
cessiveness of the existing nature of domination could be measured
through what Marcuse (1955) labeled as surplus repression . Making a dis-
tinction between socially useful repression and surplus repression, Mar-
cuse (1955) claims that :
Within the total structure of the repressed personality, surplus re-
pression is that portion which is the result of specific societal condi-
tions sustained in the specific act of domination . The extent of this
surplus-repression provides the standard of measurement : the small-
er it is, the less repressive is the stage of civilization. The distinction
is equivalent to that between the biological and the historical
sources of human suffering . (pp. 87-88)
According to Marcuse (1955, 1970), it is within this dialectical inter-
play of the personality structure and historically conditioned repression
that the nexus exists for uncovering the historical and contemporary na-
ture of domination . Domination in this sense is twice historical : first, it
is rooted in the historically developed socio-economic conditions of a
given society; second, it is rooted in the sedimented history or personality
structure of individuals . In speaking of domination as a psychological as
well as political phenomenon, Marcuse (1955, 1970) did not give a blank
check to wholesale gratification . On the contrary, he agreed with Freud
that some forms of repression were generally necessary ; what he objected
to was the unnecessary repression that was embodied in tie ethos and
social practices that characterized social institutions such„as the school,
workplace, and family .
For Marcuse (1969) the most penetrating marks of social repression
are generated in the inner history of individuals, in the "needs, satisfac-
tions, and values which reproduce the servitude of human existence" (p .
6). As such needs are mediated and reinforced through the patterns and
social routines of everyday life, and the "false" needs that perpetuate toil,
misery, and aggressiveness become anchored in the personality structure
as second nature . That is, the historical character of such needs is "for-
gotten" and they become reduced to patterns of habit .
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In the end, Marcuse (1955) grounds even Freud's important notion of
death instinct (the autonomous drive that increasingly leads to self de-
struction) in a radical problematic . That is, by claiming that the primary
drive of humanity is pleasure, Marcuse (1955) redefines the death instinct
by arguing that it is mediated not by the need for self destruction,
although that is a form it may take, but by the need to resolve tension .
Rooted in such a perspective, the death instinct is not only redefined, it
is also politicized in that Marcuse (1955) argues that in a non-repressive
society it would be subordinated to the demands of eros . As such, Mar-
cuse (1955, 1969) ends up supporting the Frankfurt School's notion of
negative thinking, but with an important qualification . He insists on its
value as a mode of critique, but he equally insists that it is grounded in
socio-economic conditions that can be transformed . Thus, it is the prom-
ise of a better future rather than despair over the existing nature of soci-
ety that informs both Marcuse's work, and its possibilities as a mode of
critique for social educators .
The relevance of Marcuse's analysis for educational theory becomes
obvious in the more recent work of Pierre Bourdieu (1977a, 1977b) .
Bourdieu argues that the school and other social institutions legitimate
and reinforce through specific sets of practices and discourses class based
systems of behavior and dispositions that function to reproduce the exist-
ing dominant society . As such, Bourdieu extends Marcuse's insights by
pointing to a notion of learning in which a child internalizes the cultural
messages of the school not only via the Tatter's official discourse (symbol-
ic mastery), but also through the messages embodied in the `insignificant'
practices of daily classroom life . Bourdieu (1977b) is worth quoting at
length on this issue :
[Schools] . . . set such a store on seemingly most insignificant de-
tails of dress, bearing, physical and verbal manners . . . . The prin-
ciples embodied in this way are placed beyond the grasp of con-
sciousness, and hence cannot be touched by voluntary, deliberate
transformation, cannot even be made explicit . . . . The whole trick
of pedagogic reason lies precisely in the way it extorts the essential
while seeming to demand the insignificant : in obtaining respect for
forms and forms of respect which constitute the most visible and at
the same time the best hidden manifestations to the established
order. (pp. 94-95)
Unlike Bourdieu, Marcuse believes that historically conditioned needs
that function in the interest of domination can be changed . That is, Mar-
cuse (1955) argues any viable form of political action must begin with a
notion of political education in which a new language, qualitatively dif-
ferent social relations, and a new set of values would have to operate
with the purpose of creating a new environment "in which the nonaggres-
sive, erotic, receptive faculties of man, in harmony with the conscious-
ness of freedom, strive for the pacification of man and nature" (Mar-
46
cuse, 1969, p . 31). Thus, the notion of depth psychology developed by
the Frankfurt School not only provides new insights into how subjectivi-
ties are formed or how ideology functions as lived experience, it also pro-
vides theoretical tools to establish the conditions for new needs, new sys-
tems of values, and new social practices that take seriously the impera-
tives of a critical pedagogy .
CONCLUSION
While it is impossible to elaborate in any detail what the implications
of the work of the Frankfurt School might be for theories of social edu-
cation, I can point briefly to some general considerations . I believe it is
clear that the thought of the Frankfurt School provides a major chal-
lenge and stimulus to educational theorists who are critical of theories of
social education that are tied to functionalist paradigms based on as-
sumptions drawn from a positivist rationality . For instance, against the
positivist spirit that infuses existing educational theory and practice,
whether it takes the form of the Tyler model or various systems ap-
proaches, the Frankfurt School offers an historical analysis as well as a
penetrating philosophical framework that indict the wider culture of posi-
tivism, while at the same time providing insights into how the latter be-
comes incorporated within the ethos and practices of schools . Though
there is a growing body of educational literature that is critical of positiv-
ist rationality in schools, it lacks the sophistication found in the work of
the Frankfurt School . Moreover, even some of the better histories of cur-
riculum theory and social education have failed to analyze the positivist
underpinnings of curriculum development within a wider historical con-
text, one that demonstrates the relationship between the dominant culture
of positivism and the mechanisms of schooling (Giroux, 1981a and Wex-
ler, forthcoming) . Similarly, the importance of historical consciousness as
a fundamental component of critical thinking in the Frankfurt School
paradigm creates a valuable epistemological terrain upon which to devel-
op modes of critique that illuminate the interaction of the social and the
personal, on the one hand, and history and private experience on the
other. Through this form of analysis, dialectical thought replaces positiv-
ist forms of social inquiry . That is, the logic of predictability, verifiabil-
ity, transferability, and operationalism is replaced by a dialectical mode
of thinking that stresses the historical, relational and normative dimen-
sions of social inquiry and school knowledge.
In addition, the Frankfurt School's theory of culture offers new con-
cepts and categories for analyzing the role that schools play as agents of
social and cultural reprdouction . By illuminating the relationship between
power and culture, the Frankfurt School provides a perspective on the
way in which dominant ideologies are constituted and mediated via spe-
cific cultural formations . The concept of culture in this sense exists in a
particular relationship to the material base of society ; and the explana-
tory power of such a relationship is to be found in making problematic
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the specific content of a culture, its relationship to dominant and subor-
dinate social groups, the socio-historical genesis of the ethos and prac-
tices of legitimating cultures and their role in constituting relations of
domination and resistance . For example, by pointing to schools as cul-
tural sites that embody conflicting political values and practices, it be-
comes possible to investigate how schools can be studied as an expression
of the wider organization of society, particularly with respect to the class
and gender based nature of the content, methods and modes of educa-
tional research that characterize school life . Marcuse's (1964) study of
language, Adorno's (1976) analysis of the sociology of music, and Hork-
heimer's (1972, 1974) investigations into the normative grounding of the-
ory provide a number of theoretical constructs through which to investi-
gate the socially constructed nature of school experience and to weigh the
truth claims inherent in such experiences against the reality of the exist-
ing society .
The treatment of culture as a political entity in the work of the
Frankfurt School also points to a mode of analysis by which educators
can develop theories of social education that give a central role to the
history or cultural capital that students from different groups bring with
them to the school. It is no small matter to argue that students need to
affirm their own histories through the use of a language, set of practices,
and subject matter that dignifies the cultural constructs and experiences
that make up the tissue and texture of their daily lives . Once the affirma-
tive nature of such a pedagogy is established, it becomes possible for stu-
dents, especially those students who have been traditionally voiceless in
schools, to learn the skills, knowledge, and modes of inquiry that will
allow them to analyze critically what role the existing society has played
in both shaping and thwarting their aspirations and goals . Moreover, it is
important that such students come to grips with what this society has
made of them, how it has incorporated them both materially and ideo-
logically, and what it is they need affirm and reject in their own histories
in order to begin the process of struggling for a self-managed existence .
Unlike models of a functionalist orientation, whether they be drawn
from a conservative or radical orientation, the Frankfurt School's theory
of culture also stresses the importance of consciousness and subjectivity
in the process of learning and self-formation. While it is true that Ador-
no, Marcuse, and Horkheimer placed a heavy weight on the notion of
domination in their analysis, and the integration of the masses into the
existing society, I believe that such an emphasis was meant to highlight
the forces of social and political domination at a time when it was diffi-
cult to understand or even recognize the nature of such domination . Such
an analysis was not meant to downplay the importance of human inter-
vention or the possibilities for social change ; in fact, the notion of hope
and the possibility of transcendence were embodied in the Frankfurt
School's notion of critique . That is, inherent in the latter view was the
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idea that a better world was possible, that people could speak, act, and
think in terms that spoke to a qualitatively better life . Thus, the notion
of critique and the development of an active critical consciousness were
pointed to and focused on as the preconditions for cultural and political
mobilization .
Finally, it is clear that almost all theories of social education are too
cognitive. They lack a depth psychology, as well as an appreciation of a
sensibility that points to the importance of the sensual and imaginative as
central dimensions of the schooling experience. The Frankfurt School's
notion of depth psychology, especially Marcuse's work, opens up new
terrain for a developing a critical pedagogy . In other words, it speaks to
the need to fashion new categories of analyses that will enable educators
to become more knowledgeable regarding how teachers, students, and
other educational workers become part of the system of social and cul-
tural reproduction, particularly as it works through the messages and val-
ues that are constituted via the social practices of the hidden curriculum
(Giroux, 1981c) . By acknowledging the need for a critical social psychol-
ogy, educators can begin to identify how ideologies get constituted and
they can then identify and reconstruct social practices and processes that
break rather than continue existing forms of social and psychological
domination .
The task of translating the work of the Frankfurt School into terms
that inform and enrich educational theory and practice will be difficult,
especially since any attempt to use such work will have to begin with the
understanding that it contains shortcomings and that in addition such
work cannot be imposed in grid-like fashion onto a theory of social edu-
cation . For instance, the Frankfurt School theorists did not develop a
comprehensive theoretical approach for dealing with the patterns of con-
flict and contradictions that existed in various cultural spheres ; more-
over, they never developed adequately the notion of dual consciousness .
That is, the contradictory modes of thinking that characterize the way
most people view the world were not explored adequately nor were such
modes of thinking analyzed carefully enough with respect to the value
they might have for developing counter-hegemonic struggles . As such,
the notion of resistance was underplayed by the Frankfurt School .
Any attempt to read the work of Adorno, Marcuse, and Horkheimer,
then, must be done critically and then it must be applied selectively with-
in the specificity of the context in which it will be used . It should also be
stressed that beyond the complexity and shortcomings inherent in such
work, there are the structural and political constraints that may prevent
teachers and others from incorporating it into their educational experi-
ences. To use such work presupposes the development of a mode of radi-
cal pedagogy that might encounter enormous resistance and even endan-
ger one's job. These constraints cannot be taken lightly, even though
such risks are involved in all struggles that attempt to strive for a better
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society and world . Thus, the conditions under which this work is to be
used have to be given serious thought or one may fall into the trap of
either expecting too much too soon from such work or one may attempt
to abstract it from the context in which it is to be used and be unable to
deal with the way in which such a context might resist or alter the nature
of such theoretical approach . If one is to avoid the pitfalls of either a
false utopianism or an equally false despair, the theoretical insights
gleaned from the work of the Frankfurt School must be mediated by the
ideological and material conditions that give meaning to specific school
settings and classroom sites . Finally, it is important to note that while
schools are not the sole sites for implementing social change, they do of-
fer an important terrain on which to provide future generations with new
ways for thinking about the building of a more just society. The work of
the Frankfurt School provides a major contribution to educators who
want to play a role in helping students think and struggle in the interest
of a better world .
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The difficult thing to explain about how middle class kids get mid-
dle class jobs is why others let them . The difficult thing to explain
about how working class kids get working class jobs is why they let
themselves . It is much too facile simply to say that they have no
choice . . . There is no obvious physical coercion and a degree of
self direction. (Willis, 1977, p . 1)
There are a number of social processes that are largely invisible in so-
cial studies education . Getting jobs and selecting careers is one such pro-
cess. But the relationship between social background and jobs and ca-
reers that has been stable throughout the twentieth century in the United
States (Blau and Duncan, 1967) has not been given attention in the social
studies either as a description, explanation, or interpretation of our socie-
ty. In a sense social studies education is like Vincent Canby's description
of television :
Ninety-nine out of a hundred images we see on television are essen-
tially passive, by which I mean they are accepting of the way things
are . They're never skeptical . (1980, Section 1, p . 1)
This is certainly the case with social studies textbooks (Anyon, 1979a and
1979b). The origins and nature of this lack of skepticism and criticism in
social studies education and a proposed counter strategy is the focus of
this paper .
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It has been argued elsewhere that a broad set of positivist
epistemological assumptions that characterize social studies education
leads to the objectification of social phenomena (Cherryholmes, 1980) .
Such objectification sanctions the non-critical acceptance of social
reproduction as it exists in the United States . But a growing number of
critiques of mainstream social studies thinking and practice agree in prin-
ciple with Michael Young's assessment of the "new" sociology of educa-
tion .
The sociological mission was not to explain the world to others, but
to tell them that it was really theirs already, if only they knew .
(Young, 1978, p . 131)
Social studies education that can be traced to the new social studies - as
well as the older model of citizenship transmission - purports, however,
to explain the world to students and does not tell them in any sense that
it is theirs . The growing critical literature suggests that there are funda-
mental misconstructions in many widely accepted views of social studies
education . The criticisms have ranged from epistemological ones (Cherry-
holmes, 1980) to the politics of social education and research (Apple,
1971 ; Anyon, 1979; and Popkewitz, 1978) and the ideological dimensions
of social studies education (Giroux and Penna, 1979 and van Manen,
1975). The relationships among these critiques, even though there are
points of disagreement, exemplify the way that matters of epistemology
and ideology are related . It is not possible, for example, to search for or
discuss "true" statements without presuming a normative structure that
guides the search or governs the discussion . The norms that guide the
search for truth constitute the ideology of the discourse . If these norms
change, what we presume to be true about the world is also altered .
These critiques assume and sometimes highlight different aspects of the
epistemololgical/ideological relationship .
The relationships between questions of epistemology and matters of
ideology are complex . This has been argued in different ways by Berlin
(1962), Bernstein (1976), W olin (1968), and Habermas (1971) among
others. But social studies educators, for the most part, have treated ques-
tions of knowledge as the non-problematic product of the social sciences
and history. What social studies educators have treated as non-prob-
lematic, however, has become a matter of debate in curriculum . The
Tanner and Tanner (1979a and 1979b) and Pinar (1979) exchange is an
example of this . The problematic nature of knowledge in social studies
education can be appraised by focusing on two related issues, the
epistemological search for truth about society and the norms and
ideology that guide the search. In the curriculum field the debate has
tended to become entangled in ideological claims and charges . The result
has been to obfuscate the criticisms offered and the defenses raised
against them. For this reason, the following argument will begin with
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epistemological considerations and then move to questions of criticism,
discourse, and ideology .
Broadly speaking, much contemporary thinking about the purpose of
information and knowledge in the social studies reflects the pragmatism
of Dewey, which is an instrumental utilization of knowledge . One of
Newmann's points can be used as an illustration,
To formulate defensible goals in public affairs, therefore, in-
dividuals must grapple with empirical and definitional, as well as
moral or value, issues . Research skills in the collection, organ-
ization, and interpretation of data are required to determine, for
example, the extent of housing code violations in a neighborhood
or discriminatory practices in a public agency . To predict probable
effects of proposed policies for dealing with such problems requires
similar research capability . (Newmann, 1975, pp. 83-84)
Information and knowledge are useful, because they help one chart a
path through the social and physical world . The options are first laid out
and can then be weighted by one's values in making personal and social
decisions (Engle, 1960 and Engle and Longstreet, 1972) .
This view of information and knowledge in social studies education
makes eminently good sense as far as it goes . But the nature of social
knowledge is a bit more complex than it first might appear . The view one
takes of social information and knowledge and their relation to social
phenomena determines, to a large degree, the options to be considered in
a decision making approach to social studies . Newmann correctly inter-
prets one aspect of this problem . If information is available about only
one course of action, the decision calculus is much less complex than if
available information and knowledge suggests multiple options .
The epistemological position implied in Newmann's statement
represents mainstream thinking in the social studies . The problem can be
illustrated by the following example .
. . , since 1920 no more than 64 percent of the American popula-
tion eligible to vote has ever turned out to vote in a presidential
election . . . The local level suffers more seriously . Less than 40
percent of the eligible voter population tends to turn out to vote in
local election . . . There are many reasons why people choose to
vote or not to vote . Some of the reasons have to do with income
and education. Other reasons include religion or ethnic or racial
identification . (Gillespie and Lazarus, 1979, pp . 105-106)
What does this statement mean? At least two different kinds of assump-
tions must be made in assigning a meaning to this statement . One
assumption is about the phenomenon itself, in this case the act of non-
voting. A second assumption must be made about the statement describ-
ing the act. It is important to distinguish between an individual choosing
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not to go to the polls and the statement " . . . since 1920 no more than
The act of non-voting can be looked at in at least two ways. It can be
treated as a given, naturally occurring, objective phenomenon or it can
be seen as an intentional act by those who have chosen not to vote and
who could have chosen to do otherwise. If the former position is ac-
cepted, social studies education will tend to focus on regularities of be-
havior . If one accepts the latter, social studies will not stop with covering
generalizations of observed regularities but will also move on to inter-
pretation of those generalizations and criticism of the interpretations
(Bernstein, 1976) .
The statement, " . . . since 1920 no more than . . .," can also be
viewed from different perspectives . These perspectives can be highlighted
by the question, what does it mean if the statement is true? But to
answer this one must first address what is meant by truth, and truth is
seemingly non-problematic in contemporary social studies education .
Philosophically, the meaning of truth is not settled ; four competing
views will be mentioned . The correspondence theory of truth, according
to Tarski, is that "a sentence is true if it is satisfied by all objects and
false otherwise" (Tarski, 1952, p . 25) . Intuitively, this is an appealing
idea. But it runs into the fundamental problem that statements are dif-
ferent from things in the world . Formal logic provides rules for testing
statements against statements but there are only guidelines for testing
statements against things .
A second view is that a statement's truth is determined by its relation
to other statements . Variants of this include the coherence theory of
truth, the pragmatic theory of truth, and the consensus theory of truth .
Under the coherence theory,
. . . to say that a statement is true or false is to say that it coheres
or fails to cohere with a system of other statements . . . (White,
1967, p . 130)
One version of the pragmatic theory is summarized in the following
passage :
Ideas become true when their "draft upon existence" is honored by
the verifying facts they promise . According to Dewey's analysis of
the working correspondence of idea and fact, the notion that truth
somehow exists antecedent to and separate from inquiry is meaning-
less. For him truth was a mutable concept . Truth "happens to an
idea" when it becomes a verified or unwarranted assertion . (Ezor-
sky, 1967, p. 42)
The consensus theory of truth has been suggested by Habermas and is
based, in part, on the work of Pierce :
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The meaning of the truth or untruth of a statement does not consist
in the conditions guaranteeing the objectivity of our experience but
in the possibility of argumentative corroboration of a truth claim
which is falsifiable in principle . (Habermas, 1973, p . 166)
Truth qua justification of the truth claim inherent in a proposition
does not reveal itself, like the objectivity of experience, in feedback
controlled action but only in a process of successful reasoning by
which the truth claim is first rendered problematic and then re-
deemed. (Habermas, 1973, p . 169)
A brief consideration of these views reveals some of the complexity of
social knowledge. Because of the ontological ambiguity of the cor-
respondence theory of truth, a view of truth whereby statements cohere,
are warranted, or are tested by other statements is attractive . But the
statements with which the statement being tested must cohere, by which
it is warranted, and against which it is tested may be, in their turn, incor-
rect. We are reduced to testing one judgment against another . To return
to Newmann's example, the true number of housing code violations
depends on judgments concerning correct interpretations of the housing
code, properly trained housing inspectors, free access, accurate record
keeping procedures, adequate budget, and a number of other factors . It
is necessary to judge each of these factors before asserting the truth of a
statement concerning the number of housing code violations .
With the coherence theory it is possible to have different logically
consistent sets of statements about the same phenomenon with no way to
choose among them, incommensurable theories as it were . The pragmatic
theory faces a different problem . Truth is warranted in the context of in-
quiry but purposes guide inquiry and purposes are normative and may
inject biases into inquiry. Habermas developed the idea of communica-
tive competence and discourse to deal with the problem of bias and dis-
tortion. Free and unconstrained discourse that leads to increasingly
reflected levels of thought is used to test the truth of statements. This
allows one set of coherent statements to be evaluated against another as
well as to reveal the purposes and normative commitments embedded in
them. Habermas's goal of "demystifying false consciousness" can be ap-
proached as arguments are increasingly reflected .
There are, then, conflicting conceptualizations of the nature of social
phenomena and social knowledge . Certain traditions encourage the ob-
jectification of an external social world where the truth of statements is
judged against objects (Popper, 1965) . An interpretative, critical perspec-
tive, on the other hand, assumes that the social world is in need of
interpretation and interpretations are in need of criticism . Criticism is
needed to disclose and peel back the layers of value and commitment
embedded in interpretations and explanations . Criticism does not lead to
value free knowledge claims but instead surfaces, analyzes, and
scrutinizes existing values with the goal of emancipating individuals from
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social institutions that are historically and culturally conditioned (Haber-
mas, 1976) .
The passiveness and lack of skepticism in social studies education
may stem from an implicit commitment to an objectified social world
and a correspondence theory of truth . These are often related to other
epistemological assumptions, such as beliefs that : there is a fact/value
distinction, there is a distinction between observational and theoretical
terms, there is a distinction between analytic and synthetic statements,
science is an inductive process, and there is a unity in all of the sciences
(Cherryholmes, 1980) . But each of these assumptions has been seriously
challenged . The works of Austin (1968), Searle (1969), Berlin (1962), and
Wolin (1968) attack the strict separation of facts and values; Suppe
(1977), the distinction between observational and theoretical terms ; Quine
(1953), the analytic/synthetic distinction; Popper (1959), the notion that
science is an inductive process ; and Schutz (1963), Husserl (1970), and
Habermas (1971), the unity of the sciences .
Ahistorical social science that unreflectively objectifies the social
world is shot through with the values of that world . Social studies ma-
terials based on the product of an unreflective social science tend to rein-
force and reproduce those values . Such social studies materials exhibit
ideological commitments of the institutions being studied . Those commit-
ments, whatever their content, will tend to be reinforced if teachers who
are largely unaware of these issues fail to adopt a critical stance toward
their subject matter . Lack of reflection on knowledge claims may also
lead to demands for teaching social studies as citizenship transmission
focusing on facts and information; non-critically teaching social science
concepts, generalizations, and theories; or encouraging the introspective
consideration of self that is not tied systematically to historical and
cultural analysis or to public affairs .
Knowledge of the social world, by this analysis, has an ideological
component, and interpretation and criticism is intended to clarify the
valuative aspects of our knowledge claims . Social phenomena and the
language used to describe them preclude a "value free" social science .
Furthermore, power relations and some social processes bias and distort
the search for truth . If these biases and distortions turn the reflective
search for truth into a straightforward reporting of observed regularities,
the knowledge generated contributes to the reproduction of existing
social institutions and relations .
If this critique is valid the debate over the "relevance" of what is
learned in school is not simply a function of topic selection but also of
the way topics are treated . The absence of a critical component in social
studies submerges political and ethical issues as the result of a demand
for information that can be settled by appealing to social science authori-
ty. Social studies education is depoliticized because the political compo-
nent of information and knowledge is ignored . The result is to support
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implicitly the status quo . Another term for lack of relevance is
depoliticized schooling .
If social science is viewed as bits or systems of information and
knowledge to be conveyed to students, then effective teaching is simply
the maximization of some learning function . But all knowledge does not
conform to the demands of behavioral learning objectives that are some-
times used to specify such a function . It is not possible, in principle, to
state sufficient conditions for the achievement of all types of learning ob-
jectives (Cherryholmes, 1978). The outcome of ethical discourse as well
as the interpretation and criticism of social scientific findings, for exam-
ple, are problematic . To treat these topics otherwise is to misrepresent
them. Therefore, if behavioral learning objectives are employed, one is
led either to trivialize or to distort fundamentally certain kinds of con-
tent, such as teaching about social justice .
Considering the past abuse of indiscriminately using behavioral learn-
ing objectives to teach all aspects of social studies brings the argument
full circle . Behavioral learning objectives submerge the ideological com-
ponent of social science findings into information and "valid and
reliable" theories and explanations that are treated as if they were objec-
tive and value free . This distortion leads to the impression that histor-
ically and culturally conditioned institutions and social processes are not
only the way the world is but the way it must be. A proper outcome of
social studies should not merely educate students about social institutions
and processes but also help emancipate them from these views of the
world and knowledge claims about it .
The passiveness of the social studies has several dimensions . One part
is epistemological. Because the operative epistemology retains severely at-
tacked positivist assumptions, social knowledge in the social studies is
distortive. A second and related factor is ideological . Critical interpreta-
tion of descriptions and explanations is not integral to social studies
texts. Uncritically treating social processes and institutions as they appear
supports "things as they are ." A third factor is the utilization of certain
educational technologies, such as behavioral objectives, that encourage
the objectification of social phenomena . Passiveness and lack of skep-
ticism persists because these views of social phenomena, knowledge,
ideology, and educational technology interpenetrate and reinforce each
other . But schools need not simply reflect and reproduce society . Schools
may not be powerful enough to revolutionize society but they are cer-
tainly not impotent (Giroux, 1979) . Social studies educators can move
toward critical reflection by acting with the freedom and autonomy they,
already possess .
II
To this point it has been argued that social behavior is intentional
and its meaning is problematic and not given on the face of things . More
is involved in the validity of social knowledge than the face validity of its
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claims. The meaning of social phenomena requires interpretation and
interpretations require criticism if the values and ideologies of institutions
and researchers are not to influence strongly knowledge claims that are
made. But to say all of this is only to outline one of the fundamental
problems with which social studies education must contend . The manner
and mode of interpretation and criticism in curriculum materials and in-
structional techniques are open questions subject to different interpreta-
tions themselves (Cherryholmes, 1980) .
The remainder of this essay explores one aspect of the problem of in-
terpretation and criticism of social knowledge in the classroom . A variety
of tacks have been taken in the literature . The thinking of Dewey (1938)
has been influential in the work of Hullfish and Smith (1961) and Hunt
and Metcalf (1968) as one approach to classroom inquiry and interaction .
Oliver (1957), Oliver and Shaver (1966), and Newmann (1975) represent a
related yet different approach . The present goal is to spell out an alter-
native view of classroom discourse that is consistent with the arguments
of the previous section and to figure out how a classroom based on those
arguments might operate . This alternative view of things that is only star-
ting to appear in the American social studies literature (Giroux, 1979 ;
Apple, 1971 ; Popkewitz, 1978 ; and Anyon, 1979a) comes from the work
of the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School especially from the think-
ing of Jurgen Habermas . In this section Habermas's view of truth,
communicative competence, and discourse will be sketched . A tentative
solution to the problem of what classroom criticism and discourse based
on this view of knowledge and society might be is proposed in the fol-
lowing section . In brief the question is : what would social studies instruc-
tion and classroom interaction that is consistent with Habermas's view of
truth, communicative competence, and discourse look like?
All normal interaction, Habermas argues, assumes that each party ac-
cepts the truth of what is said by the other . But the truth of an utterance
may be called into question . When this happens the validity of the truth
claim must be redeemed . Habermas's (1970) theory of communicative
competence distinguishes between two forms of communication, com-
municative interaction and discourse . Communicative interaction results
from a smoothly functioning language game that rests upon four suc-
cessful validity claims . The claims are that the utterance must be under-
standable, the speaker sincere, the propositional content true, and the
performative content successful . These are routinely accepted and taken
for granted when communicative interaction functions smoothly and they
characterize non-dialectical communication and thought . But it is pos-
sible for any of these claims to be challenged and for the consensus to
break down. When this happens validity must be reestablished . If the
utterance is not understood or the sincerity of the speaker is in question,
these can be resolved through further communication as meanings and
intentions are clarified .
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The remaining two claims to validity, Habermas argues, can only be
redeemed discursively . The purpose of discourse is to resolve the truth of
the problematic belief or norm :
Discourses help test the truth claims of opinions (and norms) which
the speakers no longer take for granted . In a discourse, the "force"
of the argument is the only permissible compulsion, whereas the co-
operative search for truth is the only permissible motive . (Haber-
mas, 1973, p. 168)
Discourse is dialectical communication .
Discourse points toward institutionality unbound speech acts (Haber-
mas, 1979) . The language of normal communication is bound up with
the implicit values and commitments of its institutional referents . But
when utterances employing such language are challenged the assertions
can only be weighed and evaluated in discourse . The discourse, therefore,
has a normative structure that is designed to guard against institutionally
bound interpretations or distortions .
Habermas's consensus theory of truth does not aim at a final char-
acterization of the world. Discourse is an on-going process that has no
final stage because any utterance purported to be final may be the prod-
uct of false consciousness ; historically and culturally conditioned institu-
tions and processes may be mistaken for fundamental and unchanging
social reality .
Discourse must be symmetrical and non-dominated . All parties to the
discourse may initiate comments, challenge assertions, and question not
only theoretical formulations but meta-theoretical and meta-ethical
frameworks as well . Discourse is not bounded . It is radically free to
allow the best argument to be pursued . Strategic behavior is not per-
mitted. For example, discourse must not be viewed in terms of conflict
or competition and the outcome must not be seen in terms of winning or
losing . The pursuit of the best argument is the only goal . In a discourse
one must anticipate the ideal speech act .
All speech acts imply an intended consensus on that which really is,
as distinct from that which subjectively only appears to be . . .
(Habermas, 1970, p . 370)
The norms of discourse are designed to eliminate constraints that would
bias arguments and conclusions . Search for truth cannot be separated
from an appropriate social structure and social values. Wherever these
norms and values are absent or distorted the pursuit of truth will be
biased .
This is not fundamentally a new idea . Researchers continually make
decisions. For example, researchers decide about rejecting or failing to
reject the null hypothesis that cannot be decided without decision criteria
norms, if you will, that include, for example, the form of choosing an
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acceptable alpha level . The conventional decision criteria for empirical
social research are designed to minimize error and bias . Thus, there are
norms of publicly presenting one's evidence to make replication possible,
accurately reporting research procedures, submitting findings for public
comment and criticism, and so on . Such norms have long been recog-
nized as functional for controlling error and minimizing bias . But these
conventional norms treat error and bias in a technical, objectified fash-
ion that separates the researcher from the object of research . The institu-
tional setting and language of the research endeavor are not covered by
these methodological prescriptions and proscriptions . Habermas, on the
other hand, does not reduce epistemology to the philosophy of science
and he explicitly acknowledges a complex relationship between social
scientific research and ideology .
Discourse must not just be used only to characterize face to face in-
teractions . It may also be thought of as a metaphor where the pursuit of
truth is conceptualized as an ideal face to face interaction . Discourses
may be carried on in political commentary, in research journals, or in a
classroom . Each normative dimension of a discourse is also an ideal
type. One does not realize ideal goals ; they can only be approached .
They can be used to monitor discourse. As deviations from the ideal are
detected, distortions can be expected and predicted. If the passiveness
and lack of skepticism in the social studies stems from an unquestioning
commitment to a flawed epistemology and mistaken view of ideology,
then Habermas's arguments present a strong case for restructuring social
studies education along the lines of critical reflection and patterning
some classroom interactions along the lines of critical discourse . Social
phenomena are not given but are constituted . Social knowledge is not
simply an objectively based system of statements to be transmitted to and
learned by students . The knower cannot validly be separated from the
object of social knowledge . But what such a reconstructed social studies
education would be like can only be built up slowly . The concluding sec-
tion represents an attempt to formulate a preliminary set of conditions
necessary for critical classroom discourse .
III
The most striking problem in transforming classroom interaction into
discourse is the basic asymmetry in social relationships, that is, the prob-
lem of authority . There are two ways in which the teacher is an authority
in the classroom (Benne, 1970) . First, the teacher is an authority by vir-
tue of position . Teachers are contractually obligated to provide instruc-
tion, to evaluate student progress, to assign grades, and to follow direc-
tives of the administration and board of education . Any proposed class-
room organization and procedure must account for the positional author-
ity of the teacher. Second, the teacher is an authority because of greater
education, training, and experience . The authority of the teacher mili-
tates against classroom discourse from ever being completely symmetrical
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and non-dominated . Given this, it therefore follows that a first necessary
condition for classroom discourse is that the teacher must understand the
arguments underlying critical discourse and be committed to it .
Discourse, obviously, cannot exist without commitment to the norms that
define it. With this commitment the authority of the teacher will
legitimize and support conditions necessary for discourse .
A second necessary condition is that the teacher must communicate
the nature of discourse and his/her commitment to it to the students .
Either of two general approaches may be taken . Secondary students
might be directly engaged in a consideration of arguments and
epistemological considerations that lead away from a positivist view of
knowledge and culture to critical reflection . These issues need not be
discussed in technical detail . Students may, however, be apprised of the
fact that social institutions are created, that they reflect values and
ideological commitments, and that knowledge about these institutions
also reflects many of these ideological components . Discourse itself can
be shown to be a necessary condition for making true statements . Final-
ly, students may be introduced to the norms of discourse : symmetry,
non-domination, the right to initiate comments, question assertions, and
the right to challenge meta-theoretical and meta-ethical frameworks . The
teacher must enforce these norms . Students should be encouraged to
point out deviations from the norms when they see them .
For younger students it might be more effective simply to use the
norms of discourse in guiding classroom discussions, enforcing them as
fairly and consistently as possible . This is a radical departure from in-
quiry activities that are mainly cognitive activities focusing on a much
narrower range of concern . The teacher who opens his/her classroom to
discourse should be forewarned that an arbitrary retreat to a conven-
tional classroom format might create feelings of hostility and an-
tagonism .
All that goes on or should go on in a classroom is not discourse and
should not be treated as such . Discourse, recalling Habermas's argument,
is called for when normal interaction breaks down . Normal communica-
tion is non-dialectical and discourse is dialectical . There must be a com-
bination of the two in the classroom and the mix will certainly vary
among students, grade levels, and topics . Non-dialectical classroom in-
struction itself is a necessary condition for discourse . Students cannot
engage in discourse if they have no information about what it is they are
studying whether it be the family, community, government, historical
events and developments, cultures and so on . They also must have the
skills to study them . Only when there is a background of information,
even if problematic, can the validity of truth claims be called into ques-
tion. A corollary to this is that what the students learn must not objec-
tify social phenomena. Along with the obvious, visible characteristics of
social relations students must appreciate and understand that there is a
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constellation of values and norms embedded in these empirical
regularities . Students must learn that many social facts have an
ideological component. This is the bridge to discourse, the basis for
criticism, and the linkage between nondialectic and dialectic .
Someone must first decide what needs to be known about social
phenomena before either normal classroom interaction or critical dis-
course can take place . Learning objectives may even be useful here be-
cause it is at this point that necessary conditions for the achievement of a
learning objective can be stated (Cherryholmes, 1978) . It is when the
problematic of interpretation is confronted that learning becomes dialec-
tical and learning objectives become inappropriate because sufficient con-
ditions for critical interpretation cannot be identified .
Normal classroom interaction is transformed into critical discourse
when a truth claim is questioned and rendered problematic . This is an
important point of intervention for the teacher . Sometimes students may
question interpretations promoted by textbooks and suggest alternative
interpretations themselves . This should be encouraged and students
should be given help in articulating their views and accumulating
evidence to support them . But it is . not likely that this will happen often
and certainly not until students gain experience with the radical openness
of critical discourse. The teacher can structure the early information that
is put before the class . Providing alternative interpretations may not be
a necessary condition for discourse but it is likely to facilitate criticism .
The alternative interpretations should account for the source of the infor-
mation, be clearly argued since clarity of communication itself is a
necessary condition for discourse, and present different ideological points
of view. The latter is crucial because teachers and students are likely to
come from a relatively homogeneous setting, homogeneous in terms of
social class, culture, race, ethnicity, and locale . The more homogeneous
the setting the more likely it is that a given set of social beliefs will be
treated as unproblematic. Critical discourse makes it possible to question
those views of the world that are taken as given . It is then possible to ex-
plore in what ways those views are historically and culturally condi-
tioned . This realization will help students learn they are free to help
fashion their social world instead of merely accepting it .
The necessary conditions specified above - commitment to the norms
of discourse, ensuring that information is available and drawing attention
to interpretations - bring us to discursive interactions themselves . Even
as there are generalized norms to evaluate the quality of a discourse,
there are criteria to evaluate the quality of arguments that constitute a
discourse. Habermas relies on the work of Toulmin (1964) . Toulmin
breaks arguments into the conclusion to be justified, the data that will be
used for the justification, the warrant that provides the link between the
data and the conclusion, and finally, the backing for the warrant . Mak-
ing and evaluating arguments constitute still another necessary condition
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for discourse . All who participate in discourse must be able to distinguish
better from worse arguments and have the skill to put together argu-
ments of their own . This establishes another connection between non-dia-
lectical thought, the ability to create and evaluate arguments, and dialec-
tical thinking . The dialectical component of discourse resides in the free-
dom to radicalize progressively the .argument, that is, the freedom to
challenge at successively deeper levels what is claimed to be empirically
the case and what normatively should be the case . Classroom instruction,
then, is neither all dialectical nor non-dialectical but is characterized by a
continual movement from one to the other. A discourse can only rise
above institutional interpretations if there is the freedom to question
premises and orientations and the ability to evaluate competently argu-
ments for and against these proposed and questioned interpretations .
Another necessary condition for classroom discourse is that the in-
teractions cannot be allowed to become competitive or conflictual .
Strategic behaviors, such as manipulating an agenda, choosing a
favorable voting system, selectively using evidence in constructing an
argument, are not permitted, for advocacy of specialized interests is out
of place in a discourse . For example, when the topic concerns public
policy decisions a discourse aims at finding the generalized interest . This
represents a dramatic shift of emphasis from that normally encountered
in a pluralistic society . Strategic behavior, if allowed, would encourage
non-symmetric and dominated communication .
Another necessary condition for classroom discourse is that all of
those in the classroom must be qualified to participate . The problem,
however, as Habermas makes clear is that not everyone can participate in
discourse. McCarthy comments on this :
. . . to discourse are admitted only speakers who have, as actors,
the same chance to employ representative speech acts, to express
their attitudes, feelings, intentions, and so on so that the partici-
pants can be truthful in their relations to themselves and can make
their inner natures transparent to others . (1978, p . 307)
It seems evident on its face that many students are not prepared to par-
ticipate in discourse . Feelings of apathy, alienation, hostility, and per-
sonal insecurity may act to inhibit and distort student participation . In
these situations the teacher must play a nurturing role . The teacher must
create a social atmosphere so that students will feel safe in expressing
their beliefs and feelings . Likewise, the teacher needs to work with
students individually not only to develop skills in analyzing and con-
structing arguments noted earlier but also to overcome personal inhibi-
tions .
A desirable but not necessary condition for discourse is a hetero-
geneous classroom. Classrooms that are socially, politically, econom-
ically, culturally, ethnically, or sexually homogeneous are susceptible to
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institutionally bound interpretations . Even though discourse is structured
to be open, free and non-dominated it can only range as widely as the in-
sight of those who participate . The narrower the range of backgrounds
represented places greater demand on imagination and does not take
advantage of informational and interpretative resources that students
bring with them . Heterogeneity gives participants a leverage on institu-
tionally bound interpretations . Heterogeneity, however, makes consen-
sual agreement more difficult to achieve .
Necessary but not sufficient conditions for discourse have been identi-
fied. The question of sufficient conditions has been avoided and is some-
what off the point . Discourse itself must not be objectified, for it is an
ideal that can only be approached . Discourses vary in quality as they
vary in openness, symmetry, non-domination, progressive radicalization
of arguments, and so on . The necessary conditions already noted consti-
tute conditions for the beginning of discourse . If these conditions were
met in a thousand classrooms the level of argumentation and criticism
would vary widely . It is not appropriate to seek determinant sufficient
conditions because the ideal end of discourse does not permit them to be
stated. This theory of discourse does not meet the logical requirements
required when one specifies sufficient conditions . The task is to continue
to elaborate empirically, normatively, and practically necessary condi-
tions for discourse, criticism, and the pursuit of truth in social studies
education .
There is a passiveness in social studies education . It has several com-
ponents: epistemological, social scientific, normative and political, and
classroom interactional . The problem dealt with here can be stated rela-
tively simply: what view of classroom interaction and criticism is con-
sistent with the critical theorist, specifically Habermas's, critique of
positive conceptions of social scientific knowledge . A preliminary set of
characteristics necessary for classroom criticism and discourse in the
critical mode have been proposed. They include the teacher's commit-
ment to criticism and discourse, the communication of characteristics and
norms of discourse to students, the mutual enforcement of the norms of
discourse in the classroom, the movement between non-dialectic and
dialectic in classroom interaction, making valid arguments and evaluating
the quality of arguments, and searching for alternative interpretations of
social phenomena that are critically acceptable .
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Critics of field studies have argued that the results of field studies are
not generalizable and are, at best, rich idiosyncratic descriptions of
teachers' actions. The issue is made more complex when some of those
who engage in field studies appear reluctant to claim that their findings
have any general application, preferring to settle for more limited claims,
that, for example, their findings are intended only to be intelligible to
those who read them. Such disputation and uncertainty leads one to ask
how educational researchers define generalizability and how they expect
it to be demonstrated .
In this paper, I will argue that there has been a tendency to limit
claims of generalizability to cases where one could demonstrate an appro-
priate use of sampling theory . Those who accept this view have narrowly
defined the notion of generalizability in terms of sampling theory, thus
reducing the possibility of a science of education . These views will be
examined in the first part of this paper . In the second part, I will discuss
the possibility of research producing generalizations which lead to theory .
This view of generalization will be identified with the interpretation of
school events . In these uses of generalization in educational research, I
will argue that sampling theory is not a necessary condition .
'The author wishes to express his appreciation to Kathy Kasten, Penelope Peterson, Tom
Popkewitz, Gary Price, and Tom Romberg who made helpful comments on earlier
drafts of this paper .
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At first glance, one may wonder why such questions should arise .
Surely, it may be argued, field studies are intended to interpret, explain,
and produce understanding of the actions being investigated ; and in that
sense, the investigations are concerned with making generalizable conclu-
sions. Wolcott, for example, in his study Teachers vs. Technocrats
(1977), sought to explain the effects of a system of planning and commu-
nication on teachers in one school district . To suggest that Wolcott's
analysis of the impact of that innovation may not have any relevance
beyond that school district would appear to do an injustice to his inten-
tions .
The Received View
Critics of field studies, however, are unlikely to concede that the
possible relevance of a field study to other sites is sufficient to justify a
claim to generalizable results. It is one thing, they argue, to intend that
one's field study has a wider application and explanatory power beyond
the sites which comprise it . It is an altogether different issue to achieve
success in this enterprise . According to what may be called the conven-
tional, or received, view, one can generalize with assurance only by en-
suring that the instances under investigation are truly representative of
the population, and by carefully eliminating bias from the data one has
chosen to study . The received view has been succinctly articulated by
Julian Simon (1978) :
A good principle is that you should generalize from your data if
you can reasonably regard them as a fair sample of the universe to
which you want to generalize . Everything that we know about bias
in samples, therefore, comes to bear on the problem . If the sample
was randomly drawn from a universe, then you can infer that what
is true of the sample is true of the universe . But when the sample is
not randomly drawn from the universe, the generalization is cer-
tainly not automatic. (p . 390)
In applying his view to an anthropological study such as Wolcott's,
Simon can be interpreted as requiring Wolcott to establish that the dis-
covered patterns could be expected to occur, with some measure of confi-
dence, in other sites where similar innovations had been implemented .
That seems quite a modest requirement to make of Wolcott ; and one
which would not force him to argue that exact "carbon copies" of those
patterns are likely to occur in other sites, only that similar innovations
could be expected to produce similar patterns .
However, among those who support the received view, there appears
to be a more radical critique of the findings of field studies : that, in the
absence of controls against bias in sampling, no generalizable conclusions
can be drawn from a study in which a single group is investigated as it
undergoes change. This line of criticism seems to question whether any
valid conceptual knowledge can be obtained through a field study of one
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instance. Campbell and Stanley (1963), representative of the received
view, once argued that field studies "have such a total absence of control
as to be of almost no scientific value"; at best it may be said that field
studies are based upon "a tedious collection of specific detail . . . and in-
volve the error of misplaced precision ." Campbell and Stanley conclude :
How much more valuable the study would be if the one set of
observations were reduced by half and the saved effort directed to
the study in equal detail of an appropriate comparison instance .
(pp . 176-177)
Since the time of this pronouncement, the battle lines have been more
clearly drawn between those who argue that generalizability is only war-
ranted under conditions of statistical control, and those who claim that
field-based studies are an equally potent source of warranted generaliza-
tions. The following section will outline three lines of attack on the
received view. Each line of attack focuses, in different ways, on exposing
the assumptions embedded in the received view, and argues that, when
these assumptions are properly understood, the applicability of the
received view to the study of schooling is more limited than its pro-
ponents have believed it to be .
Some Doubts About the Received View
One critic is David Hamilton (1981), who asserts that the notion of
generalizability as espoused by Simon (1978) and Campbell and Stanley
(1963) rests on three assumptions embodied in conventional sampling
theory:
first, that nature is uniform in time and space ; second, that closed
populations can be unambiguously defined ; and third, that the
defining characteristics of a population are shared by all its
members. (p . 223)
Drawing upon a distinction advanced by Ilyenkov (1977), Hamilton sug-
gests that educational researchers should distinguish between "formal"
populations, whose features conform to the above characteristics, and
"genetic" populations, whose components are related "not by virtue of
their possessing one and the same identical attribute . . . but by virtue of
their arising as diverse modifications of the same substance" (Illyenkov,
1977, p . 354) . Hamilton argues that schooling can be viewed as a "genet-
ic" phenomenon because it is embedded in an historical, political and
ethical context; and that these features prevent one from applying the
assumptions of sampling theory to the study of schooling .
Not only does the received view of generalizability rest on certain
assumptions about the population being studied, as Hamilton (1981) sug-
gests, it seems also to embody a procedural definition of generalizability .
The results of a study are said to be generalizable because, among other
things, the right sampling procedures have been employed . This sense of
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generalizability might be called "horizontal" generalizability because it
implies that, if the same sampling procedures were performed on another
sample from the same population, one would expect to have one's results
replicated in the second study . This definition of generalizability is
therefore related to the use of certain sampling procedures which enable
one to attach a quantified estimate of likelihood to the repeatability of
one's findings . The essential feature of this definition is that it rests on
certain notions of probability which enable one to predict how the
elements of a sample, and the characteristics they bear, relate to a
general population having the same characteristics .
There are dangers in solidifying one sense of generalizability as it
relates to educational research; and yet it seems that the notion of "hori-
zontal" generalizability is most frequently employed by those, for exam-
ple, who present conclusions from correlational studies of teaching beha-
vior. If "horizontal" generalizability is what these researchers imply when
they use the term, then it is clear that the statistical and sampling proce-
dures which are intended to produce repeatability of the results of a
study are distinct from the procedures one would use in order to explain
the actions and events being studied ; that is, explaining why certain ac-
tions by teachers are more effective in helping students to learn . Gage
(1978), for example, reports several studies of specific variables in
teachers' behavior and their effect on pupils' achievement in reading and
mathematics in the early grades of elementary school . One such study, by
Brophy and Evertson (1974), reports that teachers' criticism of wrong
answers by pupils is highly correlated with their adjusted achievement in
reading. If Brophy and Evertson were to explain why teachers' criticism
of wrong answers is more effective, in certain contexts, than not criticis-
ing their answers, they would need to appeal to other considerations than
those they had used to ensure that their results were repeatable .
The argument about generalizability could indeed rest with this sense
of "horizontal" generalizability if researchers limited themselves only to
making claims about other samples of the same population or about
samples of other populations which bear the same characteristics as the
one studied. However, they do use generalizations to interpret what has
been studied . That is, they look beyond the specific situation in ways
which simplify that situation, and at the same time link features of that
situation to more abstract and general considerations . This other sense of
generalizability might be called "vertical ."
This sense of generalization is the one which I wish to attach to the
interpretation of school events . I argue that this sense of "vertical" gener-
alization can be aspired to by field studies and by conventional empirical
research as well . The contrast between "vertical" and "horizontal" gener-
alizability can be illustrated by making a distinction between building
interpretative theory and showing that these interpretations are likely to
be useful in studying school events . For building interpretative theory,
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there may be value in selecting an instance which offers clearly delineated
features and telling contrasts - as did Wolcott in his study Teachers
Versus Technocrats (1977) . However, once developed, these interpreta-
tions need to have some more general application ; and an investigator
will need to convince a skeptical audience that there are grounds for be-
ing confident that the features which gave rise to the interpretative theory
are likely to be borne out across a range of groups or instances .
A second line of criticism of the received view has come from re-
searchers who are well-versed in conventional methodology. They draw
attention to the inadequacies of methodologies for the study of events
which have the following "dynamic" features : 1) they involve humans
interacting with one another ; 2) they occur over time; 3) they are con-
cerned with some substantive content ; 4) the content is brought out over
time through an interactive process ; and, 5) there is deliberate attempt to
combine the first three characteristics into events which have an impact
on the participants (cf. Romberg and Fox, 1976, p . 52) .
Romberg and Fox (1976) argue that underpinning the conventional
search for well-established generalizations are several assumptions which
restrict its capacity to deal adequately with dynamic events . These
assumptions are : 1) that treatment effects are additive ; 2) that treatment
effects are constant ; and, 3) that there is no difference between experi-
mental units (cf . pp. 55-60) .
From the first assumption, it follows that one can quantify the contri-
bution of all the "variables" ; that one can accurately determine the effect
of a treatment on specific criteria by comparing the results of the treat-
ment group with those of a control group, which has received no treat-
ment; and that the experimental units themselves do not change during
the study . It is argued that none of the implications of this first assump-
tion applies to the study of dynamic events within schooling .
In qualifying the second assumption, that treatment effects are con-
stant, Romberg and Fox (1976) argue that, on the contrary, we would
expect dynamic events to have different effects on different people : "per-
sons do indeed differ in how they respond to the same information, or
the same instructional procedures" (p . 60) .
The third assumption of conventional methodology is that when more
than one experimental unit is used, there is no interference or interaction
between the units : "investigators have typically assumed that the treat-
ment effect of a class is simply an aggregate of individual effects"
(Romberg and Fox, 1976, p . 60) . This assumption is not warranted since,
in the study of dynamic events, interaction between students or teachers
is precisely what one would expect to occur .
Romberg and Fox (1976) point very persuasively to the problems of
applying additive models (e.g. ANOVA) to dynamic aggregates . They do
not intend, however, by their criticisms to diminish a concern for appro-
79
priate "horizontal" generalizability . Many empirical researchers who form
"vertical" generalizations seek to devise ways to check the "horizontal"
generalizability of their interpretative theories, not necessarily through
sampling theory, but in ways which are consonant with the subtleties of
their interpretations, for example, through interrupted time-series anal-
yses. (See Romberg & Fox, 1976 .)
A third line of attack has come from within social science . Homans
(1967), for example, has challenged the view that one is not warranted in
drawing any general conclusions unless one has employed the methods of
statistical sampling and experimental control . He argues :
What makes a science are its aims, not its results . If it aims at
establishing more or less general relationships between properties of
nature, when the test of the truth of a relationship lies finally in the
data themselves and the data are not wholly manufactured - when
nature, however stretched out on the rack, still has the chance to
say "No!"-then the subject is a science . (p . 4)
It needs to be noted, however, that Homans does endorse a deductivist
view of explanation as articulated by Hempel (1965), a view which is
shared by the proponents of the received view . For Homans, what is to
be explained needs to be "deduced from, derived from . . . other propo-
sitions, the whole set forming a `deductive system" (p . 25). Using the
notion of "vertical" generalization, we can interpret Homans as arguing
that the findings of educational research are to be explained by showing
that they follow "as a logical conclusion, as a deduction, from one or
more general propositions under specified given conditions" (p . 23). The
fact that some findings of correlational research currently lack, as I have
said, an appropriate theoretical justification does not diminish the appeal
of an ultimate goal of achieving a deductive model of explanation .
Gage's (1978) advocacy of a "descriptive-correlational-experimental-loop"
is motivated with such a goal in mind .
However, in recent philosophy of science, the deductivist model has
itself come under fire. Scriven (1962) contends that a philosophical analy-
sis of explanation requires us to attend to all forms of discourse which
are counted as explanations and not only to a limited range of scientific
discourse. Thus, Scriven writes :
It seems reasonable to suppose that scientific explanation represents
a refinement, rather than a totally different kind of entity from,
ordinary explanation . In our terms, it is the understanding which is
the essential part of an explanation . . . . We shall argue that good
inductive inferability is the only required relation involved in scien-
tific explanations, deduction being a dispensible and overrestrictive
requirement which may of course sometimes be met . (pp. 192-193)
Scriven's comments reinforce a view later elaborated by Cronbach (1975)
when he questions the assumption that the only goal of educational re-
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search is "to amass generalizations atop which a theoretical tower can
some day be erected ." The implications of this view will be explored later
in discussing field studies . It does serve, however, to modify Homans'
claim that all explanation must be based on a deductive model . On the
other hand, I think Homans is right to argue that whether generalizations
of the "vertical" kind are soundly based depends on their relation to the
facts . I have argued, moreover, that "horizontal" generalizability is not a
necessary condition for the use of generalizations of this latter kind .
These three positions have been presented to show that the notion of
"horizontal" generalizability on which sampling theory is based is inade-
quate to account for all the purposes which educational researchers bring
to making generalizations . However, none of these positions, as far as
they have been described, develops the idea of "vertical" generalization to
any degree, or discusses how this kind of generalization is to be artic-
ulated.
Generalization as Interpretation
In this section, it will be argued that field studies and conventional
empirical studies each presuppose a theoretical context . In any study of
school events, the theoretical context of the study will be defined, in
part, by the social, political, psychological and ethical beliefs which the
investigators bring to that study . Unless these assumptions are clearly
articulated, there is little chance that warranted "vertical" generalizations
will be produced. One sense of "vertical" generalization refers to the
development of axiomatic theory, or a deductive model of explanation . I
suggest that the search for this kind of generalization in the study of
schooling is unlikely to be successful . Another sense of "vertical" general-
ization applies to those cases where one intends to interpret the events
being studied, to related them to more general patterns of action by
means of abstract concepts, and so lead to a broader understanding of
school events .
In regard to scientific generalizations, Homans (1967) refers with ap-
proval to the statement of Bridgman (1936) that all such propositions are
accompanied, explicitly or implicitly by a "text" (see Bridgman, 1936,
pp. 59-61). In the case of Boyle's Law, which states that the volume of a
gas in an enclosed space is inversely proportional to the pressure on it,
the "text," or as we might say "context," would include assumptions
about the nature of a gas, how pressure is measured, and the conditions
under which the relationship was true, i .e. under conditions of constant
temperature .
This notion of an implicit context can be used in order to develop
some remarks made by Lee Cronbach in his well known address,
"Beyond the Two Disciplines of Scientific Psychology" (1975), when he
says that generalizations which result from tested hypotheses seem to
"decay" with time . He continues :
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Our troubles do not arise because human events are in principle un-
lawful; man and his creations are part of the natural world . The
trouble, as I see it, is that we cannot store up generalizations for
ultimate assembly into a network . It is as if we needed a gross of
dry cells to power an engine and could only make one a month .
The energy would leak out of the first cells before we had half of
the battery completed . So it is with the posing of our generaliza-
tions . (p. 123)
If Cronbach is correct, the notion of generalizability which is at the
heart of the received view of educational research is more limited in its
capacity to build a "deductive system" than its proponents have argued .
The reason Cronbach offers for this is that the phenomena under investi-
gation are subject to change . His view has clear associations with Ilyen-
kov's (1977) idea of "genetic" phenomena . In this view, our beliefs about
schooling will be embedded in a changing context of social, political,
psychological and ethical beliefs ; and these beliefs will help to define the
theoretical context of schooling in any study . Durkheim, in his classic
study The Evolution of Educational Thought (1978), argues that disposi-
tions and beliefs of different groups and interests within a society help to
shape the kind of education which is deemed appropriate for children .
As Popkewitz (1981) points out :
This occurs neither by conscious design nor conspiracy, yet the way
teaching is defined and carried out reflects the social/cultural pre-
dicament of a school .
If schooling has the features of a "genetic" phenomenon, then in
order to offer generalizations which interpret the events of schooling, one
needs to address those beliefs and dispositions which define schooling
and its events within a society . Fullan and Pomfret (1977), for example,
conclude their extensive review of empirical studies which examined
various possible determinants of curriculum implementation with the
criticism that
Theoretical "explanations" of the social processes that underlie the
relationships between many factors are missing . Particular determi-
nants may be critical under one set of circumstances while others
may be prominent under other conditions . The role of specific fac-
tors may vary according to the type of innovation and in terms of
whether we are viewing implementation from a fidelity or an adap-
tation perspective. (p . 390)
Their preference to "particular determinants" ought to be read more
widely to include the assumptions and beliefs which define curriculum
implementation . What constitutes curriculum implementation, as an ex-
ample of a school event, is embedded in assumptions about a teacher's
autonomy in selecting and using materials . The kind of autonomy which
teachers exercise in these areas reflects these beliefs, and is also part of a
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highly complex process involving relationships between users and devel-
opers, and among various interest groups within a society . I interpret the
criticism by Fullan and Pomfret (1977) as supporting my claim that a
clear articulation of the theoretical context of a study of schooling is a
necessary condition of being able to make interpretations of school
events in the form of "vertical" generalizations .
If it is a fault of some studies that they fail to articulate the theoreti-
cal context which underpins the generalizations they seek to develop, an
apparent reluctance about making generalizations of any sort is some-
times shown by the authors of field studies . It is as though they are so
intimidated by the notion of "horizontal" generalizability and its tie to
sampling theory that they see themselves as disqualified from using the
term altogether .
Cusick, in his study Inside High School (1973), when confronted by
the objection that his study, "dealing with a limited and perhaps unique
sample, may be ungeneralizable," seems to back away from the issue of
generalizability, and claims only to offer a description of a high school
which is intelligible even to those who have never participated (c.f . p .
231). Not that Cusick refrains from drawing some general conclusions
from his study . He recommends, for example, that "teachers should be
prepared to accept school as a place where conflict is inevitable," and
that they should give primary importance to their instructional role (c.f .
p. 226) .
My response to Cusick is that his study is intelligible only to the ex-
tent to which readers can understand those beliefs and assumptions
which underlie the practice of high school education in the United States .
For, despite his disclaimer on the issue of generalizability, Cusick believes
that the characteristics which define the social and learning environment
of the students at Horatio Gates High School are probably shared by
most American high schools . These have been elaborated by Wehlage
(1981) following Cusick's own listing :
1 . Subject matter specialization for teachers and students,
2. Vertical organization of people, with students at the bottom,
3. A doctrine of adolescent inferiority, which denies students
initiative and responsibility,
4. Downward communication flow from teachers to students,
5. Batch processing of students by a single teacher,
6. Routinization of activity for students and teachers,
7 . Dependence on rules and regulations for students and teachers,
8. Future reward orientation for students, and
9. Supporting physical structure to facilitate the above. (p . 221 ; c .f .
Cusick, 1973, pp. 208-209)
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Whether each of the above claims is well founded, and whether every
detail of Cusick's study is sound, is not implied here. What is being
argued is that the characteristics which Cusick presents as defining the
social and learning environment of Horatio Gates High School already
embody interpretations of school events . These characteristics are notable
as much for introducing all kinds of non-observable perceptions and
understandings . Nor are they explicable as generalizations derived from
evidence which can be described in everyday observable terms (c . f. Ryan,
1970, p . 72). I argue that in his description of the defining characteristics
of the social and learning environment of an American high school,
Cusick can be seen as using the kind of interpretation which I have called
"vertical" generalization . His claim that these characteristics are probably
shared by most American high schools, although unproved, would, if
true, ensure that his interpretations had a wide "horizontal" generalizabil-
ity. In other words, "vertical" generalizations need a certain level of
"horizontal" generalizability if they are to be treated as useful theoretical
knowledge about schooling .
Cusick's descriptions, such as "vertical organizations," "batch process-
ing," and "routinization," interpret school events in terms of more
general social categories . In using categories of descriptions from indus-
trial production and management theory, he is able to interpret school
events as having important features in common with these enterprises .
His argument can be thought of as a kind of "existence proof" ; that is to
say, there exist in high schools patterns of actions and events which are
well accounted for, not in conventional educational terms, but in the lan-
guage and discourse of industrial production and management theory . It
is in this sense that one can depict Cusick's study as aspiring to a kind of
"vertical" generalizability .
Using Cusick's study as an example, I argue that the findings of field
studies are generalizable in the "vertical" sense, if the particular events
and actions being studied can be interpreted, in terms of a rationally
defensible and consistent theoretical framework, as instances of more
general categories of social discourse (c.f . Tabachnick, 1981) . The theo-
retical framework out of which an investigator works will provide "ori-
enting categories" in terms of which generalizations will be formed .
Cusick, for example, draws his "orienting categories" from a social inter-
actionist theory of behavior, especially from the work of Blumer (1969) .
While other field studies may adopt a somewhat different theoretical
framework from that used by Cusick, field studies, in general, reflect a
common interest in documenting and interpreting the intentional deci-
sions of the parties engaged in the actions and events being studied, and
to the intersubjective agreements shared among the participants .
This common approach undertaken by those who employ field studies
in educational research is supported by social theorists such as Bernstein
(1978). In Bernstein's view, we cannot divide social phenomena into two
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simple categories : that which is publicly observable, on the one hand,
and that which is merely private and subjective, on the other-as though
in seeking to develop interpretive generalizations about schooling we need
to concentrate only on the first category, and can afford to disregard the
second. Bernstein continues :
Human actions cannot be properly identified, described, or under-
stood unless we take account of the intentional descriptions, the
meanings such actions have for the agents involved, the ways which
they interpret their own actions and the actions of others . These
intentional descriptions, meanings, and interpretations are not
merely subjective states of mind which can be correlated with exter-
nal behavior ; they are constitutive of the activities and practices of
our social and political lives . (pp. 229-230)
If the beliefs people have about a given activity, and their under-
standing of the rules surrounding that activity, help to determine their
actions, any interpretation of their actions will need to address their
beliefs and shared understandings .
Bernstein's (1978) position is supported by Ryan (1970) . He argues
that the fact that people's beliefs and perceptions of shared rules help to
shape and are constitutive of what they do
seems to damage the objectivity of social theory in the following
sense: people following rules and choosing what to do for the
appropriate reasons only make the choices as they do because they
hold certain beliefs about the point and purpose of what they are
doing. (p . 238)
While this kind of theoretical position offers support to those who
choose to adopt a field-study approach to educational research, there are,
as Ryan points out, some uncomfortable consequences of this position .
Those who undertake a field study of school events bring their own be-
liefs and assumptions about schooling to their study . They will also share
a range of intersubjective agreements about schooling with those whose
actions are being studied . But there can be no ready-made and simple
distinction between actors and observers, for the observer/researcher is
an actor also insofar as he/she is reading from a "text ." If one allows
only those who are, prima facie, actors to contribute to the development
of generalization and theory, this would result in an uncritical account of
the psychological, ideological and social preoccupations of the actors . On
the other hand, if the observer has the last say, is one thereby disregard-
ing the rationality of the actors? Even if the actors and observers should
agree in their descriptions, does this show any more than that both par-
ties are kindred spirits (c.f . Ryan, 1970, p . 238)?
The path to resolving this problem is not that of gathering up more
opinions to support one side over the other . There is a sense in which the
"facts" can help one's case, and so free the field-based researcher from
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an endless regress into subjectivity . The beliefs of the actors are, as Bern-
stein has reminded us, not simply mental entities ; they are constitutive of
people's activities and practices, and therefore imply beliefs about the
consequences of each other's actions . Thus, people's beliefs can be tested
and interpreted in the light of the events which follow .
Appraising Interpretative Generalizations
When conventional empirical studies claim some measure of "horizon-
tal" generalizability for their results, these claims presuppose that certain
sampling procedures have been used. While there are no procedural
checks to ensure that "vertical" generalizations embody sound interpreta-
tions of the events being studied, these interpretations need to be checked
with other facts about those events (c.f . Homans, 1967) ; and, at the
same time, critical appraisal will need to be directed at the rationality
and consistency of the theoretical framework employed by the in-
vestigator .
The theoretical framework of a field study will provide the "orienting
categories" upon which an investigator will develop interpretations of
events and actions . Tabachnick (1981) has argued that these orienting
categories, unlike the operational categories of conventional empirical
research, are "open to change and development as a result of encounter-
ing the action being studied" (p . 84). That this should be so is not a sign
of theoretical weakness, but rather a direct result of the purposes one
brings to a field study . If one aims to look beyond the particular events
and actions in ways which simplify them, and at the same time link them
to more abstract categories of social behavior, then, even if one had a
consistent theoretical framework interpretation, one cannot determine in
advance how that theoretical framework would apply to the particular
events being studied, or whether all aspects of the theory were equally
relevant to those events . Furthermore, one might also be led to modify
one's theoretical framework in the light of the events themselves . For
these reasons, the orienting categories which an investigator brings to a
field study apply in a different manner than the operational categories of
conventional empirical studies .
Interpretation and Practical Discourse
What are the uses of these interpretive generalizations which might be
produced by field studies? These generalizations are useful in developing
an understanding of school events . If they are successful in linking our
understanding of school events to more general categories of social beha-
vior, then that enterprise does not need any further justification .
However, there is another sense in which one can be said to interpret
events: they can be interpreted in ways which make certain kinds of ac-
tions, certain responses to those events reasonable . Very often one inter-
prets events in political, or social, or ethical terms in order to justify a
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particular response to those events . In this sense, the interpretative
generalizations of field studies can be intended to serve as a guide to
practical action . When used in this way, they become part of one's prac-
tical discourse about schooling .
If, as I argued earlier, the beliefs which people hold about what they
do are constitutive of the practices of their social and political lives, then
to lead people to interpret their actions differently gives them a reason
for acting differently. Thus, the teachers whom Cusick studied might be
led to see themselves as helping to maintain a division of knowledge into
artificially discrete subject areas or as helping to perpetuate beliefs about
the inability of adolescents to take initiative and responsibility for their
own learning . Having accepted these interpretations of their actions, the
teachers can choose whether to modify their actions and practices in the
light of this understanding . The fact that the findings of field studies can
serve to provide reasons for action is evidence of their generalizability .
Descriptions which are entirely particular cannot serve as reasons for ac-
tion. They can serve as reasons only when they relate the particular ac-
tion to categories of political, or social, or ethical behavior which a per-
son judges to be worthwhile and desirable .
Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that the findings of field studies can be
generalizable. Most typically, these generalizations take the form of inter-
pretations of the specific events and actions being studied, and are in-
tended to link these events and actions to more general descriptions of
social behavior. If these interpretative generalizations are to be useful, a
reader needs to be convinced that similar interpretations are likely to
apply to instances which can be identified as similar to the cases studied .
That is another enterprise which needs to be addressed by those who use
field studies to generate theoretical knowledge about school events . How-
ever, in a particular study, whether the enterprise of building interpretive
generalizations is successful will depend on the accuracy of one's observa-
tions and upon the rationality and consistency of the theoretical frame-
work which one brings to that study ; especially in the form of orienting
categories derived from that framework . Where these are lacking, or not
well developed, an investigator runs the risk of offering no more than a
rich description of particular events and actions ; and will have to head
off the charge that the study involves an error of "misplaced precision ."
But where a consistent and rationally defensible framework has been
employed, investigators should not be intimidated by critics of field
studies who define generalizability in terms of sampling theory . I have
argued that there is another sense in which one can aim to develop
generalizable findings, for which sampling theory is not a necessary con-
dition. Generalizations in this other sense can be developed by conven-
tional empirical studies and by field studies equally well .
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A college of education faculty was asked by a teachers' organization
to provide a two-day workshop to help teachers "in the trenches" prepare
"to survive the battle" of the coming school year . The faculty members,
accustomed to teaching about growth and development and to using
what might be called garden language, were rather shocked by the
metaphor of the teachers' request .
This article, asserting that the languages we use are basic and dif-
ferent, is an exploratory probe into the connections between language,
curriculum theory, and social studies . Language is defined as the words
and images educators use when they talk and write . Curriculum theory
may lean toward a scientific statement of what is or it may lean toward a
philosophical sttement of what ought to be (McCrory, 1981) .
Huebner writes that theory is "rooted in the language we use to talk
about what we do, and it is this language web which must be our starting
point." His description of various modes of language in "The Tasks of
the Curricular Theorist" (Pinar, 1975) seems to have relevance for social
studies educators as they try to develop theory . In this article, Huebner's
six modes of language - descriptive, explanatory, controlling, legitimat-
ing, prescriptive, and affiliative - will be related to social studies and
implications for theorizing will be briefly suggested .
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There will be, of course, overlapping of categories of language . Thus,
some examples might fit in more than one category or mode . Some
might argue that instructional objectives are mostly explanatory or that
they are really prescriptive . Legitimating language may also be affiliative .
The point here is not to declare rigid boundaries, but to provoke think-
ing about different uses of language and speculate about the possible im-
pact on theory-building . The author will draw heavily on Theory and
Research in Social Education articles and National Council for Social
Studies publications, as well as personal experiences and interests for
examples .
Descriptive Language
Teachers talk in a descriptive way about what they do, did, or plan to
do in their classrooms . For example, a second grade teacher, whose six-
week trip to Nigeria inspired him to turn his classroom into a museum
which the whole school visited, describes with enthusiasm how much his
students have learned about Nigeria . "Jonathan narrated my slides for
the fourth graders and some parents . He even pointed out things I hadn't
seen, like the telephone wires . And did you notice the words the kids
came up with when I asked how Nigeria and Kentucky were alike -
coal, cars, schools, houses, horses?" With similar enthusiasm, a secon-
dary student teacher describes her best lesson of the week in which
students researched various New Deal programs, discussed the current
administration feeling about each program still in existence, and
wondered about the huge growth of government - good, bad,
necessary?
Descriptive language, then, may be the ordinary sharing of daily
classroom events - good times and bad - in the narrative of conver-
sation. It can also take the form of a matrix whose deciphered codes
describe the interaction between teacher and class or students within a
group (Hough and Duncan, 1970) . Or it may be poetic, as in the follow-
ing descriptive language of Denton (1972, pp . 58-59) :
The class members sat in the middle of the floor while the sound of
two tape recorders and the projections from two movie and three
slide projectors played over, on, into, and for them . It seemed that
every imaginable element of inner-city life and suburban living had
been captured and thrown into juxtaposition .
being well fed/going hungry
vermin free/rat infested
shiny bicycles/rusty-nailed carts
warm houses/cold apartments
space/alleys
green grass/oily pavement
pretty play clothes/raggy handmedowns
new cars/banged-up heaps
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multi-bathrooms/a hole at the end of the hall
supermarkets/dilapidated stores
laughter/stony silence
and on and on and on and on and on this came at us in micro-
second intervals for forty minutes . We were getting rung out . And,
then, when it appeared that we could take it no longer, that another
moment would yield screams, there were sounds of a nuclear explo-
sion, with corresponding images given forth by all five projec-
tors-silence, blessed silence-then shock and dismay, for on all the
screens was one image, that of a totally destroyed city .
No, the students didn't like it, but, for days afterwards, that
classroom was a center for intense inquiry, argumentation,
and soul-searching . Social studies was alive and very well .
That dissonance which opens possibilities for
becoming new persons
dissonated through the space .
Who is the teacher?
the
Dissonator .
Finally, descriptive language may be imaginery, as a scenario for a
social studies classroom of the year 2000 that would serve as base camp
for various student forays into the community to do oral history, intern
in a local social agency, and participate in a state legislator's campaign .
As Huebner points out, "descriptive language can be a link between a
reality and an image or a dream ; between a present and a future or a
future and a past" (Pinar, 1975, p . 254) .
Descriptive language is an especially important basis for theory . It
grounds that theory in the real world . For example, McCutcheon's
research on elementary teachers' planning for social studies (1981)
describes how teachers actually plan. She suggests that descriptive studies
focusing on how practical problems are solved may help develop theories
regarding the process as opposed to the procedure of decision-making in
teaching . Another potentially useful descriptive project might be life his-
tories of teachers who teach from a global perspective . Such life histories
might provide clues for a theory about the global education of teachers .
The imaginary description is valuable for theorists who want to con-
struct a model of the ideal . For instance, Anderson (1979) has written a
futuristic scenario of how a global school might be organized .
Explanatory Language
Descriptive language begins to tread on the heels of explanatory
language when it wonders why . Huebner writes : "Descriptive language
permits one to skate linguistically over the surface of events and
phenomena, whereas explanatory talk digs below the surface . Explana-
tory language seeks to explain why something occurs or how it occurs . It
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is usually concerned with postulated concepts and inferred relationships"
(Pinar, 1975, p . 254) .
Huebner goes on to point out that curriculum people frequently at-
tempt to use explanatory language to describe . It is one thing to describe
the second graders in their Nigerian museum classroom . It is another
thing to explain how the activities they engaged in - using Nigerian
primary school reading books for two weeks, for instance - contributed
to the objective of discovering Nigeria's similarities to the United States .
The most valid explanatory language is that which arrives at explana-
tions after hypothesizing and gathering data . Again in the second grade
classroom, the teacher hypothesizes : my students can learn responsibility
and content knowledge by acting as guides in the Nigerian museum . The
sixth graders will learn more from our classroom museum than the other
grades because their teachers have prepared special study guides . The
multiple visits of the Foreign Curriculum Consultant from Nigeria are
more effective than one-time visits by international guests . Now he must
gather data to prove or disprove his hypotheses .
Research reports in this journal are good examples of explanatory
language. For instance, Jennings and Ehman (1976) summarize their
study, entitled "Political Attitudes of Parents and Social Studies
Teachers : Comparisons and Linkages," by stating that "in general the
differences between parents and teachers are not large ." Their findings
show both social studies teachers and parents of equal education are obe-
dient, loyal, and passive in the political arena, leading to the conclusion
that the citizenship training function carried out in the high school
classroom will not be radically different from that carried out by parents .
In a study of the effect of the Family of Man social studies program
on third grade children's views of foreign peoples, Mitsakos (1978) con-
cludes that children who participate in a carefully designed program with
a strong global education dimension develop a more positive attitude
toward foreign peoples . The experimental group had a more favorable
view of foreign peoples according to their performance on a People Pic-
tures test and used more positive adjectives in a Describing Nations in-
strument .
Another elementary study (Herman, 1977) shows a relationship be-
tween activities, teacher talk, children's interest in social studies, and
ability level of the class . Herman writes :
As the ability level of the class decreased, teachers were more direct
in their verbal behavior, they dominated instruction with more
teacher-centered activities, and children generally gave social studies
a low rating. The teachers of high ability classes were indirect,
employed more pupil-centered activities than did teachers of the
average and below average groups, and nearly half of their children
gave social studies a high rating . (p. 56)
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Out of such explanatory language can develop theory about how
citizenship and global education happen and theory about effective social
studies teaching . One problem with explanatory language is that it is
sometimes farther away from practical teacher concerns than descriptive
language since explanatory language often begins with hypotheses of
university faculty rather than those classroom teachers might formulate .
Sometimes, as well, there is a paucity of looking before the sequence of
hypothesizing, testing, and concluding .
Controlling Language
Controlling language puts together descriptive and explanatory
languages in order to manipulate and predict behavior . Instructional ob-
jectives are examples of controlling language because they describe the
student behavior which will be accepted as evidence that the student has
learned. They describe how and explain why learning should happen,
though of course it is possible the objective will not describe what actual-
ly happens in the classroom . The objective deals with "should" and
"ought" and "will ."
The objective "Students will describe at least four techniques that they
could apply during group discussions . t o ensure that every student who
wants to gets a chance to participate" (Hough and Duncan, 1970, p . 60)
is controlling language .
Another illustration in the cognitive domain is :
Using prepared criteria for judging the objectivity of news stories,
the students will state in writing which of the two reports of the
same international event is more objective and state how they used
specific criteria in arriving at that judgment . (Hough and Duncan,
1970, p . 105)
Affective objectives can also be quite precise, as in :
Students will orally state how increased awareness of their feelings
about members of a social minority has caused them to re-evaluate
their beliefs about such minority groups and their contribution to
American culture. (Hough and Duncan, 1970, p . 76)
Ideally, Hough and Duncan see a teacher offering to instruct in such
a way as to facilitate student learning and the student then agreeing to
learn. They see the instructional objective as a contract . Even with stu-
dent aquiescence or input, however, the objective remains controlling
language which predicts what will happen .
Out of controlling language grow theories about what should or
ought to take place in the social studies classroom, not just with students
but also teachers . The descriptive and explanatory languages may be
utilized and transformed into controlling language . The theory-building
becomes less tentative . Now there may be a universal model or several
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competing models against which practice can be measured . Such models
may be very helpful, and theory indeed may be translated into practice .
Hopefully, that equation has been reversed earlier and practice has also
informed the theorizing .
Legitimating Language
Huebner suggests that if the languages used were only those of
description, explanation, or control, then analysis would be fairly simple
since those forms of language are common to scientific and technological
endeavors (Pinar, 1975, p . 255). However, persons engaged in curriculum
also use legitimating language . They try to rationalize their actions for
the judging group, which may be the local community in which a school
is located or a scholarly community to which social studies educators
relate .
Perhaps the most common sort of legitimating language in social
studies is that used to tie social studies to the general purpose of prepar-
ing good citizens . Thus, traditionally, social studies educators have tied
together democracy and their particular curricular domain . Even a Prob-
lems of Democracy course in the 1950s, which might have had as one im-
portant goal the teaching of reflective thinking, was taught in a citi-
zenship context. American history, especially, was seen as a course or
series of courses through which certain values would be transmitted. As
the very vocal moral minority currently gains increasing strength in local
communities, the legitimating language of citizenship as recently set forth
in the National Council for Social Studies' Essentials of Social Studies
becomes particularly relevant and important . In that brief document, a
quotation from Thomas Jefferson sets the tone . Democratic beliefs are
described, with the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution
designated as sources . The closing challenge again refers to the Constitu-
tion, asking :
As we approach the bicentennial of our Constitution and Bill of
Rights, is it not time for us to recommit ourselves as a nation to
strong education for civic responsibility?
In the 1960s the so-called new social studies used a different
legitimating language from the traditional and now revitalized citizenship
rationale . Bruner had written The Process of Education, the disciplines
of the social sciences were kings, and the goals of social studies were
related to learning their concepts and processes . The introduction to the
teaching plan for the Anthropology Project used phrases like "intellectual
operations," "inquiry process," "original analysis of the data," and "ac-
quisition of social science tools and attitudes ." The simulation DIG had
as a major purpose for students to experience how it feels to be an arch-
aeologist. The Sociological Resources for the Social Studies chose to
focus on concepts such as leadership, social mobility, and migration .
These broad concepts were broken down into sub-concepts so a student
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was expected to learn the difference between the terms "residential
mobility" and "internal migration." The Geography of Cities Unit of the
High School Geography Project asked students to play geographer and
select settlement sites, prepare site diagrams, and predict urban growth .
It would be interesting to write a history of the legitimating language
used for the social studies, particularly as that language relates to citizen-
ship . What is Dewey's contribution to that language, for example? What
is the contribution of founding documents and fathers? How does the
current imagery of cultural diversity fit in? How is legitimating language
and thus the theory which grows out of it related to the particular milieu,
times, even person? Most importantly, to what degree are we aware of
the cultural apparatus of our lives? To what degree are we self-conscious
about our interpretive projects (Said, 1981)?
Prescriptive Language
Prescriptive language goes beyond legitimating language to take ac-
tion and to influence others . Prescriptive language is imperative and
commanding and political in nature.
In 1975, the Chief State School officers, for example, prescribed the
following goals for Citizenship Education :
1 . The effective citizens should demonstrate concern for the well-
being and dignity of self, family, and others .
2. The effective citizen should support the concept of governance
by law and oppose unjust applications .
3 . The effective citizen should support rights and freedoms impor-
tant for human development .
4. The effective citizen should understand the structure, functions,
and actual processes of governments .
5 . The effective citizen should understand that civic action is essen-
tial and should participate actively in civic improvement .
6. The effective citizen should have understanding of and concern
for world, national, state, and local civic issues .
7. The effective good citizen should use rational processes when
making civic decisions .
Another .longer and much more specific but very similar list of goals
which also begins "The effective citizen should . . ." was disseminated by
the Commission of the States for the National Assessment of Social
Studies/Citizenship in 1979 .
In 1971 the National Council for the Social Studies put out guidelines
for social studies programs. Although the text specifically states that they
are not intended to prescribe a uniform program or even to propose an
ideal program, the guidelines are "should" statements, including :
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1 . The Social Studies Program should be directly related to the
concerns of the students .
2. The Social Studies Program should deal with the real social
world .
3 . The Social Studies Program should draw from currently valid
knowledge representative of man's experience, culture, and
beliefs .
4. Objectives should be thoughtfully selected and clearly stated in
such form as to furnish direction to the program .
5. Learning activities should engage the student directly and active-
ly in the learning process .
6. Strategies of instruction and learning activities should rely on a
broad range of learning resources .
7. The Social Studies Program must facilitate the organization of
experience .
8. Evaluation should be useful, systematic, comprehensive, and
valid for the objectives of the program .
19 . Social Studies Education should receive vigorous support as a vital
and responsible part of the school program .
It is interesting to note that citizenship is not mentioned in the 1971
guidelines . Of the three approaches to social studies defined by Barr,
Barth, and Shermis, reflective thinking or analysis of social issues seems
ascendant in the 1971 NCSS document as citizenship is in the 1980 Essen-
tials of Social Studies and as the social sciences were in the so-called new
social studies projects mentioned earlier .
There are also other more directly political situations in which
prescriptive language may be used . A leader in the social studies field
may make a plea for support of those in trouble because of academic
censorship, or an individual social studies educator may write a member
of Congress to urge support for international education and quote the
following rhetoric from the President's Commission of International
Education :
Nothing less is at issue than the nation's security . At a time when
the resurgent forces of nationalism and of ethnic and linguistic
consciousness so directly affect global realities, the United States re-
quires far more reliable capacities to communicate with its allies,
analyze the behavior of potential adversaries, and earn the trust and
sympathies of the uncommitted . . . . National security, moreover,
cannot safely be defined and protected within the narrow
framework of defense, diplomacy, and economics . A nation's
welfare depends in large measure on the intellectual and
psychological strengths that are derived from perceptive visions of
the world beyond its own boundaries .
Prescriptive language may more often be the starting point for philo-
sophical as opposed to scientific theorizing . "The effective good citizen
should use rational, processes when making civic decisions" objective may
be more likely to inspire a boxes chart of decision-making as it ought to
be than a description of how citizens decided in actual case studies,
though obviously the former could result from the latter. What seems
most important is the theorizer's self-consciousness about the fact that
language is prescriptive rather than another mode .
Affiliative Language
Huebner's last category refers to the use of languages that serve as a
symbol of cohesiveness or of membership in a particular community .
Huebner suggests that the use of behavioral science language is an at-
tempt by educators to affiliate with the social science community : "Scien-
tific technical language has more cash value in today's economic and
political spheres" (Pinar, 1975, p . 259). Educational slogans can also
symbolize membership in a particular community . There are code phrases
that, if used, immediately establish one's biases or bases . Thus, one
educator may speak of "inputs and outputs" while another speaks of
"meeting the needs of the whole child ."
The tendency of social studies educators to use social science language
in social studies content during the era of the so-called New Social
Studies has already been mentioned under legitimating language . In more
recent years there have been scattered attempts to talk about social
studies curricula from other perspectives .
Michael Apple, for example, sees education as moral and political
activity . As a critic of both schools and society, he has looked at the
treatment of conflict in social studies curricula and discovered it is usual-
ly viewed as dysfunctional (Pinar, 1975) . Since Apple's article, the pro-
ponents of global education have included "conflict" as one of four ma-
jor concepts to be studied, but how it is studied is still an important
issue. Do students learn, for instance, that conflict, as in the civil rights
movements for blacks and women, can be law-creating? Some current
law-related education materials deal with the concept of justice but
others concentrate primarily on understanding, obeying, and using law .
Giroux and Penna (1979), who also view schools within the context of
the larger society, use a neo-Marxist approach to "illuminate how social
reproduction is linked to classroom social relationships and how the con-
struction of knowledge is related to the notion of false consciousness ."
After describing the hidden curriculum which contradicts the official
curriculum (e.g. teaching about democracy in authoritarian classrooms),
Giroux and Penna offer suggestions for change, including elimination of
tracking and introduction of peer-leaders and self-pacing .
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A rarely used language has been that of the theologian . Johns (1978),
however, uses Buber's description of the I-Thou relationship to buttress
his image of man-in-dialogue as the most appropriate image for global
minded-citizenship .
For Buber, according to Johns,
real living, is I-Thou, which means in its fullest sense, persons
responding with a total continuing commitment to each other as
persons. Only by responding in this way-by giving oneself fully to
others - one can achieve the highest degree of responsibility and
fulfillment . People find themselves by losing themselves in others .
For Buber, it is in these special I-Thou moments that one is
responding not only to companions but to the "eternal Thou," or
God. Buber's concept of the moral society would be person-
centered, a community in which I-Thou relationships predominate .
Johns goes on, after gathering support from other disciplines as well, to
paint a picture of homo dialogicus acting openly and responsibly in the
world community .
Phenomenology is a third example of a little-used affiliative language .
This author (1977) drew on phenomenology to develop a philosophy for
intercultural education, suggesting that phenomenology's emphasis on
bracketing, perspective, wide-awakeness, and personal meaning-making
made it an especially appropriate basis for learning about other people .
Another language worth borrowing might be that of ecology . The
concept of interdependence, applied not only to a textbook vision of the
world, but also to the way in which the vision is taught could reform the
factory-type school . Education might become a common adventure in
which teachers and students depend on each other to choose learning
topics within an interdisciplinary framework and also depend on each
other to run the school through a town meeting and maintain the school
through shared janitorial services (Wilson, 1978) .
Huebner identifies as a major theoretical problem : "finding, creating,
or borrowing a language which can be used to describe and explain
human events in education situations ." He suggests, for instance, that
"writers, using story, novel or hypothetical form, can describe students
and teachers in new and strange environments, in the manner of good
science fiction" (Pinar, 1975, p . 265) .
Social studies educators clearly need to be open to a variety of affilia-
tive languages as bases for theory-building, if only because richer theory
will result . The language of behavioral science is a useful and often used
basis for theorizing . The language of science fiction could be valuable,
too. Certainly languages which allow us to visit with the persons in the
classroom as opposed to "mapping" the classroom activities are rarely
used.
100
Conclusion
Finally, this author asserts that the language we use as teachers and
researchers and whether we are aware of that language choice and use
matters . There is a difference between the retired Army Colonel who
presents history as an exciting multi-media narrative and Denton's
Dissonator . There is a difference between the military or factory
metaphor for school and the garden and travel metaphors . It is more
complicated than .that simple contrast, however. For language, very often
a web of languages, composed at times of criss-crossing, even tangled
languages, is the starting point for the theory, whether that be the per-
sonal theorizing of an individual teacher or the more general theorizing
of the researcher .
What would the language web of one social studies educator, heading
toward theory-building, look like? It might draw heavily on descriptive
language first, looking at the kinds of cross-cultural experiences teachers
and students bring to social studies classrooms and the kinds of cross-
cultural experiences that can happen in classrooms . Another strand
would be explanatory language from studies of the impact of cross-
cultural experience on high school students, teachers, Peace Corps
volunteers, and others . Hanvey's descriptive language concerning a global
perspective which includes a perspective consciousness and a cross-
cultural awareness might become legitimating language . Dewey's stress on
the connection between experience and education is also relevant .
Perhaps theology, ecology, and phenomenology would represent helpful
affiliative languages .
Out of such a language web would come some theorizing about the
meaning of cross-cultural experiences for education . Out of other
language webs would come other theorizing, even on the same topic .
Perhaps Huebner's language web could be likened to a compost heap .
The leaves, the grass, the faded flowers from the vase, the carrot and
beet tops from the garden are all mixed together . They rot and ferment
and form compost which goes on the garden to fertilize the growth of
new plants . Language may be the compost out of which our theorizing
grows. What opportunities await .
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Introduction
In his essay "Moral Dilemmas and Moral Education," which appeared
in the summer issue of this volume, Daniel R . Nicholes develops a cri-
tique of an essay of mine by the same title that appeared in an earlier
issue of this journal (Pekarsky, 1980) . I want to respond to his criticisms
for two reasons . The first is that he seriously misunderstands and misrep-
resents my position ; -the second is that his rationale for a dilemma-
centered approach to moral education seems to me inadequate . I shall ex-
pand on both these points below . I would like to say at the outset that
although I am not convinced by much of what Nicholes has to say in his
critique, I found his thoughtful essay very useful in helping me to clarify
and develop my own views regarding moral education, and I am very ap-
preciative of the careful reading he gave my original essay .
I
In this section I want to respond briefly to three fairly specific points
of disagreement or misunderstanding between Nicholes and myself,
reserving for Sections II and III a discussion of some of the larger issues
that divide us .
First, a very general point . A reading of Nicholes' article might sug-
gest that I believe reflection on moral dilemmas has no place in moral
education . In fact, though, and as stated in the original essay, I believe
moral dilemmas can function as valuable educational tools . My objec-
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tions pertained not to the possible value of having students reflect on
moral dilemmas, but to the social context in which such reflection pro-
ceeds, to the character of the human problems that are used to trigger
reflection, and to the ways children are encouraged to resolve these prob-
lems .
Second, Nicholes agrees with me that the dilemmas chosen for moral
education should be "realistic ." But his statement that the Heinz dilemma
was realistic in the fifties but is no longer so today makes me doubtful
that we mean the same thing by "realistic." I am not sure of the basis for
his judgement that this dilemma was once realistic but is no longer so to-
day. For me, what is "unrealistic" or artificial about it is that, like a
story-problem in a mathematics text, is is an abstraction from everyday
life, a situation stripped of everything but its morally relevant features . I
find this "unrealistic" because, in everyday life, situations do not ordinar-
ily come packaged in this way . On the contrary, as noted in my earlier
essay, in everyday life morally relevant and other features of a situation
are found intermingled in an often-complex configuration, and it often
requires considerable skill not just to conceptualize what the morally rele-
vant features of a situation are and how they jointly give rise to a moral
problem, but even to recognize that there is a moral problem that needs
addressing . A "more realistic" dilemma, as I understand it, would be one
that gives the student a great deal more information about the motives,
attitudes, and situation of the protagonists -the kind of thing that might
be found, for example, in a novel or short story . This would provide stu-
dents with much more to work with in trying to articulate and to test
competing conceptualizations of and solutions to the problem ; and it
would thus afford them the opportunity to develop the skills needed for
this kind of analysis . Although I would endorse the alternative-generating
activity that Nicholes describes, I am doubtful that it will go far enough
in helping students develop these skills if the situation they are asked to
analyze are not "realistic" in the sense I have indicated .
Third, Nicholes seems interested in my claim that "escape-hatching"
or problem-avoidance is sometimes the most appropriate response to a
difficult situation . (Note that by this I refer not to avoiding what is prob-
lematic but to finding a solution that does not require us to choose be-
tween competing moral claims, each of which seems to some degree com-
pelling.) He suggests that about this and other matters more research is
needed. But the context in which he says this leaves me with an uneasy
feeling that he has more empirical research in mind when he makes this
point. For this reason I want to state that my claim regarding the wis-
dom of trying to solve a problem without an either/or choice between
the competing claims we acknowledge is not intended as an empirical
hypothesis but as an elucidation of rationality in the moral realm . The
gist of the suggestion is this : if both A and B are moral claims that on
reflection seem compelling, then, other things being equal, it is more ra-
tional, assuming that it is possible, to adopt a course of action that
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allows us to satisfy A and B than to adopt one that allows us to honor
only one of these claims. This suggestion is close in spirit to Rawls' dis-
cussion of the principles of rational choice (Rawls, 1971, pp. 411-413) .
Though this suggestion may be mistaken, I don't think empirical re-
search, as ordinarily understood, will show it to be so . I am indebted to
Nicholes for stimulating me to clarify my views on this matter .
II
In my original essay, I had argued that the dilemma-centered ap-
proach is inadequate because there is little reason to think that the skills
in conceptualization and reasoning that develop and are exhibited in the
classroom context will transfer to the student's analysis of his or her
everyday experience outside the school. That Nicholes finds this line of
reasoning untenable as a criticism of Kohlberg and other dilemma-
centered approaches is clear ; what is clear is why he things I am mis-
taken. For he appears to offer two, not wholly consistent, interpretations
of my error, neither of which, I will argue, is adequately defended .
Thus, at one point Nicholes seems to urge that, contrary to what I
argue, the skills in conceptualization and deliberation developed in the
classroom will, or are likely to, transfer to everyday contexts outside the
school :
It would be grossly unfair and probably incorrect to suggest that if
young people can always reason, they will always be moral. How-
ever, if they can and do reason, they are less likely to take action
precipitously. Action based on thoughtful reflection, I would sug-
gest, is less likely to take a violent course, but we have no guaran-
tee .
But this reasoning will not do . It is not just that Nicholes does not de-
fend his claim that action' based on thoughtful reflection is less likely to
take a violent course or justify his tacit equation of "moral" and "non-
violent"; more importantly, his re-assertion of the view that the reasoning
skills learned in the moral education context will transfer to other con-
texts does not even attempt to rebut the reasons I offered in my earlier
piece for believing such transfer unlikely, and I refer the reader to that
essay to judge whether those points are persuasive .
To this let me add that I have some residual doubt concerning
whether, in the passage just cited, Nicholes was really asserting some
connection, albeit an attenuated one, between the reasoning skills devel-
oped in a dilemma-centered moral education program and everyday con-
duct outside the school . And the reason for this doubt is that, with the
exception of the passage just cited, Nicholes appears to concede my point
that transfer is unlikely and offers a different kind of objection to my
argument . In particular, he seems to be suggesting that it is unfair to
criticize dilemma-centered theorists because the reasoning skills that will
107
develop in the moral education class will not transfer to everyday situa-
tions outside the school . I quote verbatim the remarks in which this view
is developed :
The point is that the dilemma story was never suggested as a tactic
by which children would become more moral . The skills which
Pekarsky suggests are not resulting in moral action outside the
classroom are designed to do something quite different, to help stu-
dents reason .
The crux of Pekarsky's criticism, then, rests on his view that the ra-
tional reasoning processes in which students engage in social studies
class have little or no transfer to the real world . This is a problem
not unique to moral education . One could as well ask whether high
school students really use the knowledge in a unit on quadratic
equations . While only a few will solve quadratic equations in the
real world, supposedly all benefit by their better understanding of
mathematical systems . Discussion of Sharon's dilemma may have
little impact on a student if he or she finds himself or herself in a
shop-lifting situation . More importantly, however, the students who
discuss Sharon's dilemma and other similar dilemmas have opportu-
nities to recognize and confront conflict or moral principles and
look at the reasoning they find satisfying in rationalizing a solution
in such conflicts .
Nicholes seems to think my criticism unfair, first, because although there
may not be transfer, this is not a problem unique to moral education but
also infects other parts of the curriculum, like math. One would think
that this observation would be the starting-point for an argument de-
signed to show that both math and moral educators should be looking
for more effective educational strategies. Instead, Nicholes uses the par-
allelism with the math curriculum to absolve moral education of any
responsibility for making transfer more likely . But if, as he seems to
acknowledge, math education is in certain critical respects unsuccessful,
then the fact that moral educators are no less successful than math edu-
cators is not a very compelling argument for present forms of moral
education .
But Nicholes also has a second reason for thinking my point regard-
ing transfer unfair, even if true, and this is that it is not the intention of
dilemma-centered moral educators to get children to be more moral ;
rather, and "more importantly" he says, students will have opportunities
to reason, to recognize and confront moral conflicts, and to discover
forms of reasoning that they find "satisfying ." Just why the achievement
of this purpose is more important than students coming to be more
moral in everyday contexts is not explained, and surely there are many
who would dissent from this judgment, including some of the people
who have been lobbying for moral education in schools . Nor is it clear
that Kohlberg, for one, would agree that his intention is not to help
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cultivate individuals who will address their everyday problems using the
,skills and principles developed in the moral education setting . Moreover,
even if Nicholes is correct and dilemma-centered moral educators are
interested exclusively in moral reasoning and disclaim any intention of
cultivating individuals whose daily conduct is guided by the kinds of
reasonings and considerations that' enter into their thinking in the class
devoted to moral education, this would not suffice to deflect my criticism
-for the simple reason that if the question of transfer does not concern
them, it should! That is, a program in moral education can be criticized
not just if it fails to accomplish its avowed objectives but also if its ob-
jectives are themselves incomplete or otherwise inadequate ; and if, as
Nicholes seems to think, dilemma-centered moral educators are not try-
ing to cultivate individuals who will actually use the skills developed in
the moral education context in everyday life, then this is seriously prob-
lematic; and it is problematic because there is a pressing social need to
cultivate human beings who are not just adept at articulating their prin-
ciples and engaging in moral reasoning of a high order in the privacy of
their classrooms and living-rooms but who will effectively use these tools
amidst the hustle and bustle of everyday life .
III
Nicholes, following Mayer and- Kohlberg, breaks down the universe
of educational ideologies into three distinct types which he describes
under the rubric of "developmentalist," "humanistic," and "cultural trans-
mission."
Nicholes identifies me with the last camp, which he describes as
follows :
It finds that leaping results from the direct instruction of informa-
tion and rules . . . . Acquisition of morality in this view consists of
learning culturally accepted rules . It is this view of education which
Pekarsky adopts when he asks that moral dilemmas teach and rein-
force skills to uncover the morally problematic . I suspect (although
he does not say) that Pekarsky would suggest, as do the social
learning theorists, that the sources of moral behavior reside in soci-
etal norms and the degree to which one observes them .
These remarks trouble me on at least two scores, the first of them be-
ing that they seriously misrepresent my views concerning the nature of
morality and the nature of education . I am at a loss to understand why
he thinks I believe that education consists of imparting information and
rules through direct instruction or that I believe that the acquisition of
morality consists of learning culturally accepted rules (whatever they are) .
Perhaps I used certain words or phrases that led him to this mistaken in-
ference, but I am not sure what they are; for the record I do not sub-
scribe to the views he ascribes me. So far. a s moral education goes, its
aim, as I understand it, is to cultivate human beings who will examine
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the problems presented to them by life, guided by intelligence and by a
sympathetic interest in and respect for the various individuals that make
up the community. And so far as education goes, my views are, with res-
ervations, close in spirit to those developed by Dewey in such books as
The Child and The Curriculum and Experience and Education ; and it is
from this perspective, rather than from that of social learning theorists,
that I would approach the problem of moral education . Needless to say,
this perspective is a far cry from that of social learning theory .
My second reason for being troubled by Nicholes' remarks is that
there are many important thinkers, including, for example, Jerome
Bruner and John Dewey, who favor some form of cultural transmission
without in any way being committed either to direct instruction, as
Nicholes understands it, or to generating conformity to existing cultural
norms. Cultural transmission as an educational ideal varies according to
the thinker's views concerning which aspects of the culture should be
transmitted and how they are to be transmitted, and it is misleading and
confusing to ignore this diversity in identifying the ideology of cultural
transmission as Nicholes does. Of course, Nicholes is free to stipulate
that "cultural transmission" is to understood in the way he suggests in his
discussion; but if so, it would be important to add that there are many
seminal educational thinkers who are interested in some form of cultural
transmission without subscribing to the beliefs he identifies with cultural
transmission . Indeed, Nicholes himself, in recommending that the young
engage in the effort to understand and examine their own moral outlook,
can aptly be described as engaging in cultural transmission, in the sense
that the ideal of self-criticism and self-knowledge is a product of our cul-
ture, and one which survives, to the extent that it does, only because
educators like Nicholes are determined to pass it on to succeeding genera-
tions .
More generally, it seems to me that education inevitably involves cul-
tural transmission, and the only real questions concern what aspects of
the culture should be transmitted and the spirit in which, and the meth-
ods by which, they are to be transmitted . In the moral domain, it is rele-
vant to inquire whether we want the young to acquire certain concrete
rules of conduct, or ways of thinking about moral questions, or particu-
lar moral ideals, or some combination of these and other features of
morality as we, as members of a particular culture, understand it ; and
once we answer these kinds of questions, it is relevant to consider what
educational approaches, developmentalist or other, will facilitate the at-
tainment of these aims. My own view is that the ideal of giving sympa-
thetic, impartial, and respectful consideration to the interests of everyone
affected by a course of action or social policy and of being guided by
such reflection in one's commerce with the world is one of the noblest
fruits of the Western tradition, and one worthy of being passed on .
Though reflection on moral dilemmas can, given appropriate circum-
stances, contribute to the development of individuals who understand
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and are committed to this ideal, it is not, I believe, sufficient, and this
poses a serious challenge to moral educators .
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TEACHING VALUES IN COLLEGE, by Richard L . Morrill. San Fran-
cisco : Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1980, 169 pp . $13.95 hardback .
Reviewed by Hugh Wease, East Carolina University
After nearly two decades of scholarly work and instructional practice,
values education has obtained visibility in the curriculum of the elemen-
tary and secondary schools . However, its place is not nearly so apparent
in the curriculum of higher education . Teaching Values in College is a
book that will, no doubt, generate scholarly debate on the legitimacy of
values education in post-secondary schooling and might even increase its
viability on the college campus .
In the early part of the slender but solid volume, the author presents
succinct sketches of such current approaches to values education as
values clarification, normative and applied ethics, values inquiry, and
moral education; but he finds these positions lacking sufficient theoreti-
cal power to unify the major educational enterprises of "knowing, feel-
ing, and doing . . ." (p. 54) . He then sets forth a view of values educa-
tion that, in his judgment, will integrate "fact and value, the normative
and the descriptive, the cognitive and the affective, form and content,
and knowledge and action" (p . 57) .
Based on a phenomenological interpretation of value theory that sup-
posedly is neither objective nor subjective, the author posits a notion of
values that focuses on the centrality of human choice . Values are defined
as " . . . standards and patterns of choice that guide persons and groups
toward satisfaction, fulfillment, and meaning" (p . 62) . Housed in actions
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and relationships of people and disclosed through these personal and
social experiences, values orient choice and shape conduct toward sat-
isfaction and fulfillment ; make demands and claims upon people ; ". . .
relate self and the world" (p . 68) ; and serve as criteria for critical self-
assessment .
In the second one-half of the book, Morrill moves beyond his defini-
tion and functions of values to advance pedagogical principles and prac-
tices of values education that are consistent with the role and responsi-
bility of higher education . Eschewing specific content samples of values
education except for an occasional illustration, he concentrates on forms
of inquiry to bring to light the normative standards that lead to meaning-
ful, authentic action . These general methods consist of values analysis,
values consciousness, and values criticism .
Value analysis in a phenomenological investigation means that a per-
son uncovers and describes the experience of value in his or her stream
of immediate experience by asking the basic question: "What is really
taking place in this concrete human situation?" This question, if probed
deeply, yields a clear consciousness of values that has the capacity to link
"vigorous knowledge with the depth of human feeling" (p. 84). Because
an analysis and awareness of values often lead to conflicts and contradic-
tions in values, a method to critique values is also an integral dimension
of values education. This form of values inquiry consists of general nor-
mative questions that are used to assess values . Implicit in ordinary expe-
rience, these "standards for standards" are : consistency, reciprocity,
coherence, comprehensiveness, adequacy, duration, authenticity, and
openness . They serve as criteria to affirm or reject values . Of course, any
change in values serves as a powerful force to alter behavior and action .
In the judgment of the reviewer, the quintessence of the book is
found in the discussion of general approaches to values education . Be-
cause value is a key integrative concept, these pedagogical methods, if ef-
fectively carried out, will, no doubt, reduce the traditional fragmentation
of knowing, feeling, and acting . While the accomplishment of this aim is
indeed laudable, one might nevertheless expect a fuller treatment of
phenomenology's method of pure description and its theory of value in a
book on teaching values in college, written from a phenomenological
perspective .
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communicate systematic research and thinking in social education . The
purpose is to foster the creation and exchange of ideas and research find-
ings that will expand knowledge about purposes, conditions, and effects of
schooling and education about society and social relations .
Conceptualizations and research from all of the social sciences, philoso-
phy, history and the arts are needed in clarifying thinking and practice in
social education . Manuscripts are welcomed on topics such as those that
follow :
Purposes of social education :
Models, theories, and related frameworks concerning the develop-
ment, diffusion, and adoption of curricular materials ;
Instructional strategies ;
The relation of the social sciences, philosophy, history and/or the arts
to social education ;
The politics, economics, sociology, social psychology, psychology, an-
thropology, philosophy, and/or the history of social education ;
Alternative social organizations and utilizations of the school for so-
cial education ;
Comparative studies of alternative models of social education ;
Models of and research on alternative schemas for student participa-
tion and social action ;
Relationship of different pre- and in-service patterns of teacher train-
ing to social education ;
Models of the utilization of objectives in social education and related
research findings;
Implications of learning theory, child development research, socializa-
tion and political socialization research for the purposes and practice
of social education ;
The relationship of different independent, explanatory variables to ed-
ucational achievements in the area of learning about society and so-
cial relations;
The social organization, climate, cohesion of schools and other school
characteristics as independent, explanatory variables predicting to
general educational achievement .
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